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Abstract 
This study aims to understand the processes and factors that explain the framing of HIV and 
AIDS policy in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. Africa remains the global epicentre of 
the HIV and AIDS epidemic with Southern Africa remaining the most affected region in the 
world. The investigation centres on the HIV and AIDS policymaking discourses and dynamics 
leading to the securitisation of the epidemic in the three countries. The central focus of the study 
covers the timeframe of the leadership of President Mogae in Botswana, President Mbeki in 
South Africa and King Mswati III in Swaziland. This period is important as it characterises the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic being elevated onto the political agenda of the respective countries. 
This dissertation relies on two strands of theoretical literature namely, public policy theory and 
securitisation theory to help explain the framing of policy decision-making that leads to the 
process of securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the three countries.  
This study is a multiple case study within the qualitative research paradigm. This research is 
based on three case studies: Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. As far as data collection is 
concerned, this study drew on primary sources of data, which consisted of documents obtained 
during the fieldwork from various stakeholders such as such as official government documents, 
as well as official documents from international and domestic HIV and AIDS organisations. 
Twenty semi-structured interviews were also conducted between 2007 and 2008 with various 
stakeholders including government officials, representatives of domestic and international HIV 
and AIDS organisations operating in the respective countries, researchers from think tanks and 
academics. In addition, eleven exploratory interviews were also conducted as part of the 
fieldwork process. Furthermore this study also relied on various secondary sources of data such 
as scholarly articles and books, official documents and legislation and newspaper articles.  
The preliminary results collected and analysed in this study suggest that Botswana, South Africa 
and Swaziland have all demonstrated a degree of formal commitment to adopting international 
guidelines to combat the epidemic. The thesis shows that while all three countries may share the 
burden of the epidemic, each presents a different political, social and cultural identity with 
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different institutional architects (both foreign and domestic) that determined the nature of the 
response policy to the epidemic. 
The study shows that each of the three case studies presents an example of differing degrees of 
securitisation attempts: i) Botswana - successful securitisation; ii) South Africa - unsuccessful 
securitisation; and iii) Swaziland - partial securitisation because different actors and audiences 
are positioned at varying points along a spectrum of securitisation. This degree of securitisation 
can be linked to the acceptance of international ideas and the prevailing global discourse 
regarding the HIV and AIDS epidemic and the openness to forming collaborative agreements 
between state and non-state actors in each of the three countries.  
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie studie poog om ’n begrip te ontwikkel van die prosesse en faktore wat verklaar hoe 
beleid rondom MIV en VIGS in Botswana, Suid-Afrika en Swaziland geraam word. Die Afrika-
vasteland is nog steeds die wêreld se MIV en VIGS-episentrum en die Suider-Afrika-streek loop 
die mees gebuk onder die epidemie. Die ontleding sentreer op die MIV en VIGS 
beleidsdiskoerse en die dinamieke wat aanleiding gee tot die beveiliging van die epidemie in die 
drie lande. Die kollig val op die tyd toe President Mogae van Botswana, President Mbeki van 
Suid-Afrika en Koning Mswati III van Swaziland aan bewind was. Hierdie periode is van belang 
omdat dit die tyd was toe MIV en VIGS op die drie lande se politieke agendas geplaas is. 
 
Die proefskrif gebruik literatuur uit twee teoretiese velde, naamlik openbare beleidsteorie en 
sekuriteitsteorie, om te verklaar hoe daar op bepaalde beleide besluit word, hoe dit geraam word, 
en die proses waarvolgens MIV en VIGS gevolglik in die drie lande beveilig word. 
 
Die studie is ’n meervuldige gevallestudie binne die kwalitatiewe navorsingsparadigma. Die 
navorsing is op drie gevallestudies gebaseer, te wete Botswana, Suid-Afrika en Swaziland. Ten 
opsigte van data-insameling, het die studie van primêre databronne gebruik gemaak bestaande uit 
bewysstukke wat van verskeie belangegroepe verkry is. Hierdie stukke beslaan amptelike 
regeringsdokumente en amptelike dokumentasie van internasionale sowel as nasionale MIV en 
VIGS-organisasies. Daar is ook met verskeie belangegroepe onderhoude gevoer. Die 
belangegroepe het bestaan uit regeringsamptenare, die verteenwoordigers van nasionale en 
internasionale MIV en VIGS-organisasies betrokke in die drie lande, akademici, en kundiges by 
navorsingsinstansies. Twintig semi-gestruktureerde onderhoude is in 2007 en 2008 gevoer. 
Boonop is daar as deel van die empiriese navorsing 11 verkenningsonderhoude gevoer. Die 
studie het ook van verskeie sekondêre databronne soos vakwetenskaplike artikels en boeke, 
amptelike dokumentasie, wetaktes en koerantartikels gebruik gemaak. 
 
Die voorlopige bevindinge dui dat Botswana, Suid-Afrika en Swaziland elkeen hulself tot ’n 
mate formeel tot internasionale riglyne verbind het om die epidemie te beveg. Die proefskrif 
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bewys dat ofskoon al drie lande swaar aan die las van die epidemie dra, daar by elkeen 
verskillende politieke, maatskaplike en kulturele identiteite, asook institusionele argitekte 
(plaaslik sowel as buitelands) bestaan wat die aard van die beleidsrespons bepaal het. 
 
Die studie dui verskillende grade van beveiliging by elkeen van die gevallestudies: i) Botswana – 
suksesvolle beveiliging; ii) Suid-Afrika – onsuksesvolle beveiliging; en iii) Swaziland – 
gedeeltelike beveiliging. Hierdie grade van beveiliging kan verklaar word aan die hand van die 
mate waartoe daar by elkeen van die lande aanvaarding was van internasionale denke en diskoers 
oor die MIV en VIGS-epidemie en of samewerking tussen staats- en nie-staatsakteurs 
bewerkstellig is. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and rationale  
This thesis will show how the securitising move of HIV and AIDS by global securitising actors 
in the early 2000s influenced domestic policies regarding HIV and AIDS in Botswana, South 
Africa and Swaziland. Although these countries are all at what Hwedie (2001) calls the epicentre 
of the epidemic, the policymaking process in the respective countries were shaped by different 
factors and consequently the epidemic was securitised to different degrees.  
At the turn of the century a significant shift in thinking towards policymaking to address the 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
epidemic occurred. Firstly, in 1996 the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS 
(UNAIDS) was launched to deal with the increasing global epidemic. This was the first time that 
the international community established a global structure of governance to deal with an 
epidemic of a single disease.  Secondly, on 10 January 2000, a milestone UN Security Council 
meeting was held to specifically discuss the security impact of HIV and AIDS in Africa.  
Soon after the Security Council passed Resolution 1308, which stated “the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security”. This was the first time in the history of 
the UN that an issue outside the realm of conventional military issues was considered as a 
potential threat to international security. This led to many governments adopting a number of 
high-profile declarations of commitment and multilateral agreements. This shift in thinking set 
the foundation for new ideas and policymaking dynamics intended to address the emerging threat 
of HIV and AIDS. These two events were the precursors for the HIV and AIDS epidemic to be 
placed on the international security agenda.  
According to McInnes (2006:315), the UN and its related agencies have been among the most 
important actors in raising HIV and AIDS awareness. Consequently, the intervention of the 
Security Council in 2000 was very influential in securitising HIV and AIDS. This was carried 
out by framing the disease as something extraordinary demanding international attention and 
action. Through this the Security Council set the agenda for the subsequent debate on HIV and 
AIDS as a security issue.  
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In response to this, governments and international institutions have attempted to address the 
epidemic not only as a public health and development issue, but also an international security 
concern (Elbe 2005:403; International Crisis Group Report 2001). As a result, this move was 
largely identified by most scholars (Girshick, 2004; Elbe, 2005; Pereira, 2006; Rushton, 2007) as 
the global securitisation of HIV and AIDS epidemic. Seemingly the global community agreed 
that securitising HIV and AIDS would be beneficial in terms of generating political action. 
The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), which is caused by the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) had killed 25 million people in the world by 2008, with 37.4 
million more affected by HIV (UNAIDS Epidemic Update, 2009:1). When examining HIV and 
AIDS trends it is important to note the distinction between prevalence and incidence. Prevalence 
indicates the number of individuals who are HIV positive at a given point in time. Incidence 
indicates the number of new infections over a given period of time. Since the introduction of 
antiretroviral treatment (ART) the levels of prevalence may have increased due to the fact that 
people living with HIV and AIDS are living longer. Therefore, the declining incidence is a better 
tool to measure a country’s success in combating the HIV and AIDS epidemic. However, 
incidence remains more difficult to estimate than prevalence. Botswana’s prevalence rate is 25 
per cent of adults, making it the second highest in the world (UNAIDS Epidemic Update, 
2009:19). In 2009 South Africa’s prevalence rate was 16.9 per cent with 5.7 million people 
infected, making it the country with the largest number of people living with HIV and AIDS in 
the world (UNAIDS Epidemic, 2009:27). Swaziland has the highest rate of HIV prevalence in the 
world with just over a quarter of adults living with the virus (UNAIDS – How Africa Turned 
AIDS around, 2013). 
Africa remains the worst affected continent with incidence levels peaking in the mid-1990s (De 
Waal, 2006:2). In 2002 Sub-Saharan Africa had 28 million or 70% of the 40 million HIV and 
AIDS sufferers in the world (Pharaoh and Schonteich 2003:2-3). From 2008 onwards many 
national HIV and AIDS epidemics were stabilising but still at extremely high levels. In 2009 the 
nine states in the world with adult prevalence rates exceeding 10 per cent were all found in 
Southern Africa – Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, 
Malawi and Mozambique (UNAIDS Epidemic, 2009).  
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Since the HIV and AIDS epidemic has been one of the most researched diseases in recent 
history, there is an abundance of literature on the disease. Much of the literature focuses on the 
socio-economic and humanitarian concerns stemming from the epidemic. For instance several 
scholars have raised questions regarding the economic impact of the disease affecting the family 
and community levels, how the epidemic is endangering millions of orphans, whether it has the 
potential to become a threat to food security, how it contributes to crime and the implications of 
the epidemic for governance and economic development (Elbe 2001; Piot 2001; Fourie and 
Schonteich 2001, Chen 2003).  
A number of academic studies and policy reports have addressed the epidemic within the more 
traditional framework of security. More often this literature seeks to explore the indirect impact 
that HIV and AIDS could have on the territorial security and integrity of the states. The issues 
covered include for example, whether high prevalence rates can constitute a threat to the national 
security of regimes friendly to the West, therefore possibly requiring external intervention 
(Vieira 2006:49). Within the bio-political framework, the securitisation of HIV and AIDS is 
significant, because it constitutes a revealing example of the gradual geographical extension and 
globalisation of the West’s bio-political strategies to the non-Western world (Elbe 2004). 
Barnett and Whiteside (2006) provide a review of the literature on epidemiology and impact. The 
authors have also written separately on the epidemic in each of the case study countries but not 
in a comparative or regional manner. There is less literature available on Swaziland in 
comparison to Botswana and South Africa regarding the epidemic. An important study on 
Swaziland was carried out by Whiteside et al. (2006) in an attempt to identify the drivers of the 
epidemic in Swaziland. This study differs from that of Whiteside et al. (2006) as their research is 
limited to primarily only this one factor. This study on the other hand examines multiple factors 
present in the country, which influenced its policymaking processes. It is hoped that the findings 
of this study will fill the gaps and help expand the literature available regarding the factors 
influencing the policymaking processes in Swaziland to deal with the HIV and AIDS epidemic. 
There have been two major contributions to the field of HIV and AIDS and public policy and 
security in Southern Africa. Fourie’s (2005) research covered public policymaking on HIV and 
AIDS in South Africa. Vieira’s (2006) research examined Southern African countries responses 
to International HIV and AIDS norms. This study differs from both the above studies as Fourie’s 
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study is limited to South Africa and does not include the discursive processes that featured in and 
shaped the policymaking leading to the differing degrees of securitisation of the epidemic. 
Vieira’s (2006) study provides a regional dimension only to a limited degree. My research adds 
two important perspectives to the existing literature: firstly, the inclusion of the agency aspect 
gives this study a unique dimension; and secondly, it expands the regional perspective with the 
range of case studies. Where this study differs from previous studies is that it not only focuses on 
factors influencing policymaking processes, but it also incorporates the element of security 
studies beyond the traditional territorial security perspective therefore, its contribution to this 
field is multi-fold.  
While conducting the literature review, I found that there was no study that explored the link 
between factors influencing HIV and AIDS policymaking and security in relation to the case 
study countries. It is useful to examine this link as it sheds light on the complex nature of the 
public policy discourse, the power dynamics between the different actors and the way that public 
policy is framed.  
This study examines the processes leading to the framing of public policy and the process of 
securitisation. It focuses on the framing of policy and the processes and factors that explain how 
HIV and AIDS policy is shaped in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. All three countries 
are geographically located in “the global epicentre of the epidemic” (Hwedie 2001:55). While all 
three countries may share the burden of the epidemic, each presents a differing political, social 
and cultural identity with different institutional architects (both foreign and domestic) that 
determine the nature of the policy response to the epidemic. This study does not evaluate the 
effectiveness and impact of the policy itself.  
This study also focuses on the securitisation of HIV and AIDS in each of the case studies. This is 
the result of the discursive processes that featured in and shaped the policymaking in each of the 
countries examined. The study examines the policymaking dynamics as related to the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic ultimately leading to varying degrees of securitisation. Little scholarly empirical 
research has been conducted dealing specifically with these aspects, including the approach of 
viewing the epidemic through a regional lens. This approach to the study intends to enhance our 
understanding of the factors and processes that lead to the framing of policy and the dynamics 
associated with this in each of the three countries. McInnes and Rushton (2010:3) claim “that 
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rather than an issue being either securitised or not, an issue (such as HIV) may be partly 
securitised, with different actors and audiences positioned at varying points along the spectrum 
of securitisation.” As a result, this thesis will demonstrate the degree to which each of the case 
study countries have been able to securitise the HIV and AIDS epidemic. It will also identify the 
actors, factors and dynamics that have a bearing in facilitating this process. 
The HIV and AIDS epidemic is an interesting case study since the issue has gradually moved 
from the category of a politicised matter to a securitisation concern. This can best be described 
using Elbe’s (2006) metaphor of the pendulum that swings from politicisation to securitisation 
depending on the perceived levels of urgency and threat. The securitisation of the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic may be useful in addressing some of the social ills and strengthening the national 
response policy to the epidemic. While securitisation may produce effective policy, this study 
explores the process and outcomes of securitisation in policy dynamics. The theory of 
securitisation is relatively new to the field of security studies. An issue is said to be securitised 
when it is “presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” thus 
“justifying the use of extraordinary measures” (Buzan et al., 1998:21).  
1.2 Problem statement and research questions  
1.2.1 Problem statement 
The central problem statement of this study is: How was public policy on the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic securitised in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland? This investigation follows three 
main lines of inquiry. It will a) study the policymaking dynamics as related to the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic in the three countries; b) investigate the roles of the principal policymaking actors, and 
domestic and international policy-influencing actors in the national response policy in each of 
the three countries, and lastly, c) study the discursive processes that featured in shaped policy-
framing in the three countries (the securitisation dynamics). 
1.2.2 Research sub-questions 
The following research sub-questions will also be used in the study in order to unpack the 
problem statement further:  
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a) What public policies were designed to combat the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the three 
cases? 
b) What are the similarities and differences in the adoption of international HIV and AIDS 
ideas in the approaches of Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland? 
c) What are the roles of principal policymaking actors as well as domestic and international 
policy-influencing actors? And what are the power dynamics between these actors? 
d) What were the discursive processes that featured and shaped policymaking (the 
securitisation dynamics)? 
e) To what degree was the HIV and AIDS epidemic securitised in the respective countries? 
1.3 Preliminary literature review  
The literature that was reviewed can be divided into two main categories, namely literature on 
HIV and AIDS, and literature on the concepts of security and securitisation approaches.  
Because of the abundance of literature related to the HIV and AIDS epidemic, Fourie (2005:9) 
divides the existing literature on the HIV and AIDS epidemic into six categories which are listed 
as follows: 
a) Explications of international/comparative experiences;  
b) Publications that provide accounts of the disease’s economic and demographic impact;  
c) Those focused on highly specialised medical information related to the disease;  
d) Writings based on the social sciences that fall broadly into the categories of Sociology, 
Psychology and Law;  
e) Those related to workplace (private) or human resource-based HIV and AIDS policies; 
and  
f) Publications on policy interventions related to the disease.    
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This study is mostly concerned with the last group of writings on this topic which deals with 
public policy concerns. However, the aim of the study is to analyse the policy process in order to 
explain observed policy outcomes, but not to evaluate policy itself. Therefore this study adds a 
further dimension, by expanding on the literature currently available.  
Although the epidemic has had striking effects on human lives and could rightly be seen as a 
humanitarian issue, scholars have recently emphasised the growing negative effects of the 
epidemic on the core pillars of states, thus receiving increased attention by policymakers as a 
potential threat to national security (Elbe, 2010:418). This led to the emergence of a body of 
scholarship advocating the significance of HIV and AIDS as a security threat. One influential 
strand, which has adopted the securitisation perspective is the so-called Copenhagen School. 
Theorists associated with the Copenhagen School include Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de 
Wilde. 
Waever claims that “security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of 
normal politics (Buzan et al, 1998:29). The advocates of the securitisation model, as expressed 
by the Copenhagen School scholars, built on the speech-act theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) 
to understand how securitising actors engage in argumentative practises to influence (socialise) 
audiences about the threatening character of the particular issue. Consequently, securitisation, as 
an analytical concept, is very useful tool in demonstrating processes whereby issues are moved 
from the realm of normal politics (politicisation) to that of emergency (securitisation). The 
securitisation framework is used in the study as the theoretical device to help trace incidence of 
securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic at the global level and subsequently in the 
domestic structures of Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland.  
According to Buzan et al (1998), the use of instruments of securitisation by political leaders is 
intended to avoid catastrophe and massive death in the moment of alleged exceptional (security) 
crisis. As will be established later in the thesis, at the global level, HIV and AIDS was securitised 
by powerful securitising actors, namely UN and its associated agencies, the US government and 
transnational HIV and AIDS NGOs. The thesis claims that the global securitisation of the 
epidemic became internationally accepted by various international declarations and agreements 
which called for states to develop long-term policies and permanent bureaucracies. Also, the 
creation of UNAIDS to specifically deal with the HIV and AIDS epidemic has crystallised the 
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epidemic as an ongoing security threat. Because of the nature and impact of the epidemic it has 
transformed this security crisis into a long-term emergency. However, McInnes and Rushton 
(2010:3) assert that the securitisation of HIV and AIDS is more nuanced than was believed in the 
early 2000s and “that the reasons why HIV was not more successfully securitised were two-fold: 
the lack of political consensus and doubts over the empirical evidence”. 
At the domestic level, the interactions between these global speakers of securitisation and their 
state audiences were important features in understanding the methods by which international 
HIV and AIDS norms were socially domesticated. The case studies will each reveal different 
internal dynamics of securitisation.  
“Structural realists treat states as if they were black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for 
the fact that some states are more or less powerful than others” (Mearsheimer 2006:72). 
However, as the case studies will prove this is not the case as states represent collective entities 
composed of different institutions, cultures and individuals. For instance, when a government 
endorses the international norm claiming for the securitisation of HIV and AIDS, it is still 
important to understand how domestic social and power-dynamics influence its securitisation 
practices. It is at this point when the analyst can decisively determine whether or not a 
securitisation move is successful. This thesis further explores the domestic determinants that 
either constrained or facilitated HIV and AIDS securitisation processes within Botswana, South 
Africa and Swaziland. It focuses on their particular political cultures, state-society relations and 
the types of political leadership.    
While there is a body of literature available on the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the individual 
Southern African countries, the process leading to the framing of public policy and the policy 
dynamics which lead to the securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Botswana, South 
Africa and Swaziland have received scant attention. These studies also lack the comparative 
dimension and perspective that this study provides. This study therefore aims to fill this gap by 
examining a wide range of variables and factors that influence policymaking. In addition, the 
study adds to the literature by including the dimension of securitisation as part of policymaking 
dynamics which is also absent from the available literature.   
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1.4 Aims of the study  
HIV and AIDS were first detected in each of the case studies in the 1980s. Initial data after the 
detection indicate that the high rate of HIV infection and incidence levels did not show much 
improvement despite the formulation and introduction of several intervention policies in each of 
the countries under review.   
When conceptualising my research project I initially intended to explore the regional framing of 
policy and processes by investigating the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
response to the epidemic. As the three countries are all situated within the SADC region and are 
equally affected by the epidemic, it was fair to assume that a regional coordinated response 
would have been more beneficial to the policymaking process. However, after a research visit to 
the SADC offices and interviews with officials involved in HIV and AIDS regional activities, it 
became clear that the organisation was at that time not in a position to coordinate the HIV and 
AIDS policies of its member states. Therefore SADC is not central to the policy decision-making 
structure in the individual countries in the field of HIV and AIDS and this study as a whole.  
The study aims to examine how the policymaking related to the HIV and AIDS epidemic was 
shaped, and investigates the policy dynamics which led to the securitisation of the epidemic in 
Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. While the aim of this study is not to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the policies themselves, it does examine the policymaking dynamics as related to 
the HIV and AIDS epidemic ultimately leading to its securitisation.  
This approach is important as it will help to explain the similarities and differences in the 
approaches used by the actors in each of the countries. This will help to unravel who the policy-
influencing actors are and how they have shaped the HIV and AIDS policymaking discourse in 
each of the countries under review. Furthermore, it will also demonstrate the extent to which the 
HIV and AIDS policy has been elevated to the status of a security threat in the respective 
countries. As a result, it will be possible to determine the degree to which each country was able 
to securitise the HIV and AIDS epidemic.  
The main interest of this study is not the actual interpretation of HIV and AIDS as a security 
issue or why HIV and AIDS have been securitised. Instead, it aims to establish what explains the 
securitisation of HIV and AIDS and how this approach was spread and adopted. Also it must be 
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mentioned that this study does not engage with the ongoing debate about the actual links 
between HIV and AIDS and security, or assess the ethical implications of the securitisation of 
HIV and AIDS. As will be discussed later, several scholars and practitioners focusing on HIV 
and AIDS do so within the domain of universal humanitarianism or that of self-referential 
national interest. This led to some actors promoting securitisation of HIV and AIDS specifically 
because the human security/developmental approach to the epidemic produced only an 
insufficient response in the international system. While for others, the framing of HIV and AIDS 
in the language of national security can push the response in the wrong policy direction. Elbe 
(2006:121) for instance, stresses that this is because of the susceptibility for undemocratic 
decision-making in situations of national security crisis, with power concentrated in just a few 
state institutions, such as the military and intelligence services, and away from civil society 
groups. 
1.5 Theoretical framework  
Two main strands of theoretical literature are reviewed: literature on public policy decision-
making processes and literature on security concepts and the securitisation approach. This study 
presents theories on how policy decision-making is framed. Subsequently, the literature on 
securitisation illustrates how issues such as HIV and AIDS are securitised through the process of 
policy framing. The study provides a framework for understanding the securitisation of the HIV 
and AIDS epidemic in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland.   
Dye (1995:15) cautions against choosing any single theoretical approach by asserting that “we 
doubt that there is any ‘model of choice’ in policy analysis – that is, a single model or method 
that is preferable to all others and that consistently renders the best solutions to public problems.” 
Therefore, working from this premise, several theoretical approaches are examined in relation to 
the study. The study examined the following theoretical perspectives on policymaking, the 
pluralist model, the elite model and statism.   
Pluralists believe that there should be a clear separation of powers which stems from the fact that 
they deem liberal democracies to have become fractured and as a result power should therefore 
not be centred in the organs of the state. They further believe that government agencies do not 
stand alone, but are rather part of a myriad of actors who through their actions are in a position to 
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influence the political leaders of the day. Dye (1995:23) states that pluralists support the idea that 
the conduct of politics in society begins with the interaction among groups, with the latter 
consisting of “individuals with common interests”. Critics have raised the issue that pluralists 
focus more on group interaction and not enough on the actual issues (McLennan 1997:53).  
Since each of the case study countries is in the developing world, the elite theory best describes 
and helps to explain developing countries’ policymaking environment. This is based on the fact 
that in developing countries the concentration of power remains in the hands of a minority of the 
population. This situation may be applicable to each of the case studies. Elite theorists have 
expanded their definition to include - along with the government and interest groups - the 
elevated power held by identifiable groups such as the economic, military, and political and 
aristocratic elites. The main source of power for the policy elites in most developing states 
remains with those holding political offices. 
Elite theorists assert that in the public policy domain these elites are in a position to control and 
manipulate the agenda-setting process. Essentially they are able to advance their own political 
agendas while at the same time placing themselves in a position to ensure who benefits and when 
they benefit from the process. Therefore, public policies represent, “the preferences and values of 
a governing elite” (Dye 1995:25).  
Finally statism is a term used to describe the belief in public policy that a government should 
control either economic or social policy or both to some degree (Levy, 2006:469). Public policy 
as an outcome of political institutions has been a concern of political studies from its beginning 
(Dye, 1995; Anderson, 1997). Intuitionalism describes the more formal and structural aspects of 
policymaking and implementing institutions. Anderson (1997) defines an institution as a set of 
regularised patterns of human behaviour that persists over time and performs some significant 
social function or activity, whose outputs are public policy decisions. North (1991:97) expands 
this notion by drawing a distinction between institutions and organisations which is important for 
purposes of this study.  
Sharing elements with elite theory, statism takes the view that elites may be better positioned in 
state agencies to influence public policy in order to advance their own political agendas. This 
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situation allows the agency of the state to become the determinant of policy content so as to 
reinforce the state’s elite position.  
Regarding the second strand of literature related to the security paradigm, traditional and non-
traditional approaches to security are investigated focusing specifically on the issue of 
securitisation. The end of the Cold War left the field of international relations in a state of flux. 
This led to the concept of security becoming more contentious. Several scholars have theorised 
about the evolving concept of security with Haftendorn (1991:15) arguing that, “there is no 
common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualised, and what its most 
relevant research questions are”.  
This led to a call for a wider, more constructivist approach to security analysis. Scholars argued 
that the traditional concept of security was too narrow to be applicable to ‘new non-military 
threats’ posed by economic and environmental issues. They claimed that the increased 
importance of issues such as the environment and economics and the resulting inability of a 
militarily-focused framework for security studies to adequately deal with these matters has 
heightened the need for a more inclusive conception of security (Buzan, 1991:4). From the early 
1980s the neorealist conceptualisation of inter-state security relations was challenged by an 
increasing number of writers who advocated for an alternative understanding of security (Buzan, 
1983/1991; Ulman, 1983; Jahn, Lemaitre and Weaver, 1987; Tinkner, 1992; Buzan et al., 1998).  
The end of the Cold War saw the introduction of this new security agenda by scholars seeking to 
shift the referent object of security from the state to the individual. The United Nations was 
influential in these developments of the emerging human security perspective. This new 
perspective focused on a broad understanding of security that includes not just the security of 
states against external or internal armed threats, but also gives priority to the security of people 
living within states against non-military threats such as disease, environmental degradation, 
economic and social instability.  
HIV and AIDS fall into this latter categorisation of security, leading to the adoption of this broad 
perspective by a wide range of governments, multilateral agencies and academics (Vieira, 
2006:48). They raised questions regarding the economic impact of the disease affecting the 
family and community levels, how the epidemic is endangering millions of orphans, whether it 
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has the potential to become a threat to food security, how it contributes to crime and the 
implications of the epidemic to governance and economic development (Elbe, 2001; Piot, 2001; 
Fourie and Schonteich, 2001; Chen 2003).  
The emergence of the so-called Copenhagen School brought a new impetus to the securitisation 
approach. Williams (2008:68) believes that the Copenhagen School presents the most concerted 
attempt to develop a theory or framework for the study of security in the constructivist tradition. 
Collaborative work culminated in the seminal 1998 publication, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis, co-authored by Buzan, Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. They posit that security is not a 
static concept, as understood by traditional security studies, but rather an inter-subjective 
rhetorical practice.    
The Copenhagen School sought both to widen and broaden traditional security concepts. They 
placed two important steps in front of any such effort namely there must be an “existential threat 
requiring emergency action” to be identified, and a significant part of the audience must accept 
that description (Buzan et al., 1998:27). The type of threat may not be as self-evident as a natural 
disaster or an invading army, but is more likely, that a political actor will have to build a 
persuasive case for securitising the threat. While securitisation draws attention to a range of 
issues it remains “largely based on power and capability and therewith the means to socially and 
politically construct a threat” (Taureck, 2006:55). Although securitisation allows for greater 
openness, it acknowledges that the advantage remains with those who begin with more power 
and more access to certain elements such as the media. 
The study will follow McInnes and Rushton (2010), who assert that it is not fruitful to speak of 
an issue being securitised as a simple binary equation. The empirical findings in this study will 
show that the outcomes of the policymaking processes for HIV and AIDS will reveal differing 
degrees of securitisation in the different countries. 
Securitisation may prove particularly advantageous at drawing attention and prompting 
responses from national, regional and international actors. In the context of the present 
theoretical framework, Elbe (2006:132) argues that the linking of HIV and AIDS with security 
would activate “a shift out of the non-politicised status in many countries,” thereby allowing “a 
proper politicisation of the issue” as a result increased funding can be allocated to address the 
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concern. For example, when governments securitise HIV and AIDS, health sectors may benefit 
through better allocation of resources to address the concern.   
At an economic level, a major obstacle preventing many African countries from obtaining 
sufficient HIV medicines constitutes the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). 
These agreements entitle Western pharmaceutical companies to hold the patents on drugs, thus 
giving them exclusivity on the manufacturing and the pricing. Generally these drugs were 
unaffordable for many African states. Therefore, by linking HIV and AIDS to the security nexus 
it enables the TRIPS agreements to be overruled on the grounds of “security exceptions” set up 
by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This agreement compels pharmaceutical companies to 
lower their prices (Elbe, 2006:134). Therefore, it is advantageous to many developing world 
countries unable to afford the expensive patented AIDS drugs to securitise the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic in order to fully benefit from the above agreement.  
While the above stressed the potential benefits of securitising the epidemic, Mc Innes and 
Rushton (2010) identify three specific areas of tension associated with the securitisation of HIV 
and AIDS: 
• Regarding ethics and the extent to which the rights of the individual should be maintained 
over the rights and interest of society.  
• Securitising HIV may help to secure greater attention and resources, however in doing so 
it should not change the priorities for resource allocation away from those in need and 
towards political benefits. 
• Securitisation of HIV and AIDS might run the risk of creating a new form of stigma 
directed at those living with the disease who are not only health risks but also security 
risks. 
Therefore, it is important that governments put measures in place to safeguard their populations 
from the dangers associated with the securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic.  
Securitisation and the public policymaking process are closely linked through the use of 
appropriate language to frame the issue or threat. Central to this study is speech-act theory which 
is an essential component of the securitisation approach as defined by Buzan. This approach rests 
on the assumption that “by saying words something is done”; meaning that language does not 
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only convey information, but also has a constitutive role (Buzan et al, 1998:26; Elbe, 2006:124). 
In other words, security threats do not exist independently, but rather are socially constructed 
through language (Buzan et al, 1998:31). Therefore, policy-makers use speech-act as a social 
activity involving shared understandings, with the objective to frame specific issue as threat to 
security (Elbe, 2006:124). 
This study takes into account the valid limitation raised by Mc Innes and Rushton (2010:5) when 
questioning that when issues are created as security issues through speech-act it raises a problem, 
“who are the actors who, through their speech-acts, can create security issues?” Buzan et al 
(1998:31) also raised the issue that there is a bias towards certain actors who are “generally 
accepted voices of security”. Therefore in order to address this issue the study will adopt the 
following as the analytical tool to examine the securitisation attempts in each of the case study 
countries. For a speech-act to be successful three facilitating conditions are required in the 
process of securitisation: 
• It must follow the recognised grammar of security; 
• It must come from an actor in position of authority to pronounce on security;  
• The object should generally be said to be threatening. 
Buzan et al (1998:25) claim that the “definition and criteria for securitisation is constituted by 
the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects”. As a result, McInness and Rushton (2010:6) emphasise their point 
that when defining health issues as security issues, “they do not need to meet external criteria but 
rather be agreed upon intersubjectively as constituting an existential threat which cannot be dealt 
with in a normal way, and which has a political impact”. 
1.6 Significance of study 
When conceptualising the focus of my study, it was evident that there is an abundance of 
literature dedicated to the HIV and AIDS epidemic. To try and provide a balanced view of the 
epidemic a wide range of factors were examined. As a result, the study presents factors in each 
of the case studies that are both very similar and entirely unique. Each of the factors presented 
has played a role in influencing the policymaking processes and dynamics in each of the three 
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countries. This was achieved through the process of disaggregation by analysing all the relevant 
different actors and factors at play in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. Also, as my 
research adds some agency to the body of literature on the policy-framing process surrounding 
HIV and AIDS, as I am part of the policymaking process as a government official dealing with 
security threats to the Southern African region. This study therefore makes a contribution to the 
existing knowledge, because of the author’s ‘real world’ study of securitisation. Since the study 
of securitisation tends to be highly theoretical, this study adds a unique empirical dimension to 
the existing literature. This is done by demonstrating the degree to which the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic was securitised at the national level of all three case study countries.  
McInnes (2010:14) raises an important insight regarding the limitations of available empirical 
research related to the securitisation processes in different countries which this thesis attempts to 
address. The US government has been identified as a key securitising actor. According to 
McInnes (2010:14) in the US “key security institutions […] recognise AIDS as being within their 
remit, and are taking steps to address it”. However, McInnes (2010:14) argues that “there has 
been little work which has demonstrated a comparable impact on the policies adopted by other 
countries, nor do the security policy institutions in other countries appear to have seized on the 
issue to the same extent”. This thesis aims to expand and contribute to address this limitation in 
the literature by demonstrating the securitisation processes, policies adopted and influence of 
security policy institutions in each of the countries under review.  
One intention of this study is to steer away from viewing Southern Africa as a monolithic region. 
It is necessary that each case study is examined on its own merits in order to demonstrate the 
uniqueness of this study. This approach makes the research significant as it provides the reader 
with a wide range of comparative factors and dynamics, which present certain similarities and 
dissimilarities, an important aspect, which is not covered by the existing literature. The 
significance of this study compared to related studies is that it focuses on factors, implicit in 
policymaking processes and the policy dynamics that resulted in the level of securitisation of the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. HIV and AIDS entered the 
political agenda as mainly a health concern. Looking at the link between policy-framing and 
security it is interesting to examine how this non-traditional security threat has been elevated to 
find a place on the security agenda. 
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1.7 Methodology  
This study is a multiple case study within the qualitative research paradigm. The investigation 
centres on the HIV and AIDS policymaking dynamics leading to the securitisation of the HIV 
and AIDS epidemic in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. I chose to examine the 
securitisation of HIV and AIDS because it was the first non-traditional (health) security threat to 
enter the global security agenda.  
When selecting the case studies I looked at the Southern African region as this was the epicentre 
of the epidemic. The countries here have similarities in the ways they were affected by the HIV 
and AIDS epidemic. The three countries were chosen for three main reasons. Firstly, they all 
have an extremely high HIV and AIDS prevalence rate, exceeding 20 per cent. This has caused 
them to be subjected to considerable pressure to formulate and implement policies to securitise 
their HIV and AIDS policies. Secondly, despite being neighbouring countries, each of the three 
countries represents distinct domestic and political structures, which has resulted in three 
different models of state reaction responses to the epidemic. And thirdly, they were chosen for 
their geographical accessibility for the researcher. The fieldwork for the study was conducted in 
2007 and 2008. 
The main primary data sources for the study were semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from the policymaking actors and policy-influencing actors in the three countries. 
All the interviews were recorded except for one interviewee who declined to be recorded on tape. 
Other primary data sources were statistical data, government publications, administrative records 
as well as secondary sources such as media reports and academic publications on related topics.   
1.8 Limitations and delimitations 
The central focus of the study covers the timeframe from 2000 when HIV and AIDS first entered 
the security agenda to 2008 when the last of the fieldwork was undertaken. This was during the 
periods of the leadership of President Mogae in Botswana, President Mbeki in South Africa and 
King Mswati III in Swaziland. This period is important as it was the time when the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic was placed on the political agendas of the respective countries and the epidemic 
spread at an alarming rate in all of the case study countries.  
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The findings presented in this study are unique, given that this dissertation draws on the results 
from empirical research conducted in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. Nevertheless, two 
important factors were taken into consideration for the completion of the study; firstly, the 
fieldwork research conducted in the three countries did not cover the whole of the respective 
country. Secondly, because of time and financial constraints the researcher was unable to 
undertake additional rounds of fieldtrips to the three countries. During this period I was based in 
Norway and therefore could only carry out fieldwork study visits at certain times to ensure 
maximum interviewee participation.  
While it was the intention of the study to conduct as wide a range of interviews with as many 
relevant actors as possible, unforeseen circumstances such as timetable schedule clashes or 
unavailability of interviewees while I was in the region meant that this limited the study to some 
degree.  
While there are more recent statistical HIV and AIDS data available, these statistics do not show 
any major results that refute the findings of the study. This study has relied on statistics primarily 
from the UN and associated agencies, although there has been some controversy surrounding the 
accuracy of some statistics.  There was a lack of other sources of comprehensive and comparable 
statistical data covering the countries under review.  
1.9  Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters, which includes the present introductory chapter.  
Chapter 2 provides an analytical framework for guiding the subsequent empirical chapters. The 
chapter discusses the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of the public policymaking process. 
It then also looks at the origins and evolution of the academic and policy debates linking HIV 
and AIDS and security by focusing on the securitisation approach.  
Chapter 3 further discusses the scope and limitations of the study, as well as the research 
methods that have been applied. 
Chapter 4 traces the political journey of HIV and AIDS, as it moved from the biomedical sphere 
to that of an international security threat. It also briefly examines HIV and AIDS and Global 
Health Governance by highlighting the process that lead the international community to accept 
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the disease as a security threat. The chapter further traces the origins of HIV and AIDS and 
security. Finally, the chapter concludes with an examination of the three influential global 
securitisation actors namely, UNAIDS, the US government and the role of civil society actors, 
which have been instrumental in furthering the global securitisation approach. 
The empirical section is presented in chapters 5 (Botswana), 6 (South Africa) and 7 (Swaziland). 
These chapters focus on the countries’ social and political cultures, the particular characteristics 
of their state-society relations as well as sources of political leadership. They also provide the 
analysis based on theoretical considerations. 
In the case of Botswana, chapter 5 illustrates that there was a significant degree of unanimity 
between international and national actors which helped to define the HIV and AIDS policy 
process in the country. It is argued that Botswana’s approach of being open to Western ideas and 
values was reflected in its national response policy. Furthermore, the stable political system and 
the government’s continued commitment to the social and economic uplifting of its citizens 
contributed to a national response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic in accordance with that of the 
international agenda of the securitising actors.   
Chapter 6 on the South African case argues that under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, the South 
African government adopted a political agenda, which opposed perceived Western influence. 
This approach caused tensions between the government and both domestic and international HIV 
and AIDS actors. The chapter also demonstrates that, unlike in Botswana and Swaziland, in 
South Africa a vibrant and proactive civil society sector actively confronted the government’s 
stand and policies on HIV and AIDS.  In addition, the influence of domestic activism is explored 
as key links were formed with international organisations and major donor states to exert 
pressure on the government to change its HIV and AIDS policies.  
The Swaziland case study (chapter 7) examines how, under the absolute rule of King Mswati III, 
the international and domestic actors were able to create a political space to influence and 
strengthen the country’s HIV and AIDS national response policy. The case study demonstrates 
that HIV and AIDS programmes and policies should be formulated in a more country-specific 
way, since cultural practices are different in each of the case studies. In the case of Swaziland, it 
was argued that once both the international and domestic HIV and AIDS actors reached this 
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realisation, they were able to work in partnership with the state. This placed them in a position to 
influence the policymaking processes to a certain degree, which was not possible before that.  
Chapter 8 starts off by revisiting the aims of this study as well as the main research questions. 
The chapter sums up the most important theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis with 
reference to the three case studies, Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. It also highlights 
areas of continued academic interest in this field.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to lay the conceptual and theoretical bases for analysing the processes 
related to the formulation, adoption or non-implementation of HIV and AIDS policy in 
Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. Two strands of theoretical literature are reviewed, 
namely literature on public policy decision-making processes and literature on the securitisation 
process. This chapter presents theories on how policy decision-making is framed. It will then 
consider the literature on securitisation this illustrates how issues such as HIV and AIDS are 
securitised through the process of policy framing. The study provides a framework for 
understanding the securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Botswana, South Africa and 
Swaziland.   
Although the epidemic has had striking effects on human lives and could rightly be seen as a 
humanitarian issue, scholars have recently emphasised the growing negative effects of the 
epidemic on the core pillars of states. The epidemic has consequently received increased 
attention from policy-makers as a potential threat to national security (Elbe, 2010:418). This has 
led to the emergence of a body of scholarship advocating the significance of HIV and AIDS as a 
security threat. One influential strand that has adopted the securitisation perspective is the 
Copenhagen School theorists associated with the Copenhagen School include Barry Buzan, Ole 
Waever and Jaap de Wilde. 
The chapter seeks to establish the link between the framing of public policy analysis and 
securitisation approaches, which leads to the varying degrees of securitisation of the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic. It explores the extent to which the epidemic is considered a threat, which is in 
turn dependent on how the disease is framed. The framing of the disease is important as it has an 
impact on public policy decision-making and the securitisation processes. Speech-act theory is 
useful in the framing process as it demonstrates how HIV and AIDS can be constructed by 
securitising actors as a threat through the use of specific language. This is important as it allows 
the epidemic to shift from being regarded solely as a health issue to being understood as a 
security issue, which then necessitates the formulation of relevant policies to address the 
epidemic.  
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The securitisation framework offers, with some degree of precision, the analytical parameters to 
understand the historical processes that led to the current global securitisation of HIV and AIDS. 
Through the application of the four constitutive elements of the securitisation speech-act, it is 
argued that HIV and AIDS has been successfully constructed as a security threat by international 
securitising actors. While in each of the case study countries, the degree of securitisation 
attempts differed because of several factors, which will be analysed in more detail in chapters 5-
7. 
The chapter has three parts. The first part presents the socio-economic characteristics of the 
developing world, examining certain shared features that can be found in each of the three 
countries in this study, which are also all found in the developing world.  Keeping these features 
in mind when analysing the case studies may help identify the certain similarities or differences 
between Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland in terms of how each country deals with the 
epidemic. Furthermore, these characteristics may help to explain some of the factors that 
influence policy decision-making on HIV and AIDS in the three countries as they share many 
features and are located in the “the global epicentre of the epidemic” (Hwedie, 2001:55). 
The second part examines the decision-making process through which policy is framed. The 
section also reviews theories on public policymaking processes drawing from amongst others the 
elite theory and institutional model of policymaking.  The third part reviews the literature on the 
securitisation processes. The section explores the new security paradigm focusing on traditional 
and non-traditional approaches to security, in particular the securitisation approaches presented 
by the Copenhagen School. There is also an examination of the limitations and critiques of the 
securitisation process.  
According to Buzan et al (1998:23):  
‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and 
frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. […] In theory, 
any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticised (meaning the 
state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate 
and decision) through politicised (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring 
government decision and resource allocations) to securitised (meaning the issue is 
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presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions 
outside the normal bounds of political procedure). 
The HIV and AIDS epidemic has moved along this spectrum from non-politicised to politicised 
and finally securitised. As will be demonstrated, through the use of public policy processes and 
framing of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, its movement along the spectrum determines the degree 
of the securitisation of HIV and AIDS experienced in each of the case study countries. The 
politicised stage brought the HIV and AIDS issue on to the political stage. Without this stage, its 
movement along the political spectrum might have been limited. This shows that there is a link 
between the framing of public policy analysis and securitisation approaches as each can be found 
on the same spectrum but at different points. Depending on the movement of a particular issue 
along the spectrum, public policy processes may lead a particular issue to the securitisation stage.  
2.2 Socio-economic characteristics of the developing world: cultural, economic and 
political  
Cloete (2000:83) describes the following characteristics of most developing states: 
Lesser developed states normally have much larger numbers of illiterate, poorly educated 
people and on the average a much younger and less mature population. The role of the 
extended family is crucial in community life, while in many cases women still occupy 
subordinate roles in society and ethnic tolerance is sometimes superficial. They 
frequently have only primitive means of transport available to them and are therefore not 
really mobile. Their populations have relatively short life expectancies compared with the 
inhabitants of more developed countries, with incidences of infant mortality and poor 
health services that struggle to cope with ballooning populations. Large numbers of 
people still live in primitive conditions in rural areas, where they eke out an existence, 
barely surviving from day-to-day. They have only rudimentary services and facilities, 
with large regions of the country frequently being inaccessible owing to a serious lack of 
transport and other communication routes. The governments concerned cannot provide 
for even the most basic needs of their citizens.  
The large rural-based populations in developing states tend to live more widely distributed and 
consequently geographically further away from the public institutions that make important policy 
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decisions impacting on their lives. As a result, many rural-based populations do not have easy 
access to adequate information that will help them understand what their government is doing. It 
also leaves them with little influence on the policy decision-making processes itself. 
Furthermore, they also have limited, if any, access to important decision-makers. This creates a 
situation that isolates these sectors of the population (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Grindle and 
Thomas (1991:51) elaborate further by stating that:  
The age distribution of the population is significantly different in developing countries 
than in industrialised countries, and this tends to reinforce the aloofness of decision 
makers from their societies [...] significantly larger proportions of population in low-
income and middle-income countries are fourteen years of age or less. This means that 
the politically aware and active percentage of the population is also lower in developing 
countries than in industrialised ones. A large rural population, limited communications, 
low levels of literacy, and limited adult population tend to mean that a much larger 
percentage of the population is out of touch with what is happening, especially when 
government is strongly centralised. This inevitably enhances the role of policy makers 
while tending to isolate them from critical information about what is occurring in their 
societies.  
The most frequently used economic indicators for measuring socio-economic development are 
the gross national product (GNP) per capita and the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. 
Although there may be limitations regarding per capita GNP in terms of income distribution, it 
helps to illustrate the disparities in distribution of wealth between richer and poorer countries. 
The HIV and AIDS epidemic negatively impacts on both GDP and GNP of affected countries. 
Many developing countries’ economies experience this negative impact. The World Bank 
(2003:233-235) divides countries of the world into low-income (US$745 or less per capita), 
lower-middle-income (US$746-2975 per capita), upper-middle-income (US$2976-9205) and 
high-income economies (US$9206 or higher). It includes low-income, lower-middle-income and 
upper-middle-income countries into the category of developing economies. All three case study 
countries fall into this category.  
Because of their economic shortcomings, many countries in the developing world find 
themselves trapped in a cycle of international debt. This debt is usually high, which in turn, does 
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not only reduces the decision-making autonomy of the developing countries’ governments, but 
also makes them more vulnerable to policy prescriptions from international aid agencies (Cloete, 
2000). This assumption will be further examined in the case of Botswana, South Africa and 
Swaziland’s HIV and AIDS response policies later in the study. 
2.3 Public policy process  
When examining the public policy decision-making process, it is useful to start looking at the 
way different scholars have defined it. According to Theo Jans (2007:3) public policy is 
primarily concerned with the following questions: 
i) How are problems and issues defined and constructed? 
ii) How are the problems placed on a political or policy agenda? 
iii) How do policy options emerge? 
iv) How and why do governments act or do not act? 
v) What are the effects of government policy?  
According to Dye (1995), public policy represents what governments choose to do or not to do. 
However, this definition is rather too generalised and fails to provide the means to adequately 
conceptualise public policy. It is flawed as it includes every aspect of a government’s activities 
and as a result provides very few means of separating the trivial activities from the significant 
aspects of a government’s activities (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995).  Dye’s definition does stress 
that the agent of public policymaking remains the government. There are currently several 
definitions of public policy. Fourie (2005) warns about falling into the trap of choosing a single 
overly defined conceptualisation of public policy instead he has provided a list of the many 
definitions of public policy.1 Anderson (2000:4) defines policy as “a relatively stable, purposive 
course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or issue of 
concern”, adding that public policies “are those developed by governmental bodies and 
officials”. 
It is necessary to contextualise policies within the greater scheme of things with continual 
outcomes as opposed to individual outputs. Therefore, a policy is the result of a political process 
                                                
1 For the complete list see Fourie (2005:15). 
2 The contemporary international relations paradigm is based on the European state-system, a system that can be 
traced back to the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
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that may involve the following steps: negotiation, bargaining, persuasion and eventually a widely 
accepted compromise. This process is vital because the policy arrived at should be broad enough 
so that it does not have to be replaced or reformulated every year “it is clear [...] that policy has a 
cyclical nature and arises from a process over time” (Van der Waldt, 2001:91).    
In democratic states public policies arise from public demands. These demands are directed at 
the government, which is in turn, is expected to resolve the concern or deal with an issue of 
concern in society. For the purposes of this study, this point can be best by illustrated using the 
example of the public demanding ARV treatment for all HIV-positive people. This public 
demand for ARVs was experienced in each of the case study countries and will be further 
discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
The mere formulation of a policy in itself is not enough as the implementation of the policy is an 
important factor. In other words, once the government has formulated a particular policy, an 
important step will be to implement an appropriate plan of action to carry out the policy. 
Therefore, policy is two-pronged the government’s stated intentions and actions coupled with 
their ability or inability to carry out the intended implementation plan. This is a vital aspect since 
the framing of policy and the processes and factors associated with it help to a certain degree to 
explain the effectiveness or not of a certain policy decision after implementation. According to 
Anderson (2000:7), even the failure to formulate a policy, will become policy since “inaction 
becomes a public policy when officials decline to act on a problem.” 
2.4 Public policymaking and agenda setting  
The policy process is “messy, replete with considerable randomness, but careful research can 
have an important impact - from agenda setting through to the implementation state” 
(Heinemann et al., 2002:48). Fourie (2005:23) believes that it is important to view policy 
processes as a series of stages, “since the different values and perspectives brought to bear on 
each phase of the policy process can determine the definition of the issue at that point”. This is 
because the process or series of stages should be contextualised within a policy environment, 
since they do not occur in a social vacuum.  
In its broadest sense the policy environment includes several factors such as natural resources, 
demographic variables such as population size, race and age distribution, location, political 
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culture, the regime type of the state in question, social structure, class system, other nations, 
geopolitical position and the economic system (Anderson, 2000:44). Anderson (2000:45) 
highlights the fact that a state’s political culture and the prevailing socio-economic conditions 
will have a significant impact on what are deemed to be important societal issues. As discussed 
in detail in chapters 5, 6 and 7, in each of the case study countries the state’s political culture and 
the prevailing socio-economic conditions had an impact on what were deemed important societal 
issues.   
Anderson (2000:93) asserts that the policy agenda consists of those demands that policy-makers 
choose or feel compelled, to act on at a given time, or at least give the appearance of acting on 
them. Because of the vast number of public problems that may prevail at any given time in 
society it is not possible for all of them to make it onto the public policy agenda. In order for a 
public problem to make it onto the public agenda, it needs to be elevated and made into an issue 
that the government will respond to. Cobb and Elder (1983:85) make a helpful distinction 
between the systemic public agenda, which refers to issues on which there is general political 
consensus as to what merits public attention, and the institutional, which refers to issues on 
which the government and its institutions feel compelled to act upon.   
Agenda building is made possible by the conscientisation of large sections of the population 
rallying together over a specific issue; such a process could place a fairly isolated issue onto the 
public agenda (Parsons, 1997:128-129). Fourie (2005:27) argues that this can be achieved in a 
threefold process: firstly, the problem must be defined ambiguously in an attempt to encompass 
as many individuals and interest groups at the same time; secondly, by impressing on the 
audience/public the dire long term effects of inaction on an issue; and thirdly, by ensuring the 
definition remains non-technical and fairly easy for the general public to be able to identify with 
and understand. 
Several influential actors such as the media, interest groups, the government organs and the Head 
of State (expressing/passing on his or her own beliefs) all play important roles in establishing 
both systemic and institutional agenda items. These actors are influential, as they have the ability 
to elevate the status of a particular issue into the public sphere by either their actions in 
addressing the issue or even by their inaction. However, certain individuals or groups in society 
may seek to ensure that certain issues do not attain agenda-setting status. Anderson (2000:101) 
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highlights this by mentioning that the denial of an issue or certain causal links may in fact be 
used to give effect to this intention.  
2.5 Public policy theoretical frameworks and literature review 
Dye (1995:15) cautions against choosing a single theoretical approach by asserting that “we 
doubt that there is any ‘model of choice’ in policy analysis – that is, a single model or method 
that is preferable to all others and that consistently renders the best solutions to public problems”. 
Therefore, working from this premise, several theoretical approaches will be examined to 
identify their most significant aspect of public policymaking and the problems facing it in 
relation to the study.  
2.5.1 Pluralist model  
An important theoretical perspective on public policy making is that of the pluralists of whom 
Robert Dahl is an influential proponent.  Pluralists believe that there should be a clear separation 
of powers in the state, which stems from the fact that they deem liberal democracies to have 
become fractured and as a result power should therefore not be centred in the organs of the state. 
Pluralists are of the opinion that the government agencies do not stand alone, but rather are part 
of a myriad of actors are in a position through their action to influence the political leaders of the 
day. Dye (1995:23) states that pluralists support the idea that the conduct of politics in society 
begins with the interaction among groups, with the latter consisting of “individuals with common 
interests”.  
In linking it to public policymaking, theorists view society and its power relations as a 
complicated arrangement. “There is no single group, individual or agency that controls all the 
power resources in society (pecuniary, knowledge-based, status, and so on) – power has, in the 
modern state, become diffuse and unequally spread out across the plain of politics” (Fourie, 
2005:38). 
As stated earlier, pluralists believe that the government does not have the monopoly on power, as 
it is merely one of many actors/interest groups that are influential in making policy demands. 
While these actors/interest groups may be influential, they are not self-contained units. Fourie 
(2005:38-39) considers them to be composed of individual, cross-cutting memberships. He 
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explains that when polices are made or demands made to identify policy problems, these groups 
will find themselves either contracting or expanding their memberships as they mobilise around 
issues of common concern (Fourie, 2005:38-39). Essentially, these grouping will be able to exert 
pressure and raise issues that will be placed in the public domain as problems which the 
government will be expected to respond to by formulating and implementing public policies to 
address the problem.  Dye (1995:24) describes this process by saying that “public policy at any 
given time is the equilibrium reached in the group struggle”. 
Critics of the pluralist approach have highlighted the fact that it tends to focus more on the group 
interaction and not enough on the actual issues and why such issues are different across sectors 
and countries, since the pluralists remain silent on how interests interact in order to produce 
policies (McLennan, 1997:53). Furthermore, the critics claim that pluralists analyses of the 
policy making process are prone to using tautological arguments: “if the approach explains 
everything in terms of group processes, the account leaves little to be explained because it makes 
no distinction between cause and effect” (John, 2000:76). Fourie (2005:39) contends that this 
“approach seems to be facile on the level of content explanation, and so bent on demonstrating 
the interplay between the groups that it underplays the importance of the state and its 
institutions”. 
2.5.2 Elite model  
A useful approach that is a variant of classical pluralism is the elite theory. The elite theory best 
describes and helps to explain developing countries’ policymaking environment. This is based on 
the fact that the concentration of power remains in the hands of a minority of the population. 
Ham and Hill (1993: 31) argue that, 
In all societies - from societies that are very meagrely developed and have barely attained 
the drawings of civilisation, down to the most advanced and powerful societies - two 
classes of people appear a class that rules and a class that is being ruled. The first class, 
always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises power and enjoys 
the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is 
directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more 
or less arbitrary and violent. 
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In a modern state the definition of the elite has expanded to increasingly include persons other 
than those who hold formal political power. These theorists believe that political demands within 
a society emanate from plural sources in the form of interest or pressure groups that the state 
might assume greater power than other groups. Elite theorists expand their definition to include 
along with the government and interest groups, the elevated power held by identifiable groups 
such as the economic, military, political and aristocratic elites. 
The identifiable groups listed above can simply be defined as follows: the economic elite are 
those groups in society that controls the means of production; the military elite refers to those 
groups in charge of the security apparatus; the aristocratic elite refers to those groups and who 
have attained political clout because of their prominent family political connections; finally, 
there is the political elite, who gain their status from being connected to the business, military 
and economic sectors as well as to those who hold public office (Mills, 1956).  The main source 
of power for the political elites in most developing states remains with those holding political 
offices. The creation and proliferation of bureaucratic positions in governmental institutions has 
resulted in bureaucratic positions and technical expertise strengthening the power positions of 
political elites in developing countries.  
Elite theorists assert that in the public policy domain these elites are in a position to control and 
manipulate the agenda-setting process. Essentially they are able to advance their own political 
agendas, while at the same time placing themselves in a position to ensure who benefits and 
when they benefit from the process. It is important to point out that elite theory holds that the 
populace is essentially apathetic and as a result it is in fact the elite who influence the majority of 
the population in agreeing to agenda setting and policy formulation (Fourie, 2005:43). With the 
influence that the political elite have, they are positioned to determine how public policy is 
drawn up, what it will contain and also who will benefit from the policy once implemented. 
Therefore, following this logic, public policies represent “the preferences and values of a 
governing elite” (Dye, 1995:25). In view of this, the policy decision-making process can be 
regarded as top-down since it implies that the elites actually determine policy problems and sell 
these issues to the populace. 
Elite theory asserts that public policy decisions are formulated not on the basis of the demands 
and interests of the people as such, but rather on the basis of the interests of governing elite, 
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whose choices are approved and brought into effect by bureaucratic agencies. Dye (1995:25-27) 
notes that elite theorists perceive the masses as being passive, apathetic and ill-informed, and as 
such mass sentiments are more often manipulated by the elites, more than elite values actually 
being influenced by the needs of the masses. Policy decisions are not only made by the elites, but 
communication also flows top-down. As a result, democratic institutions, elections and political 
parties act as a means of creating symbolic value that binds the population to the prevailing 
political system. In most developing countries political institutions such as the executive, 
bureaucratic agencies and ruling parties employ strong statutes to force the masses to observe the 
rules of the game of the prevailing system (Wolde, 2005).  However, this is not true for many 
parts of the global South. The South African case study will show that there is participation in 
politics through informal channels such as protest and illegal strikes.     
Secondly, public policies reflect the demands and interests of governing elites, rather than the 
masses. Changes and innovations in public policies come about because of redefinitions of their 
own values by the elites (Dye, 1995; Anderson, 1997). According to Anderson (1997), because 
of the general conservatism of elites acting to preserve the system, changes in public policies are 
seldom fundamental. More significantly is the fact that changes in the nature of the political 
system may occur only when events threaten the status quo. Once this occurs, the elites will be 
obliged to formulate and introduce reforms that tend to protect and maintain their fundamental 
values in the system.  
Lastly, elites also preserve consensus about the continuation of the social system as well as the 
basic rules of the game. The survival and stability of the system depend on the elite consensus in 
ensuring the preservation the fundamental values of the system. Therefore policies that echo the 
shared consensus and values of ruling elites may be given preference and the appropriate 
attention. The circumstances in many developing countries largely demonstrate that “people are 
generally ill informed about policy issues and, hence, apathetic both the political and 
bureaucratic elite fashion mass opinion rather than the masses shaping the leadership’s views” 
(Saasa, 1985:311).  
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2.5.3 Statism - the institutional model  
Statism (also known as the institutional perspective) is also a useful approach to examine in this 
context. Statism is a term used to describe the belief in public policy that a government should 
control either economic or social policy or both to some degree (Levy 2006:469). Public policy 
as an outcome of political institutions has been a concern of political studies from the beginning 
(Dye, 1995; Anderson, 1997). Public policy is authoritatively determined, legitimated and 
implemented by governmental institutions (Hanekom, 1987). Institutionalism describes the more 
formal and structural aspects of policy making and implementing institutions. Anderson (1997) 
defines an institution as a set of regularised patterns of human behaviour that persists over time 
and performs some significant social function or activity, whose outputs are public policy 
decisions. North (1991:97) expands this notion by drawing a distinction between institutions and 
organisations which is important for purposes of this study,  
Institutions are the constraints that human beings impose on human interaction. They 
consist of formal rules (constitutions, statute law, common law, regulations) and informal 
constraints (conventions, norms and self-enforced codes of conduct) and their 
enforcement characteristics [...] Organisations consist of groups of individuals bound 
together by some common objectives. Firms, trade unions cooperatives are examples of 
economic organisations; political parties, the Senate, regulatory agencies illustrate 
political organisations; religious bodies, clubs are examples of social organisations.  
Sharing elements with elite theory, statism notes that elites may be positioned in state agencies, 
where they influence public policy to advance their own political agendas. Because of the 
political rule in Swaziland, chapter 7, will discuss a variant of statism namely, 
neopatrimonialism. For purposes of this study, Thomson’s (2004:127) definition of 
neopatrimonialism will be used. Patronage consists on the centralisation of power on “an 
individual to whom all within the system owe their position”. This essentially means that it is, 
“an exchange relationship between unequals” (Boas, 2001:700). In doing so, the agency of the 
state becomes the determinant of policy content, so as to reinforce the state elite position. 
However, this is not to say “that the elites within government agencies have narrow convergent 
views on the policies they require; rather, the point is that the state becomes the main stage 
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through which policy is made – this is where politics happen” (Fourie 2005:43-44). As a result, 
the state is in a position to dominate political life in society by feeding policy demands and 
providing prescriptions to society’s problems in a top-down manner through the public 
policymaking process. 
Dye (1995) contends that the government lends public policy three distinctive characteristics. 
Firstly, the government provides legitimacy to public policies, which in turn have legal 
obligations. Secondly, unlike policies or regulations formulated by organisations, public policies 
have universal application that extends to all people in the society. Lastly, only the government 
institutions can enforce their legal mandate against citizens who violate their policies, since only 
the state has the legitimacy to sanction violators of its policies (Dye, 1995:19). 
Therefore, the government becomes the all-important actor of policy processes, since the theory 
informs us that interest or pressure groups will have to bring their issues to the attention of the 
state with the hope that it will be placed on the public policy agenda. Fourie (2005:44) raises an 
important point by noting that “by implication this demonstrates the erroneous argument of 
pluralists, who claim state institutions to be neutral adjudicators in the determination and 
implementation of public policies”. In attempt to counter this shortcoming, John (2000:53-55) 
notes how certain pressure groups will seek ways to circumvent the state by insisting on certain 
policies or policy changes. Statism’s demand that the government is all-powerful should 
therefore be qualified. Fourie (2005:44) believes that “the pluralists are correct in that the social 
context of policy making has the potential to shape and mediate formal policy arrangements”. 
Dye (1995) argues that, as is the case in most developing states, policymaking institutions give 
an unfair advantage to certain interests in the society and withhold it from other interests. This 
creates a situation whereby those elites who allocate values and resources are also the same elites 
who benefit from greater access to the government and bureaucratic power in developing 
countries. The existing structure of the government institutions can have important policy 
consequences. It has thus been argued that “both structure and policy are largely determined by 
social or economic forces and that tinkering with institutional arrangements will have little 
independent impact on public policy if underlying forces remain constant” (Dye, 1995:21). 
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With the foundation for public policy decision-making process set out, the next section of the 
chapter will examine the processes necessary for the securitisation of the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic and how it relates to policy responses and policymaking dynamics  
2.6 A new security paradigm 
The end of the Cold War left the field of international relations in a state of flux. As a result of 
this, the concept of security became more contentious and cluttered with numerous debates on its 
real meaning. Many scholars have theorised about the concept of security, with Helga 
Haftendorn (1991:15) arguing that “there is no common understanding of what security is, how it 
can be conceptualised, and what its most relevant research questions are”. Traditionally, the 
concept of ‘security’ has been interpreted in militaristic terms as the military defence of the state, 
involving “structured violence manifest in state warfare” (Maclean 1992:8). Within the 
Westphalian2 paradigm, definitions of security were invariably linked to the nation-state. 
According to Zacarias (1999), the nation-state was therefore the primary referent of security and 
“state goals and state interests [...] occupied the top of the security agenda”. However, the 
traditional concept of security has become less relevant, resulting in the formation of two 
contending schools of thought concerned with the conceptualisation of security. 
2.6.1 Traditional approach to security 
The first school of thought is rooted in the realist tradition of international relations. The realist 
understanding of the national security problem is well exemplified by the widely acknowledged 
idea of the security dilemma (Herz 1951). Buzan (1991:14) builds on this premise by arguing 
that the security needs of one state will necessarily lead to the insecurity of another as each 
interprets the behaviour of others as potentially dangerous. These scholars interpret security 
mostly as national or state security that remain true to a more traditional outlook and they 
advocate the centrality of war and the use of force as the central tools to understanding 
international security. Realists view the international system as anarchic, signifying the lack of a 
central authority restraining state behaviour. Therefore, in this unstable environment, states will 
inevitably develop military capabilities to protect themselves.   
                                                
2 The contemporary international relations paradigm is based on the European state-system, a system that can be 
traced back to the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
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Stephen Walt (1991:212), a proponent of this school, argues that “the main focus of security 
studies is easy to identify […] it is the phenomenon of war. Security studies assume that conflict 
between states is always a possibility and that the use of military force has far-reaching effects 
on states and societies. Accordingly, security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, 
use, and control of military force”. 
While Walt (1991:213) does acknowledge and recognise that there may be potentially other 
threats to states and individuals beyond the threat of war, he remains steadfast in his opinion that 
it would be counterproductive to broaden the scope of security studies to include these threats. 
He further asserts that:    
Some writers have suggested broadening the phenomena of ‘security’ to include topics 
such as poverty, AIDS, environmental hazards, drug abuse, and the like. Such proposals 
remind us that non-military issues deserve sustained attention from scholars and 
policymakers, and that military power does not guarantee well-being […] Defining the 
field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to 
devise solutions to any of these important problems. 
This traditional view of security is shared by contemporary neo-realists, scholars such as Keneth 
Waltz (1979) and John Mearsheimer (1990), who envisage the balance of power politics as the 
permanent structural feature of the international system (Baylis 2005:302). Waltz’s views have 
been very influential in the area of security studies. His neorealist theory argues that the 
structural characteristics of the international state system should mould state behaviour. He 
believes that states remain the most important analytical units in international relations. He 
asserts that the main goal of states is self-preservation, “since no one can be relied on to do it for 
them” (Waltz 1979:109). Waltz (1979:97) argues that “the units of an anarchic system are 
functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their 
greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks”. In essence, the structure of a 
particular system is defined by the distribution of the capabilities among like units instead of 
through differences in their character and functions (Waltz, 1979:98). Therefore, in Waltz’s view 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 36 
 
of security it can be achieved only through balancing the power capabilities of the most 
important units in the system (Vieira, 2006:46). 
The main concern with employing such narrow definitions of security stems from the fact that 
insecurity threats have become much more complex. More importantly, the need to shift the 
referent object of security from the state to the individual has already occurred. Furthermore, 
scholars who attempt to move beyond these confines often fall into the same trap as the 
proponents of the traditional approach and fail to fully establish a new framework for the 
broadening of the field.  
2.6.2 Non-traditional approach to security: expanding the debate  
Proponents of the non-traditional approach argue for a wider, more constructivist approach to 
security analysis. They argue that the traditional concept of security was too narrow to be 
applicable to ‘new non-military threats’ posed by economic and environmental issues. They 
argue that the increased importance of issues such as the environment and economics, and the 
resulting inability of a militarily focused framework for security studies to adequately deal with 
these matters have heightened the need for a more inclusive conception of security (Buzan 
1991:4). Since the early 1980s the neorealist conceptulisation of inter-state security relations was 
challenged by an increasing number of writers, who have advocated for an alternative 
understanding of security (Buzan, 1983/1991; Ulman, 1983; Jahn, Lemaitre and Weaver 1987; 
Tinkner, 1992; Buzan et al., 1998). They argued that the traditional concept of security was too 
narrow to be applicable to ‘new non-military threats’ posed by non-state actors, economic and 
environmental issues. For instance, Richard Ulman (1983) argued that national security can be 
undermined by events which fall outside the realms of military conflict. He defined a national 
security threat in terms of an action or series of events (such as internal rebellions, blockades and 
boycotts, decimating epidemics, catastrophic floods etc.), which have the potential to drastically 
threaten the quality of life for the citizens of a state and/or to narrows the policy options 
available to the government of a state or a non-governmental entity (Ulman, 1983:133). Barry 
Buzan (1983/1991) added to this by making clear distinctions between the economic, political, 
environmental, social and military security threats that could affect both state and non-state 
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actors alike. Buzan (1991:20) notes that while these five areas are closely linked, each sector 
exists in a complex network of linkages and not in isolation from the others.    
The end of the Cold War saw the introduction of this new security agenda by scholars seeking to 
shift the referent object of security from the state to the individual. The United Nations was 
influential in these developments. In 1992 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
produced the first of a series of important documents to address the changing international 
security order. His An Agenda for Peace outlined the rationale and methods for moving away 
from a Cold War understanding of state security towards a closer focus on the security of the 
individual. The subsequent emergence of the human security perspective is intrinsically linked 
with the principles and themes initially developed in An Agenda for Peace. This new perspective 
focused on a broad understanding of security that includes not just the security of states against 
external or internal armed threats, but also gives priority to the security of people living within 
states against non-military threats such as disease, environmental degradation, economic and 
social instability etc.  
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) took the lead in officially championing 
the human security perspective. In 1994 the UNDP launched the concept of human security 
through its Human Development Report which listed several categories placing human security 
at risk such as food insecurity, economic insecurity, personal insecurity, community insecurity 
and political insecurity. Following the lead of the UNDP, other international organisations such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank adopted the concept of human 
security in their policy frameworks. A number of countries soon followed suit and embraced the 
concept when defining their national security policies3.   
HIV and AIDS fall into this latter categorisation of security, leading to the adoption of this broad 
perspective by a wide range of governments, multilateral agencies and academics (Vieira 
2006:48). They raised questions about the economic impact of the disease affecting the family 
and community levels, about the ways the epidemic is endangering millions of orphans, about 
whether it has the potential to become a threat to food security about how it contributes to crime 
                                                
3 The human security agenda has been primarily associated with 'middle power' countries such as Canada, Australia 
and Norway. In 1999, a group of states with human security policies launched The Human Security Network. It is 
currently formed by Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland and Thailand. For more on this, see www.humansecuritynetwork.org 
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and about the implications of the epidemic for governance and economic development (Elbe, 
2001; Piot, 2001; Fourie and Schonteich 2001; Chen, 2003). A number of academic studies and 
policy reports have set out to address the epidemic within the more traditional framework of 
security. More often this literature seeks to explore the indirect impact that HIV and AIDS could 
have on the territorial security and integrity of the states. The issues covered include for 
example, whether high prevalence rates can constitute a threat to the national security of regimes 
friendly to the West, therefore possibly requiring external intervention (Vieira 2006:49). Within 
the biopolitical framework, the securitisation of HIV and AIDS is significant, because it 
constitutes a revealing example of the gradual geographical extension and globalisation of the 
West’s biopolitical strategies to the non-Western world (Elbe, 2004). Furthermore, they assess 
whether the economic and social burdens associated with HIV and AIDS could cause domestic 
or regional instability in areas already characterised by entrenched conflict, and whether new 
strands of the HI virus may be able to penetrate Western societies (Heinecken, 2000; National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) 2000; Singer, 2002; Elbe, 2003; De Waal, 2003; Prins, 2004; 
Ostergard, 2005). Other scholarly studies and policy reports explore the impact of HIV and 
AIDS on the readiness of national armed forces with high prevalence rates (Mills, 2000; 
Heinecken, 2001; Elbe, 2002) and how international peacekeeping operations can serve as an 
important vector for further spreading HIV in the emergency areas the forces are deployed 
(Bratt, 2002; Elbe, 2003; IASC, 2003).  
While the above security concerns are important, there are other security issues which should 
also be considered, such as household economies being placed under financial strain exacerbated 
by the loss a parent who was the main source of income for the family. Families also face 
financial difficulties as a result of the added strain brought on by the epidemic in the form of 
increased medical care, special dietary conditions and funerals. In addition, families affected by 
the disease also have to deal with their human rights being infringed as a result of being 
stigmatised by their communities. 
Barnett and Prins (2006) cautioned about accepting all empirical evidence and have raised 
questions concerning the reliability of the evidence presented in some of the studies linking HIV 
and AIDS to security. They found that the HIV and AIDS and security connection has been over-
interpreted and also misinterpreted in the rush to respond to a perceived threat. They point to the 
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fact that serious problems have arisen in terms of poor data collection and the pervasiveness in 
some analysis of ‘factoids’, meaning “soft opinions that have hardened into fact” (Barnett and 
Prins 2006:18). These authors’ analysis helps to shed light on the social construction of reality 
concerning the links between HIV and AIDS and security. “This means that the case of 
HIV/AIDS, the interaction between the various discursive articulations (or speech-acts) about the 
security impact of the epidemic is what really makes HIV/AIDS a security issue rather than any 
identifiable objective fact” (Vieira, 2006:51). A key finding of Barnett and Prins’s (2006) 
research is that researchers are advised to refrain from accepting the findings of only a few 
examples of good evidence and generalise them as fact.  
2.7 Securitisation approaches 
The theory of securitisation is relatively new to the field of security studies. An issue is said to be 
securitised when it is “presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” 
thus “justifying the use of extraordinary measures” (Buzan et al., 1998:21). At the end of the 
Cold War the theory of securitisation emerged and offered a tentative compromise: not a full-
scale retreat from realism but a growing recognition in parts of the interstate community that 
states are ultimately made up of individuals and households (Alker, 2005). 
An article by Richard Ullman published in International Security in 1983, was influential in 
bringing about a change in security analysis by broadening the notion of security. Ullman 
(1983:33) proceeded to classify a threat to national security as “an action or sequence of events 
that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life 
for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices 
available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, 
corporations) within the state”. 
A few years later the work of the so-called Copenhagen School came to prominence. Williams 
(2008:68) believes that the Copenhagen School constitutes the most concerted attempt to develop 
a theory or framework for the study of security in the constructivist tradition. The Copenhagen 
School was a label attached to the collective research agenda of a number of scholars at the 
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Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)4 in Denmark, centred on the work of Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver. From the early 1990s various combinations of authors developed a series 
of observations and arguments about the operation of security in Europe. This collaborative work 
culminated in the seminal 1998 publication, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, co-
authored by Buzan, Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. They posit that security is not a static concept, as 
understood by traditional security studies, but rather an inter-subjective rhetorical practice.    
The Copenhagen School sought both to widen and to broaden traditional security concepts. They 
stated two important prerequisites namely; that there must be an “existential threat requiring 
emergency action” to be identified and a significant part of the audience must accept that 
description (Buzan et al., 1998:27). The type of threat may not be as self-evident as a natural 
disaster or an invading army, but is more likely that a political actor will have to build a 
persuasive case for securitising the threat. While securitisation draws attention to a range of 
issues, it remains “largely based on power and capability and therewith the means to socially and 
politically construct a threat” (Taureck, 2006:55). Although this approach allows for greater 
openness, securitisation acknowledges that the advantage remains with those who begin with 
more power and more access to certain elements such as the media. 
Identity rather than sovereignty is the focus of existential threats to society “because it defines 
whether ‘we’ are still us” (Buzan and Waever, 1997). This means that the concept of 
securitisation incorporates both the critical theorists’ interest in expanding the scope of issues 
which reflect security (Booth, 2005) and the traditional realists’ primary emphasis on issues 
affecting the state (Smith, 2005). But this has led to the approach facing criticism from both 
camps, from the latter for straying too far from the fold (Buzan et al., 1998) and from the former 
for not straying far enough. Some critical scholars praise the Copenhagen scholars’ work for its 
originality and its systematic study of what it means to place non-military issues on the security 
agenda (Elbe, 2006). 
In order to understand which kinds of issues fall into this category, it is useful to look at the 
definitions provided by Buzan et al. (1998). Securitisation can take place in politics (“anything 
that questions recognition, legitimacy or governing authority”), society (including “the abilities 
                                                
4 In January 2003 COPRI was merged into the Danish Institute for International Studies.  
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to maintain and reproduce a language, set of behavioural customs, or a conception of ethnic 
purity”), or the environment (“baseline concerns about the relationship between the human 
species and the rest of the biosphere”) Buzan et al. (1998:22-23). It must be noted that none of 
these threats are measurable on an objective scale. Instead, they are invoked, more or less 
successfully, by political actors whose goal it is to build a shared understanding of what such 
threats look like (Buzan et al., 1998). 
Securitisation is the form of framing that highlights the existential threat of an issue and 
undermines the arguments for dealing with it as simply a matter of routine. Securitisation is a 
distinct form of framing, because while declarations are made by and on behalf of a vested 
authority, the right to wield that authority is not guaranteed and the declarations are also not 
necessarily final. For some actors it is necessary to securitise HIV and AIDS because the human 
security/developmental approach to the epidemic produced only an insufficient response to the 
international system. While for others, the framing of the HIV and AIDS in the language of 
national security can push the intended response in the wrong policy direction. Elbe states that 
this is because of the susceptibility to undemocratic decision-making in situations of national 
security crises when power is concentrated in just a few state institutions, such as the military 
and intelligence services, and away from civil society groups. (Elbe 2006:121). The language of 
securitisation is the political instrument utilised to categorise actors and situations, while also 
outlining appropriate sets of solutions. The process of securitisation can be described as follows: 
“Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the 
issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998:23). 
Understanding the way in which this is carried out is derived from speech-act theory.  
Securitisation and the public policy making process are closely linked through the use of 
appropriate language to frame the issue or threat. This part of the study aims to shed light on the 
process of securitisation itself, with a focus on language in order to ascertain how HIV and AIDS 
has been articulated as a threat to security, which in turn requires the appropriate policy 
formulation by the relevant decision-makers to address the epidemic. 
The Copenhagen School demonstrated how an issue can be securitised “meaning the issue is 
presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside 
the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998:24). Before the securitisation has 
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occurred, an issue may also be ‘nonpoliticised’, which implies that the state has not acted on it, 
or move into a ‘politicised’ phase in which “the issue is part of public policy requiring 
government decision” (Buzan et al., 1998:23). 
Central to this study is speech-act theory, which is an essential component of the securitisation 
approach as defined by Buzan. This approach rests on the premise that “by saying words 
something is done” meaning that language does not only convey information, it also has a 
constitutive role (Buzan et al, 1998:26; Elbe, 2006:124). In other words, security threats do not 
exist independently, but rather are socially constructed as such through language (Buzan et al, 
1998:31). Therefore, policy-makers use speech-act as a social activity involving shared 
understandings, with the objective to frame specific issue as a threat to security (Elbe, 2006:124). 
However, despite its relevance to the present discussion, numerous scholars have contributed to 
the growing body of literature critiquing the Copenhagen securitisation framework. McDonald 
(2008) provides an important review of the framework and he identifies and explores three 
specific aspects of the process of securitisation that he deems problematic. Firstly, he explains 
that the form of act is defined too narrowly, and asserts that the Copenhagen school fails to 
adequately investigate other methods of representation beyond the discursive speech-acts. 
Secondly, the context of securitisation is too narrow, since it emphasises the securitising move as 
the single most important point in the process. He argues that this limitation does not take 
account the construction of security over a period of time nor does it explain why certain issues 
are securitised while others are ignored. McDonald (2008:564) also adds that this only 
perpetuates the negative and reactive connotations associated with security. He also raises 
relevant issues in relation to areas that have been identified as under-theorised, including the 
speech-acts themselves, the lack of attention to context of securitisation, and finally threat 
recognition. (McDonald, 2008:568) states that “the securitisation framework […] is narrow in 
ways that are both analytically and normatively problematic, providing a partial account of the 
construction of security and potentially reifying traditional security discourses and practices in 
the process”. He argues that the Copenhagen process of securitisation is problematically linked 
to traditional realist understandings of security. Specifically, the framework maintains too much 
of an unchanging identification of security, bound by specific and strict rules that resonate with 
militaristic action (McDonald, 2008:579). The last and the most challenging critique from 
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McDonald (2008), is that the nature of securitisation is only understood by way of its recognition 
of threats to security, resulting in security being understood only in terms of dangers and threats. 
Roxanna Sjöstedt (2008) critiques the Copenhagen School framework by pointing to one of the 
essential requirements set out for successful securitisation to occur: the necessity for a 
securitising actor to call for extraordinary measures to be taken in order to achieve successful 
securitisation. Sjöstedt (2008) believes that the prescribed requirement for successful 
securitisation limits the analytical and empirical potential for securitisation, since a decision-
maker would only resort to bypassing normal political procedures in the most extreme of 
circumstances. Sjöstedt (2008:10) offers an alternative conceptualisation where the securitising 
move is “operationalised as the public framing of an issue as a national threat, accompanied be a 
strategy to act”. Sjöstedt (2008) also focuses on the interactions between norms, identities and 
securitisation. Sjöstedt (2008:12) clarifies that an observable or traceable “discursive change is 
sufficient to conclude that some form of norm internalisation has taken place”. She continues by 
arguing that a noticeable difference in the way an issue is discussed, framed and worded can 
demonstrate norm acceptance. This would imply that HIV and AIDS are regularly framed as a 
security issue or threat associated with words such as threat, fight and combat being used to 
describe the approach to addressing it. This is a vital requirement that is important for tracing the 
influence of the United Nations on and for recognition of the extent to which states have 
followed suit (Sjöstedt, 2008:24).  
The Copenhagen School has been critiqued by McSweeney (1996:83) for appearing to give an 
exaggerated importance to the ‘speaker’ and ‘audience’ that are at odds with a more 
constructivist perspective of identity. Michael Williams (2003) raises the point that the 
Copenhagen School’s method of securitisation can be found in other theories of sovereign 
authority, and that securitising moves are an attempt by the sovereign to decide the exception and 
thus remove the sector from democratic debate. To him it appears that the Copenhagen School 
represents securitisation as a threshold, particularly within a democratic society. “Either a threat 
is represented and then accepted as a security issue, or it remains contested within the realm of 
normal, deliberative politics” (quoted in Salter, 2008:324).  
Rita Floyd (2007) contends that within the Copenhagen School framework individuals can be 
both securitising actors and/or referent objects of security. Buzan et al. (1998:36) quite clearly 
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state that “in principle, securitising actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object”. 
This has led to several critics arguing that the Copenhagen School’s approach to securitisation 
operates with a state-centric reading of security that is little different from mainstream 
approaches to security such as the realist approach (Booth 2005:37). Floyd (2007:41) believes 
there is some discrepancy in Wæver’s numerous writings on the role of the state in security 
analysis and by extension, therefore, in the securitisation approach. In 1995, Wæver vehemently 
argued that “the concept of security belongs to the state” (Wæver 1995:49), while just three years 
later in their seminal book Security: A New Framework for Analysis, they argue for the 
incorporation of other referent objects of security, including the individual (Floyd, 2007:41).  
According to the securitisation approach, potentially anything can become a referent object of 
security; yet much of the Copenhagen School’s analysis still deals with the role played by the 
state in security analysis. Floyd (2003:71) points out that despite all that was stated in the earlier 
published Security: A New Framework for Analysis, the 2003 book Regions and Powers, the 
state once again takes centre stage in the Copenhagen School’s analysis. This has led to critics 
interpreting this as realist state centricism. Since securitisations are still primarily performed by 
state actors, as opposed to most other securitising actors, because tend states to have the 
capabilities to make securitisations occur. Therefore, as stated by the authors of the Copenhagen 
School, the securitisation approach is “not dogmatically state-centric in its premises, but [...] 
often somewhat state-centric in its findings” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:71). 
Vieira (2006) raises two very important limitations. Firstly, the pendulum analogy illuminates a 
fundamental concern to most of the advocates of the securitisation approach, including Buzan et 
al (1998). This relates to the tipping point in which an issue is moved from an area of normality 
to one of exceptionality. In other words, the question is “how, in practice, can the analyst draw a 
line between processes of politicisation and processes of securitisation” (Buzan et al, 1998:21). 
For example, in the military sector, emergency measures are very clearly defined such as a 
declaration of war, but in the case of health, is the international community really responding to 
the epidemic in emergency mode? Certainly, with the creation of special HIV and AIDS 
bureaucracies and policies at system, regional and state levels is indicative of the fact that the 
pendulum has moved towards the institutionalisation of the security threats. 
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However, Vieira (2006) contends that it does not imply that a large global audience was 
convinced about the urgency of the threat posed by the epidemic. For instance, when comparing 
it to other security threats such as international terrorism, the insidious nature of HIV and AIDS 
has concealed the actual magnitude and emergency of the security threat.  This feature of the 
securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic challenges previous understandings about the 
determinants of successful securitisation claims. Therefore, it is useful to understand that the 
successful securitisation of HIV and AIDS can only be measured by examining the 
internalisation of its constitutive principles in the domestic structure of states. 
According to Buzan et al (1998:41), the defining characteristic of a successful securitisation lies 
on the acceptance by an audience that something is indeed threatening and demands exceptional 
action. Vieira (2006:41) argues that “the actual understanding of the limits between politicisation 
and securitisation is dependent on a strong analytical focus on the acceptance of the audience”. 
At the global level, it has been demonstrated that the securitising of HIV and AIDS can be 
empirically proven by the widespread acceptance of the securitisation claim in multilateral 
organisations, such as the UN. With the state’s adhering to prominent international declarations 
of commitment shows that the large audience of UN member states were convinced of the 
particular security nature of HIV and AIDS.  However, this compliance of national governments 
at the international level did not filter down into the immediate internalisation of the 
securitisation approach at the domestic level. This means that in the domestic structures of states, 
the securitisation of HIV and AIDS offered varying outcomes in terms of its assimilation.  
Secondly, Vieira (2006) claims that Buzan and his supporters disregard the empirical verification 
of actual processes whereby issues, “after being successfully securitised in the realm of 
discursive practices (speech-act), become widely embedded in transnational institutions and 
states’ bureaucracies”. Buzan et al (1998) also lack conceptual tools to understand the impact of 
externally induced securitisation processes in pre-existing regional and domestic systems. 
Several scholars (Balzacq, 2005; Strietzel, 2005; Vieira, 2006) point out that the need for proper 
social contextualisation in the analysis of processes of securitisation. Buzan et al (1998), fails to 
satisfactorily expand on the interplay between the autonomous linguistic practises of 
securitisation and the structured social and power contexts in which those practices take place.  
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Rather, they centre the analysis almost solely “on the subjective practices of discourse, omitting, 
therefore, the strategic environmental factors that deeply influence them” (Vieira 2006:42). 
Finally, successful securitisation is at root a political process, but the actual politics of the 
acceptance are left very under-determined by this model. Buzan et al (1998:25) make a case that 
“the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such [...] [it must] gain 
enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimise emergency 
measures”. It is precisely the dynamics of this acceptance, this resonance, this politics of consent 
that require further unpacking. The Copenhagen School certainly open their model to 
consideration of the “external, contextual, and social roles and authorised speakers” of the 
speech act “and, not least, under what conditions (i.e. is the securitisation successful)” (Buzan et 
al., 1998:32). However, it must be noted that an omission in the securitisation model is that there 
is no mechanism to gauge accurately whether the actual securitisation process has been 
successful or not. Therefore, to address this limitation, I choose to trace the degree to which each 
of the case study countries adopted the securitisation framework into their domestic structures by 
examining the roles played by both state and non-state securitising actors in each of the countries 
under review. In order to achieve this aim the study supports Mc Inness and Rushton’s (2010:17) 
claim which suggests that “the securitisation is not a binary condition – there is a spectrum from 
failed to partial to successful securitisation process”. Therefore, this study will use the above 
premise to examine the degree to which the securitisation processes took place in Botswana, 
South Africa and Swaziland. 
2.8 The process of securitisation 
The attempt at securitisation is called a securitising move, which must be ‘accepted’ or rejected 
by the target audience. The Copenhagen School authors argue that the conditions for success are 
(1) the internal grammatical form of the act (2) the social conditions regarding the position of 
authority for the securitising actor - that is, the relationship between the speaker and the audience 
and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitising attempt, 
and (3) features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitisation (Buzan et al., 
1998:33). In line with this basic premise, successfully framing something of security entails a 
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securitising actor having to convince a significant audience that a specific issue constitutes an 
existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998:32). This is done through the action of a speech-act.  
2.8.1 Framing as a speech-act 
It is necessary that two characteristics are present when an issue/concern is to be securitised 
firstly, the issue must be seen as an existential threat – one that endangers the very physical or 
cultural continuity of the state, and secondly, this threat must be the kind for which 
extraordinary, if not extra-legal measures may be invoked. 
Securitisation differs from other framing models because it suggests that this transformation 
comes about through a speech-act. Through his speech-act theory, Austin (1962) recognised the 
transformative importance of language in social relations, for instance a particular rhetorical 
action in which the mere pronouncing of a condition has the force of bringing the condition 
about. Through the use of speech-acts, social and political actors define the standards for social 
activity. Following Austin’s lead, Waever (1989) and his Copenhagen colleagues pioneered the 
definition of security as a form of speech-act. Waever (1995:55) explains how such statements 
can work in securitisation: “By uttering ‘security’ a state representative moves a certain 
development into a specific area and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are 
necessary to block it”. Therefore, to label something in “security terms is nothing more than a 
discursive articulation in which social/political actors try to inculcate a particular quality (threat, 
emergency, etc.) into an issue” (Vieira, 2006:38). 
Building on this premise, Buzan et al. (1998:36-37) broke down the security speech-act into four 
constitutive parts. According to them, in framing something in terms of security, (i) a securitising 
actor(s) should present (ii) a specific issue as (iii) an existential threat to the survival of (iv) a 
referent object. The authors feel that securitisation is only considered a success when the 
securitising actor is able to convince a significant audience that something constitutes a threat. 
Vieira (2006:38) contends that the extent of (in) security is indicated not only by an objective 
assessment of the actual nature of the threat, but chiefly through the analysis of the conditions by 
which a securitisation claim becomes widely accepted and eventually institutionalised. Once an 
issue has been successfully securitised, there is a need for the institutionalisation of the security 
rhetoric. At this stage the security argument is enough since the sense of urgency is implicit in 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 48 
 
the standards of behaviour, principles, policies and bureaucratic processes which were created to 
tackle the problem. Therefore, the securitisation is institutionalised only if the threat (either 
perceived or real) is resilient enough to demand that the bureaucratic procedures take place with 
the formulation and implementation of public policies to address the perceived threat.  
However a valid limitation is highlighted by McInnes and Rushton (2010:5) when questioning 
that when issues are created as security issues through speech-act it raises a problem, “who are 
the actors who, through their speech-acts, can create security issues?”. Buzan et al (1998:31) also 
raise the issue that there exists a biased towards certain actors who are “generally accepted 
voices of security”. Therefore in order to address this issue the study will adopt the following as 
the speech-act tool developed by McInnes and Rushton (2010:5), to examine the success of the 
securitisation attempts in each of the case study countries. For a speech-act to be successful three 
facilitating conditions are required in the process of securitisation: 
• It must follow the recognised grammar of security; 
• It must come from an actor in position of authority to pronounce on security;  
• That it helps if the object can be generally said to be threatening. 
Buzan et al (1998:25) claim that the “definition and criteria for securitisation is constituted by 
the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects”. As a result, McInness and Rushton (2010:6) emphasise the point 
that when defining health issues as security issues, “they do not need to meet external criteria but 
rather be agreed upon intersubjectively as constituting an existential threat which cannot be dealt 
with in a normal way, and which has a political impact”. 
Following on from McInnes and Rushton (2010), the HIV and AIDS epidemic is an interesting 
case study, since the issue has been gradually moved from the politicised to the securitised stage. 
This process can best be described as a pendulum that swings from politicisation to securitisation 
and back again, depending on the perceived levels of urgency and threat that are allocated to a 
specific issue. The pendulum has already swung from politicisation to securitisation in the case 
of HIV and AIDS. This may not be the case in future, since the disease may eventually be 
controlled resulting in it moving back to the sphere of politicisation.  
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Since security is not a static concept, all issues can therefore be articulated as a security threat. A 
reason for this is that the need for security need not to portray a frightening reality, but is only a 
social and inter-subjective construction by means of which a subject is displayed as a threat 
(Gündüz, 2006:56). According to Wæver (1995:55), 
Security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself 
is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise or naming a 
ship). By uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a 
specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to 
block it. 
Wæver (1995:65) also asserts that the “use of the security label does not merely reflect whether a 
problem is a security problem it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualisation 
in a special way”.  
The act of securitisation implies the construction of a threat that needs to be reclassified by quick 
action, if need be, through extraordinary measures. This securitising act allows for the issue to be 
raised from the realm of low politics to that of high politics. When securitising an issue, political 
authorities display it as “an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying 
actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998:24). Wæver 
(1995:63) asserts that securitisation consequently has “enormous power as an instrument of 
social and political mobilisation. Putting something on the security agenda persuades us of the 
need to furnish urgent and unprecedented responses; it signals imminent danger and is therefore 
given a high priority”. 
Buzan et al., (1998:23) argue that securitisation can be described as an “extreme version of 
politicisation”. Buzan et al., (1998:29) continue by asserting that 
Although in one sense securitisation is a further intensification of politicisation…, in 
another sense it is opposed to politicisation. Politicisation means to make an issue appear 
to be open, a matter of free choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore 
entails responsibility, in contrast to issues that either could not be different (laws of 
nature) or should not be put under political control (e.g. a free economy, the private 
sphere, and matters for expert decision). By contrast, securitisation on the international 
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level (although often not on the domestic one) means to present an issue as urgent and 
existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of 
politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.  
Furthermore, for a speech-act to be successful, the addressees have to be convinced by the 
securitising act and be willing to accept it. Buzan et al. (1998:32) argue that “a successful 
speech-act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the 
group that authorizes and recognizes that speech”. Therefore, security becomes a political 
construction applicable to a range of issues and securitisation becomes the “politics of existential 
threats” (Buzan et al., 1998:33).  
Security moves beyond the normal working rules of politics. After securitising a threat, the 
government is positioned to facilitate and carry out the required procedures to help address the 
threat. In some instances, this process may need to curtail the democratic processes. As the 
government works towards managing a near threat, it seems only logical to redraw the lines of 
the legitimating borders of politics and to limit civil and human rights (Gündüz, 2006:57). The 
state passes new laws, limitations and prohibitions with which it limits the area of politics, 
widens that of security while it frightens and subdues the public. As the concept of security is 
widened, securitisation can narrow the very concept of democracy, and therefore should be 
handled with care. Buzan et al., (1998:34) have tried to address this concern “it is possible to ask 
with some force whether it is a good idea to make this issue a security issue - to transfer it to the 
agenda of panic politics - or whether it is better handled within normal politics”.  
2.9 Conclusion 
The current study is concerned with the framing of policy and the processes, and factors that 
explain how a policy is formulated and becomes (or does not become) placed on the policy 
agenda. It was demonstrated that the HIV and AIDS epidemic can be elevated to the level of the 
policymaking agenda, depending on the way in which it is framed. Once this has occurred, a 
threat may become securitised.   
The chapter sought to find the link between the public policy analysis process and the 
securitisation process. It demonstrated that whether the HIV and AIDS epidemic can be 
considered a threat will be dependent on how the disease is framed. Speech-act theory 
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demonstrated that HIV and AIDS can be constructed by securitising actors as a threat through a 
specific use of language. Also, shifting the epidemic from being a health issue to a security issue, 
creates the need for the re-framing of policies to address the urgency of the threat.   
The chapter also highlighted the fact that security studies scholars have identified the need for 
the concept of security to be expanded beyond the traditional approach, thereby allowing the 
inclusion of non-traditional security threats into the security debate, in this case HIV and AIDS. 
The human security approach has been instrumental in placing the HIV and AIDS threat onto the 
agenda of the security actors. The UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report’s new concept of 
human security was influential in changing the perspective on HIV and AIDS globally.  
The process of securitisation of HIV and AIDS is not straightforward as proved by the opposing 
views of scholars. The shift from national security to human security is of importance.  However, 
instead of a comprehensive replacement of one security concept by another, it may be more 
beneficial to accept a pluralistic coexistence of several concepts (Thakur 2005:10). It must be 
emphasised that human security is not in opposition to national security, nor a substitute for it.  
Socially constructed threats are not considered to be constitutive of identity and personally held 
values, but a mere reflection of them. The Copenhagen School remains the leading proponent 
promoting the securitisation approach by looking more deeply into the social construction of 
threats. At presently the securitisation theory has demonstrated that it represents the most 
elaborate analytical framework for the construction of security threats for purposes of this study.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the study in light of existing research paradigms. Within 
the field of social sciences there are two main research paradigms, namely positivist and 
interpretive. This study follows the interpretive qualitative paradigm, based on reality as a social 
construction.  
This chapter will outline the research design. The research strategy adopted for this study was to 
conduct multiple case studies. The units of analysis were the policymaking discourses in three 
different countries Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. The roles of the policymaking and 
the policy-influencing actors in the discourse were also studied. In terms of the qualitative 
paradigm, this study seeks to highlight and analyse the differences and similarities in the 
countries’ institutional responses to securitise and implement policies focused on the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic.  
The fieldwork, sourcing relevant documents and the interviews with the primary sources was 
conducted during field trip visits to the three countries in 2007 and 2008. The time frame for the 
study is from 2000 when the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Africa was first elevated onto the 
security agenda by the UN Security Council, to 2008 when the last of the fieldwork was 
conducted. However, certain historical developments prior to 2000 were also examined to 
illuminate the framing of the respective policy responses.  
Case study research is strengthened by using multiple sources of evidence for analysis, and the 
triangulation of these strengthens the study. It was therefore important to collect evidence from 
several different sources, namely key informants, prominent academics in the field, policy 
documents and media reports. To further strengthen this research I also gathered different types 
of empirical data, interviews, statistical data, reports and policy documents. Adding to this, I 
triangulated different empirical techniques, mainly personal semi-structured interviews with key 
informants, document analysis and analysis of statistical data. This chapter also discusses the 
scope and limitations of the research design. 
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This chapter has six main parts. First it will discuss the research paradigms in social science. 
Second it will present the research design used in the study, namely the multiple case study 
method. Third, it will review the research process shedding light on the data gathering and 
processing. The fourth part of the chapter will deal with how the data were analysed. Part five 
discusses challenges and limitations of the study. Part six presents the research ethics that are at 
the core of this study. These six parts are then followed by a conclusion. 
3.2 Research paradigm  
The two main paradigms in the field of social science research are positivist and interpretive. 
Positivism is often referred to as ‘scientific method’ or ‘science research’, which is “based on the 
rationalistic, empiricist philosophy that originated with Aristotle, Francis Bacon, John Locke, 
August Comte, and Emmanuel Kant” (Mertens, 2005:8) and “reflects a deterministic philosophy 
in which causes probably determine effects or outcomes” (Creswell, 2003:7). Positivism can be 
of relevance to the social world since “the social world can be studied in the same way as the 
natural world, that there is a method for studying the social world that is value free, and that 
explanations of a causal nature can be provided” (Mertens, 2005:8). Positivists aim to test a 
theory or describe an experience “through observation and measurement in order to predict and 
control forces that surround us” (O’Leary, 2004:5). In essence, positivists’ research is most 
frequently associated with quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. 
The interpretive paradigm can be traced back to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s and other German philosophers’ study of interpretive understanding called 
hermeneutics (Mertens, 2005:12). The interpretive approach is used for research purposes with 
the intention of understanding “the world of human experience” (Cohen and Manion, 1994:36). 
This suggests that “reality is socially constructed” (Mertens, 2005:12). The interpretive 
researcher is aware of the significance for the research of his or her own background and 
experiences. However, the researcher is more inclined to focus on the “participants’ views of the 
situation being studied” (Creswell, 2003:8). Interpretive research is most commonly aligned with 
qualitative data-collection methods and analysis or a combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods (mixed methods). Quantitative data may also be used if they support or 
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expand the meaning of the qualitative data and effectively deepen the outcomes (Mackenzie, 
2006). 
This study is conducted within the interpretive paradigm in order to acquire a better 
understanding of the human experiences presented by the interviewees. Consequently, the 
empirical core of the research is mainly qualitative data in the form of interviews and document 
analysis. However, quantitative data, such as relevant statistical information are also used to 
support the qualitative data sources.  
3.3 Research design  
After the initial research and a literature review, the problem statement for this study was 
narrowed down to: How was public policy on the HIV and AIDS epidemic framed? In order to 
address the research question the case study method was chosen as the most appropriate. In order 
to examine the complexity of the public policy-framing process, three cases were chosen, namely 
Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. To aid the data collection the rather general problem 
statement was further broken down into three lines of inquiry: a) a study of the policymaking 
dynamics as related to the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the three countries and; b) an investigation 
of the roles of the principal policymaking actors, and domestic and international policy-
influencing actors in the national response policy in each of the three countries; and lastly c) a 
study of the discursive processes that featured in and shaped policy-framing in the three 
countries (the securitisation dynamics). The two first lines of inquiry address the policymaking 
discourse and its actors. The last line of inquiry was added to address a gap in the existing 
literature linking public policy theory and security studies.  
3.4 Case study method  
Political science does not have a single definition or application for what is known in the 
discipline as a case study. However, there is a rich history of case study research in bureaucracy 
implementation, as well as in public policy administration and public policy studies (Yanow et 
al., 2008:3). Yin (2009) cautions researchers against confusing case studies with qualitative 
methods using the ethnographic method. Ethnographic methods are derived from cultural 
anthropology. In studying institutions these methods may help the researchers to extract cultural 
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knowledge, and identify actions and instruments that participants utilise in their everyday life 
(Schwartman, 1993; Prasad, 1997). Yin (2009) also by claims that researchers conducting case 
studies, unlike ethnographic studies, may not even need to visit the institution under review as 
they could gather their data by means of consulting secondary sources or interviewing 
respondents telephonically or by email.   
Yin (2009) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, particularly when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly defined. Yin (2009:13) argues that, “The case study allows an 
investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as the 
individual life cycles, organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, 
international relations and the maturation of industries”. 
The case study approach is particularly useful when dealing with situations where the contextual 
conditions of the events being studied are critical and where the researcher has no control over 
the events as they unfold. Therefore, the case study research strategy should encompass specific 
techniques for the collection and analysis of data, which must be directed by clearly stated 
theoretical assumptions. In addition, data must be collected from different sources and it is 
always necessary to ensure that its integrity is protected.  
Different scholars have distinguished the types of case study available. Yin (2009) distinguishes 
three types of case studies: 
• Exploratory – the collection of data occurs before theories or specific research questions 
are formulated and this is followed up by the analysis of data resulting in more systematic 
case studies; 
• Causal – looks for cause and effect relationships and searches for explanatory theories of 
these phenomena;  
• Descriptive – will require a theory to guide the collection of data and “this theory should 
be openly stated in advance and be the subject of review and debate and later serve as the 
‘design’ for the descriptive study. The more thoughtful the theory, the better the 
descriptive case study will be” (Yin, 2009:22). 
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Through adopting the case study methodology to this study I hope to covey an extensive picture 
of the complexity of how public policymaking on HIV and AIDS was shaped in Botswana, 
South Africa and Swaziland. The case study will allow me to, in Yin’s words, “retain the holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin 2009:4). There are two main reasons for 
adopting the case study method for this study. Firstly, the phenomenon studied is a contemporary 
issue. The second reason stems from the complexity of the phenomenon. There are several 
institutional and governmental actors involved, and the aim of the study is to uncover the 
relationship between these actors and their context. The case study methodology accommodates 
both of these characteristics of the study. The case study method was useful for purposes of my 
research, since the research dealt with the contextual conditions of events that are critical and 
which I as the researcher had no control over the as the events unfolded. When looking at types 
of case studies it is clear that this study is best described as a descriptive case study that looks at 
how events unfolded over a certain period of time. 
After adopting the case study as the most suitable methodology for the study, I had to further 
develop the research design. According to Yin (2009:25), this is a complicated endeavour as 
there is “no comprehensive ‘catalogue of research’ to rely on. Simply put, the research design is 
a logical plan for connecting the empirical data to the research questions and consequently the 
conclusions” (Yin, 2009:26).  
For case studies, five components of a research design are especially important: 
1. A study’s question; 
2. Its propositions, if any; 
3. Its unit(s) of analysis; 
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions; and 
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2009:27). 
When defining this study’s question, the starting point was the key topic, which was HIV and 
AIDS policy and security policy in Southern Africa. After initial explorations of theoretical 
literature and related studies, the key topic of the research question was further narrowed down: 
How was the policymaking related to HIV and AIDS shaped? 
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In order to address the research question, the unit of analysis was the policymaking discourse, 
and in an extension of this, the policymaking institutions and policy-influencing organisations. I 
also decided to do multiple case studies, as I was hoping to highlight how the HIV and AIDS 
policymaking discourse was shaped by the different circumstances in the different countries.  
When deciding on which countries would be a part of this study, I first looked at the countries in 
Southern Africa, as they are the most affected by the HIV and AIDS epidemic. There were four 
main reasons for selecting Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. Firstly, they all of the 
countries have extremely high HIV prevalence rates. At the end of 2006 South Africa was 
estimated to have about 5 million people living with HIV. This represented approximately 20 per 
cent of the adult population. Botswana recorded an even higher HIV prevalence rate with about 
24 per cent of its adult citizens infected (UNAIDS, 2006). Swaziland holds the unenviable 
distinction of having the highest HIV prevalence in the world 26.3 per cent (USAID, Swaziland 
Country Profile, October 2010).  
Secondly, stemming from the high HIV prevalence rates present in each of the three countries, 
they have all been subjected to considerable pressure from the international community to 
securitise their HIV and AIDS epidemics. Furthermore, each of the three countries is a major 
recipient of bilateral and multilateral aid to combat the epidemic in the form of the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Bank’s Global HIV and AIDS Programme 
of Action and the US President’s Emergency Plan for HIV and AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).   
Thirdly, each of the three countries presents a very distinct domestic political and social 
structure, largely because of their colonial experiences, present-day political and social cultures, 
and differing levels of economic development. This has meant that each country presented a 
different national response policy approach to the international and domestic pressure placed on 
them regarding their national strategy to combat the HIV and AIDS epidemic. 
Lastly, the countries were chosen for their accessibility for me as a researcher. Both 
geographically, as I knew my fieldwork would have a rather strict time limit, and also because I 
am familiar with government and political structures in all the three countries through my work. 
Steps four and five in Yin’s research design recipe deals with how to link empirical data to 
propositions and then conduct an analysis. At this stage of developing the research design my 
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main concern relating to these two steps was to make sure that a structure for gathering the data 
was in place in order to facilitate subsequent analysis.  
3.5. Research process  
3.5.1 Sources  
Yin (2009) emphasises the need for triangulation using multiple sources of evidence or data. He 
stresses that it strengthens the case study research. “The most important advantage presented by 
using multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging lines of inquiry, a process 
of triangulation and corroboration” (Yin, 2009:115-116). I have used different types of sources 
in this study; secondary sources such as media reports and academic writing, and primary 
sources namely government publications, administrative records and personal interviews with 
experts and key informants. 
Because of the lack of secondary materials dealing with key issues, such as the role of external 
actors in HIV and AIDS policy decision-making processes, much of the research was conducted 
directly in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland during my field-trip study visits to each 
country. I was also able to consult numerous primary sources such as: government publications, 
for instance green and white papers, legislation and internal policy documents. These were all 
important, as each was able to provide a better perspective on the governments’ respective 
positions in policymaking decisions and also to fill in some of the gaps in the study. 
Furthermore, donors’ policy statements and the minutes of meetings were useful in filling in the 
gaps that remained after analysing government publications. In essence, both sets of documents 
were important to the study, as they helped in deciphering the events and policy choices taken as 
they unfolded.  
Yin (1993:15) mentions that in case study research, unlike in ethnographic studies, it is not vital 
to the study that the researcher should be in the “field”. However, in this study, I found it proved 
highly beneficial to the study that I undertook field-trip visits to each of the countries, and that I 
was able to conduct most of the interviews at the different institutions in person. Another benefit 
from the field trips was access to documents that I otherwise would not have obtained, as some 
of my interviewees willingly shared administrative records and policy documents. 
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Primary sources relied heavily on government publications, technical documents and annual 
country reports from domestic and international institutions. Valuable insight was gained from 
the analysis of the various country briefs, namely UN reports and US Department of State 
Country Fact Briefs (those from the UNAIDS and the US and transnational NGOs proved very 
useful). Many of the key policy documents, reports and a wide collection of official 
documentation were available on the Internet.   
Access to local media was beneficial in helping to set a context for the research questions and 
give a sense of the perceived relationship between the actors. Most of the primary data were 
collected between 2007 and 2008. The relevance of the interviews to the topic was considered in 
terms of consistency with the research proposal, and then included in the analysis accordingly. 
3.5.2 Interviews   
In addition to conducting the key informant interviews, I conducted preliminary interviews (for a 
full list of interviewees, see interview schedule in the Appendix). These preliminary interviews 
were semi-structured, informal and exploratory in nature. The three main reasons for conducting 
these were, firstly, to help identify key people of interest that I could contact later for the key 
informant interviews. As I learned from talking to people in the field and through the preliminary 
interviews it was not always obvious who it would be appropriate to interview, as the topic was 
fairly new and not, as I learned, easy to understand for the interviewees. A second reason was 
that they would help structure the later interviews in clearing up misunderstandings as far as the 
research questions were concerned. I learned from this that it was easier to use fewer questions 
that were open that I could then clarify in the interview situation, as the interviewees would have 
differing backgrounds and would therefore relate to the questions differently. The third reason 
relates predominantly to the interviews with academics within the field. These interviews helped 
reveal the field as there is not a great amount of academic writing on this specific topic. These 
preliminary interviews were very helpful, particularly in guiding me to the right actors to contact 
for later interviews. They also made it clear that the link between HIV and AIDS and security 
policy still is unfamiliar to many actors outside of the academic world. This was an important 
aspect that I kept in mind when conducting the key informant interviews.  
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I later conducted the key informant interviews with a wide range of actors in both the private and 
public sectors in the three case studies. I decided to use semi-structured interviews as the primary 
data-collection method because of the advantages this method offers in terms of allowing for the 
inclusion of both close-ended and open-ended items depending on the circumstances. These 
interviews form the core of the case study information. The non-interview data gave me the 
opportunity to assess the robustness of some of the interview data, in order to fill the prevailing 
gaps in the data. The perceptions, thoughts and analyses of the interviewees provide insight into 
the mechanics of state politics as well as the motivation and strategies adopted by all actors in an 
attempt to assert their influence on policy decisions. As several of the interviewees held senior 
positions, they were in a position to determine future policy decision-making and 
implementation by their respective organisations and provide informed opinions about possible 
future policy decisions to be made by state institutions.  
When looking at the list of interviewees it is clear that the selection has its strength and 
weaknesses. One strength is the access I was given to interview high-level representatives from 
the different organisations/actors. One weakness is that, due to time constraints and availability 
of key informants, as a result not all organisations/actors are represented.  
The exploratory interviews with academic experts in the field also added useful insight into the 
dynamics surrounding the securitisation of HIV and AIDS. They also added third party insight 
into the relationships between the actors. As these academic experts were in a manner on the 
outside looking in, they were able to speak more freely on how they perceived this relationship. 
The exploratory interviews with SADC officials revealed that there was no coordinated regional 
response to the epidemic as I had first assumed, it also helped guide me to possible interviewees.  
When analysing the key informant interviews it is clear that not as many actors as I could have 
wanted are represented. However, both civil society and government representatives are 
interviewed in all three countries. When conducting the fieldwork I had two main criteria for 
selecting the interviewees. Firstly, I selected representatives from organisations and institutions 
that were mentioned in the preliminary interviews as being of interest in this regard. Secondly, 
and more pragmatically, I had to select the ones that were available to me during my fieldwork. 
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The government representatives from each of the case studies are either from the Ministry of 
Health as is the case for South Africa and Swaziland or from government HIV and AIDS 
initiatives such as NACA in Botswana and NERCHA in Swaziland. Although this study is about 
securitisation of the epidemic rather than the medical side of the epidemic there are no 
interviewees from the security services in either of the cases. Due to the sensitivity of the issue 
and general secrecy concerns surrounding the security services it was difficult to get access to 
representatives from this sector for interviews. However, the interviews with SADC officials 
were conducted in order to add some insight into the regional security aspect of the politicisation 
of HIV and AIDS as these are at liberty to speak a little more freely.  
Another observation was that the government representatives from the South African Ministry of 
Health were also not very open about the issue, in my opinion this was partly due to the fact that 
during this period under President Mbeki, the HIV and AIDS issue was very controversial and 
highly sensitive.  
Another shortcoming is that I was not able to interview any representatives from the South 
African National HIV and AIDS coordinating body, SANAC, which is the equivalent to NACA 
in Botswana and NERCHA in Swaziland. 
There are a large number of civil society actors dealing with HIV and AIDS, and although I 
managed to interview quite a few of them not all are represented. In particular, no representative 
from the TAC was available for interviews within the time frame of my fieldwork. This is a clear 
weakness as the TAC is a very interesting actor within the field as discussed later in the chapter 
on South Africa. However, there is an abundance of primary and secondary data on the TAC 
which helped to address this weakness. 
Both the interviewees from SADC and from the UN agencies were useful in that they were able 
to shed light on regional perspectives as well as each of the three case studies.  
It is important to make mention that during the interview I did not want to come across as being 
unfriendly, biased or threatening. I tried to ensure that my questions were asked in a relatively 
unbiased manner, as recommended by Yin (2009:106). Due to the sensitivities of the subject 
matter I was also mindful of Becker (1998:58-60) cautioning about posing a “why” question to a 
respondent, as in his view this may create a defensive mood in the respondent. He supports 
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instead the approach of posing a “how” question rather than a “why” question (Becker, 1998:58-
60). Therefore, it was a fine balance between the aim of satisfying the needs of my line of 
inquiry, while at the same time posing friendly and non-threatening questions (Yin, 2009:106-7). 
The interviews usually ran on average between 30 minutes to an hour. However, some ran 
shorter because of time constraints on behalf of the interviewee. To maintain consistency and to 
strengthen the data analysis, I asked all interviewees the same eight questions. (The Interview 
Schedule – Guiding Questions is included in the Appendix.) These questions were also asked in 
the exploratory interviews. It was my belief that using questions that were as general as possible 
and by limiting the number of questions I posed would they would structure and guide the 
interviews without restricting the responses. 
During some of the interviews, where necessary, I probed for specific pieces of information that 
were not readily offered up by the interviewees. Because of several factors such as time 
constraints, interviewee reluctance, or interviewees not fully understanding the rationale for my 
study, I tailored each interview to fit the personality of the interviewee. Yin (2009:106) describes 
this process as “guided conversations rather than structured queries”. All the interviews were 
recorded with the permission of the interviewees, except for one who refused to be recorded. She 
stated that I should only record it in written form.  
There are definite advantages to using semi-structured interviews, as indicated and expressed by 
Mason (2002:62): 
• An interactional exchange of dialogue; 
• A relatively informal style, with the appearance of a conversation or discussion, rather 
than a formal question-and-answer format; and,  
• A thematic, topic-centred approach. 
I found that using semi-structured interviews allowed the interviewees the opportunity in most 
cases to speak their mind without fear that I was trying to impose my assumptions on them. This 
approach also permitted me to remain in the position to steer the interview in the intended 
direction, while ensuring that certain key themes that required attention were touched on. 
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Interviewing as a data-collection method has several advantages. As part of my analysis I was 
careful not to fall into the trap of being too subjective when evaluating the interviewees’ 
responses at face value. I was mindful that the “interview method is heavily dependent on 
people’s capabilities to verbalise, interact, conceptualise and remember” (Mason, 2002:64). 
3.5.3 The interview processes  
I was based in Norway during much of the time I was collecting data for my research, and 
undertook study visits to all three countries at different times between 2007 and 2008. Because 
of time constraints and the unavailability of certain individuals while I was in the region, I was 
not able to interview all the interviewees in person and had to resort to some telephone and email 
interviews. For the telephone and email interviews I had to adopt a more focused interview 
approach which required that the interview still remained open-ended but owing to the fact that it 
was not conducted face-to-face, I had to follow the questions more closely and adopt a less 
conversational approach (Merton, Fiske and Kendall, 1990).  
Miles and Huberman (1984) have suggested that researchers conducting qualitative research 
should consider four parameters:  
• The setting; 
• The actors; 
• The events; 
• The process. 
These parameters aided the nature of the interviews conducted for this study. Regarding the 
setting, all of the face-to-face interviews were conducted in the respondents’ offices, except for 
one interview that was conducted in a coffee shop in Mbabane. The telephone interviews were 
conducted over Skype and landlines. As I was fully aware that I was imposing on their time, I 
ensured that the date, time and venue for the interview was left to the respondents to decide upon 
and therefore it can be assumed that the interviews took place in a setting in which the 
respondents felt comfortable and to some extent in control. 
With regards to the actors involved in the interviewing process, I interviewed academics, 
domestic and international civil society officers, and government officials. As they were experts 
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and professional people in their own right, I did not get the feeling that my presence intimidated 
any of them. However, I had to be mindful of keeping to the time schedule that they set and tried 
at all times to adhere to it, unless the interviewee felt the need to go beyond the time limit set.   
Letting the respondents set the date, time and venue for the interview, resulted in most of the 
respondents agreeing and giving up their time to be interviewed. There were only three 
respondents who failed to provide any feedback even after they suggested that I send them the 
questionnaire and agreed that they would email me their responses at a later stage.  Regrettably, 
the follow up emails did not materialise and no explanations were given.  
Finally, it was important to consider the process of the interviews. The interview process was 
determined by personality of the interviewee. Some of the interviewees were very formal in 
answering and kept to the point without providing further elaboration, unless probed. Others 
were more interested in the larger topic of HIV and AIDS and were keen to comment more at 
length leading to the interview straying into other topics not included in this study which resulted 
in the interview having to be redirected and focused back to the topic at hand. 
In addition, I had to ensure that the questions posed to the respondents covered all issues that 
would provide the necessary data to answer my research questions. I tried to conduct the 
interviews in a less structured and more conversational manner in the hope that by being 
comfortable in my presence the respondents would be less hesitant to share their knowledge. At 
the end of all of my interviews I offered the respondents an opportunity to reflect on issues they 
experienced as problematic, especially if they felt that these factors may have been overlooked or 
not adequately dealt with during the interview session. This proved very useful for my research, 
as it resulted in highly valuable and insightful comments provided by the respondents as they 
were given the space to reflect on their concerns about which they had strong feelings. 
3.5.4 Data analysis 
The data analysis was an iterative process. There was no rigid separation between data 
collections and analysis. The strategy that I applied for my data analysis was guided by the 
theoretical propositions I developed that were the basis for my research questions and literature 
review. Yin (2009:130) calls this one “of the preferred types of analysis strategies”.  
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The quality of the information collected is critical, as it impacts on the validity of the results or 
inferences drawn. The main data-collection tools utilised for the purposes of this research were 
semi-structured interviews, email correspondence, telephone interviews and secondary source 
analysis. The face-to-face interviews constituted one of the most important and valuable sources 
of information. The interviews were chosen for their relevance to the conceptual questions and 
for their representativeness in the field of study, as I tried to encompass a wide variety of actors 
involved in each of the three countries concerned.  
The secondary data were first examined to crystalise the research questions and provide a 
foundation for the research, before conducting the preliminary exploratory interviews. Analysis 
of the secondary sources, as well as the preliminary interviews proved essential in identifying 
key actors and representatives of those who would be able to contribute to the study. 
Importantly, this helped me to identify some representatives to interview from institutions5 on 
the ground in Gaborone, Mbabane, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town. It also helped to 
narrow down the questions for the interviews by identifying gaps in the source material that 
would need further explanation or background, consequently ensuring the interviews were as 
focused as possible. In addition, they helped to prepare me for the possibility of probing the 
interviewees when necessary in order to gain a fuller insight into the subject matter under review. 
After the interviews were conducted, the secondary sources were also used to further corroborate 
the findings in the interviews. The secondary data proved vital in helping to verify or cross-check 
official information, gain a better understanding of policymaking decisions, the implementation 
process and key institutions and institutional responses taken by the relevant actors.  
All the interviews were conducted in English. Most interviews were tape-recorded and additional 
written notes were taken during the interview. The interviews were transcribed in Word format 
as close to verbatim as possible. This was done to ensure that inaccuracies did not occur as a 
result of poor recall by the researcher. The interviews were transcribed while in the field and 
where quotes are used they are a true reflection of the respondent’s answer.  
When analysing the interviews, I first read through the transcribed interviews thoroughly. 
Afterwards I started identifying the evidence that answered each of the questions in the interview 
                                                
5 For a full list of the institutions refer to the interview table in the Appendix. 
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schedule. I then identified relevant information that didn’t speak directly to the questions, but 
that added insight into the case study. After reading through the findings in the interviews, 
several themes began to emerge. Data and quotes from the interviews were initially grouped in a 
matrix of categories under appropriate sub-themes as determined by the available theoretical 
literature.  
When it became clear that a particular respondent was not able to fill the particular gaps in the 
research this too was grouped and entered into the matrix. This process allowed me to use the 
gaps in the data as probing questions in follow up emails and other interviews. Also, depending 
on the personality of the respondent I attempted to appear relatively naive about the topic in the 
hope of allowing the interviewee to provide more insight on the topic. This was done deliberately 
since, “if you ask leading questions, the corroboratory purpose of the interview will not have 
been served” (Yin, 2009:107). During the interviewing process, in order to gain a better 
understanding and test the sequence of events, I intentionally cross-checked with respondents 
known to hold different perspectives.  
The statistical data on HIV and AIDS that was used is mainly from UNAIDS. The main reason 
for this is that this was the best source of comparable statistical data for the three countries.  
Primary data from government reports relating to HIV and AIDS and reports from the different 
organisations that were examined were gathered and catalogued according to country. Thereafter 
they were read through looking for rhetorical evidences of speech acts related to security. 
Furthermore the reports were scrutinised for evidence of how HIV and AIDS was framed.  
3.6 Challenges and limitations 
The methodological challenges to this research were related to the reconstruction of events and 
processes that were not documented, nor easily accessible to the public. On several occasions the 
study had to rely on the memory of the interviewees to retrace policy decision-making 
procedures, to understand the functioning of state institutions and to assess the role of 
international partners in influencing domestic HIV and AIDS policies.  
Furthermore, some of the most relevant actors were either not available for an interview or were 
unwilling to provide the relevant information. It must be remembered in this respect that HIV 
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and AIDS remains a very sensitive and politicised issue in all three countries. In order to 
overcome this gap in the data, measures were taken to remedy the situation by utilising other 
documentary sources available on the Internet or provided by non-state actors during the 
interview process.  Also, interviews were arranged with lower-ranking individuals, who were in 
possession of reliable knowledge about the topic and were directly involved with the issues at 
hand.  
Challenges confronting the case study were bureaucracy and secrecy concerns encountered 
throughout the research process. National government security representatives are generally not 
easy to access for research purposes. This was especially the case in South Africa, where under 
President Mbeki, the HIV and AIDS issue was very controversial and government officials were 
reluctant to open up about it. Also the study was about current policy developments and not all 
government departments are open to disclose information about on-going developments.  
When interviewing government officials about policy decisions it was important to come across 
as being as objective as possible. Because of criticism levelled at all three governments for their 
different policy responses, the subject matter was fairly sensitive. Several non-state actors 
interviewed also cautioned me about being perceived by the respondents (government officials) 
as challenging the respective governments’ commitment to their national response policies. Their 
view was that if I came across as objective I would gain a more accurate insight into the various 
government perspectives.  
According to an interviewee, “Avoid only pointing out the failures of government policies but 
rather try show an understanding as to why they may have failed” (interview, Senior Health 
Officer, SADC, 5/3/08) and “questioning the political status quo in the country will abruptly end 
your interview” (interview, AIDS Specialist, William J. Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly 
with Ministry of Health and NERCHA) 11/4/08).    
There were instances when I felt that certain questions were not always accurately or honestly 
answered. These situations arose when discussing such issues as the relationship and problems 
between the donors, and the state and the civil society. In retrospect, I think that if the interviews 
were held in a more neutral venue outside of the official offices certain interviewees may have 
felt freer to discuss sensitive issues without fear of being overheard by their colleagues. This 
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could be because they feared their funding sources drying up if they openly criticised the donors 
or spoke out against the government. The interview conducted in the coffee shop in Mbabane 
confirms this point about conducting the interviews in a more neutral venue.  
I also experienced problems setting up interviews with certain key people. After making contact 
through email, certain respondents did not agree to meet up in person and instead suggested other 
people to interview. Interestingly, they did agree that I should send them the questionnaire for 
the interview through email, but I did not hear back from them. In fairness, I was appreciative of 
the suggestions made of potential people to interview since it provided me with insights from 
actors, who had initially been overlooked.  Also because of the sensitive political nature and the 
time the study was conducted, some government officials seemed unwilling to be interviewed for 
the study. This may be because of the high levels of criticism levelled at all the governments 
regarding their failures to formulate and implement relevant policies to curb the high HIV 
incidence. This was experienced in all three countries.   
Ensuring the validity and reliability of the results is an important aspect of any study. This 
chapter has attempted to outline the various measures, which were implemented to produce a 
reliable and accurate data set for analysis. Despite all the quality control measures taken, there 
may still be shortcomings and limitations in the data-collection method including gaps in the data 
itself. Because respondents gave freely of their time to be interviewed I can only assume that the 
respondents were generally sincere in their responses. 
3.7 Research ethics 
The interviewees were all informed of the objectives of the study as well as its background by 
means of a brief synopsis in the letter of invitation to contribute to this study. It was explained to 
each interviewee that their participation in the study was voluntary and at their own convenience, 
and that they agreed to let me use their contribution for the study. 
It was also explained to the interviewees that all information would be kept confidential and they 
had the choice to remain anonymous or to be mentioned by name and designation. During the 
interviewing process, if the interviewees were unclear about the meaning of a term or concept 
used during the interview process, they could ask for further clarification. This was done as a 
further measure to ensure the reliability of the responses given by the interviewees.  
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Furthermore this study was conducted within the Stellenbosch University ethics guidelines. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the research design and methodology of the study. Adopting the case study 
methodology allowed for using multiple types of sources, something I believe creates a more 
holistic picture of the events examined. The multiple case study method also allowed for a better 
understanding of the complexity of the policy discourse around HIV and AIDS. The chapter 
demonstrated the manner in which the relevant data were obtained for purposes of this study, 
namely through interviews, primary and secondary documentary sources. The chapter presented 
the significance of having both exploratory interviews and key informant interviews, as the two 
processes complement each other and strengthen the research process as a whole. It also 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the interviews. The chapter also highlighted the 
challenges and limitations of the study such as the lack of access to some government officials 
because of the sensitive political nature of the study. Although the results of this study are not 
meant to be generalised for the whole of the Southern African region, the three case studies do 
provide an interesting and useful glimpse into the policy responses to the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic, which will be further examined in detail in the following chapters.   
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Chapter 4: HIV and AIDS – Journey from Biomedical to Global Security 
Threat  
4.1 Introduction 
Almost 32 years ago on 5 June 1981, the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States 
of America (USA) published their Weekly Morbidity and Mortality Report reporting on the first 
recorded cases of HIV and AIDS. Since then the HIV and AIDS epidemic has killed over 30 
million people worldwide. Currently, there are about 34 million people infected, with about 22.2 
million of theses residing in Sub-Saharan Africa, making Africa the most infected region in the 
world (UNAIDS – World AIDS Day Report, 2011). Out of the total number of people living with 
HIV worldwide in 2009, 34 per cent resided in 10 countries in Southern Africa (UNAIDS - AIDS 
Epidemic Update, December 2009).  
This chapter starts with tracing the HIV and AIDS journey from biomedical to international 
security threat that was placed on the political agenda of the international community. It then 
moves on to examining HIV and AIDS and Global Health Governance by highlighting the 
process the disease took to be accepted by the international community as a security threat 
requiring urgent attention.  
The chapter moves on to tracing the origins of HIV and AIDS and security. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with an examination of the three influential global securitisation actors namely, 
UNAIDS, the US government and the role of civil society actors which have been instrumental 
in promoting the global securitisation approach.  
4.2 From a biomedical issue to a security issue 
Before exploring how the epidemic was securitised it is useful to trace its journey from 
biomedical on to the political agenda. 
For much of the 80s and early 90s, multilateral agencies responses were focused entirely on the 
biomedical aspects of the epidemic. Because the full magnitude of the disease was still unknown 
at this point in time, the early efforts to address it were relatively inadequate. The disease was 
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first discovered mostly in the homosexual community in the USA, this might be one of the 
reasons behind the slow initial responses.  
The World Health Organisation (WHO) was established in an attempt to manage the outbreak of 
diseases. It was to concentrate its resources on the provision of healthcare to poor populations 
(Iilffe, 2006:68). After the publication of reports highlighting the growing prevalence of HIV and 
AIDS in several parts of Africa, the WHO, began to address the epidemic as a serious health 
problem on a global scale in 1986. WHO had already established its Global Programme on AIDS 
(GAP) and advised governments to create surveillance structures and HIV and AIDS committees 
based in their Ministries of Health.  
GAP was important, as it was the first multilateral initiative intended to raise the profile of the 
epidemic as a public health issue of global importance. To deal with the epidemic, GAP 
promoted a global mobilisation of institutional and financial resources. GAP’s early policies 
focused primarily on the promotion of public awareness, blood screening, condom distribution 
and preventative efforts. Between 1986 and 1990, Johnathan Mann as the head of GAP, helped 
to devise short and medium term plans for more than 150 countries (Ilife, 2006:70). 
The initial HIV and AIDS securitising move took place in the mid-90s. HIV had already spread 
across several African states at an accelerated pace. Because of this accelerated pace, this might 
have attributed to the ineffectiveness of the earlier global response as it caught out those tasked 
to deal with the disease. It became more apparent to the international community that HIV and 
AIDS was not merely a medical condition. In order to address it, there was a need for all 
branches of government and non-state actors to be involved in a more inclusive response effort. 
It became apparent that to address the global epidemic, a greater effort was necessary to provide 
a better coordinated level of assistance to challenge the many factors fuelling the spread of the 
virus and to help those countries experiencing the brunt of the impact. As a consequence, “A 
growing sense of urgency prompted the creation of special multilateral and national 
bureaucracies and more comprehensive policies to deal with the impact of the epidemic” (Vieira, 
2006:55).  
The end of the Cold War brought about a change in the global thinking of security. In order to 
address the growing number of non-traditional security threats such as HIV and AIDS, policy 
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decision-makers and academics were required to rethink how HIV and AIDS fits into the new 
security framework. For instance, the human security approach of the UNDP called for the 
protection of people against a wide range of new threats, including epidemic diseases, which 
should be a primary concern of national governments and multilateral organisations (Axworthy, 
2001:19). 
In 1996, the UN undertook an important initiate by drawing six organisations together in a joint 
and co-sponsored programme, leading to the establishment of the Joint United Nations Program 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). The creation of a separate multilateral HIV and AIDS agency was the 
first time that the UN had adopted this approach to deal with a single disease. UNAIDS was 
tasked with promoting a particular understanding of what HIV and AIDS is and how it should be 
dealt with by states and non-state actors alike. The creation of this UNAIDS signalled the change 
of direction concerning the multilateral response to the epidemic (Vieira, 2006:56).  
From the late 1990s, an increasing number of high profile politicians, transnational activists and 
academics began to articulate that the global HIV and AIDS epidemic was indeed a serious 
threat to security (Prins, 2004). UNAIDS adopted this view and began to take the securitisation 
of HIV and AIDS as “a teaching mission, whereby this organisation would work to supply states 
and other HIV/AIDS actors with information about best HIV/AIDS policies and organisational 
practices at the state level” (Vieira, 2006:57).  
At the turn of the millennium, at the international level, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSC) 1308 was passed which fully recognised the potential threat posed by the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic to stability and security. At the continental level, in April 2001, African 
countries met in Nigeria to deliberate on the challenges posed to by the epidemic. This resulted 
in the signing of the Abuja Declaration of 27 April 2001, which was endorsed by all members of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Declaration stated that HIV and AIDS “is not a 
major health crisis but an exceptional threat to Africa’s development, social cohesion, […] as 
well as the greatest global threat to the survival and life expectancy of African peoples” (OAU, 
2001). Later that year on 27 June 2001, at the 26th Special Session of the UN General Assembly 
(UNGASS), the Heads of State and Government adopted the Declaration of Commitment on HIV 
and AIDS. This document was very important as far as the response policy towards epidemic was 
concerned. It represented an official acknowledgement by all the UN member states that the 
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epidemic was a “global emergency” and “one of the most formidable challenges to human life 
and dignity”. This called for global action and total commitment from all signatories. UNAIDS 
was tasked with coordinating the multilateral response, “which could assist, as appropriate, 
member states and relevant civil society actors in the development of HIV/AIDS strategies […]” 
(UNGASS, 2001). Under UNGASS, it was agreed to establish the Global Fund to fight HIV and 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. This was formally established in 2001 by the UN and the G8 
group of industrialised nations to provide funds to address the three most serious epidemic 
diseases in the world namely, HIV and AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  
In mid-2006, the Heads of State and Government gathered in New York to renew the strong 
commitments they made back in 2001 and also to review progress in implementing the UNGASS 
Declaration. The meeting ended with the adoption of a comprehensive political declaration that 
reaffirmed the states engagement in the implementation of the policies and principles set out in 
the first UNGASS (UN General Assembly, 2006). 
While these events took place, there was a growing feeling amongst the developing world which 
led to a North-South ideological and political difference within the international community. 
Many of the differences related to the political disputes over treatment with generic antiretroviral 
drugs (ARVs). Because of the benefits derived from ARVs, countries such as Brazil and India 
began to produce and provide generic ARVs to their populations. As a result, pharmaceutical 
companies claimed their patent rights were being infringed upon. The matter was eventually 
decided in favour of those developing nations’ who claimed a need to produce the generic 
versions of the ARVs. In November 2001, in Doha, the World Trade Oraganisation passed an 
important policy decision which agreed that TRIPS6 should not prevent states from undertaking 
means to protect their societies against epidemic diseases such as HIV and AIDS. 
This important exception made provision for countries experiencing a threat to public health to 
produce, buy and import generic AIDS drugs at the expense of patented AIDS drugs. Therefore, 
this makes the Doha agreement of 2001 very important, as it was an unprecedented move 
towards the securitisation of severe epidemic diseases. Politically this was seen as a victory for 
                                                
6 TRIPS stand for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. It is an agreement by the WTO between 
1986 and 1994 to ensure intellectual property rights are respected within international trade. It came into force on 1st 
January 1995, but implementation dates vary from country to country. 
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the countries of the South against the more economically strong North. As a first in the history of 
trade negotiations, it meant that states were legally permitted to issue compulsory licenses to 
duplicate patent drugs in the case of heath emergencies. Transnational advocacy groups saw it as 
beneficial to pressure donor governments and multilateral agencies to ensure that the provision 
of generic HIV and AIDS drugs as a core priority in the domestic national plans to combat the 
epidemic7. 
The introduction of generic ARV drugs revealed a difference in opinion between various 
international securitising actors. At the international level, the US government supported the 
patent protection claims of pharmaceutical companies. However, this approach was not fully 
adopted by UNAIDS/WHO. For example, in 2003 UNIAIDS/WHO launched a global initiative 
expecting to treat 3 million people by 2005, which was supplied by both branded and generic 
AIDS drugs. Only in 2005, the US government under President Bush’s Global Initiative on HIV 
and AIDS included a few generic drugs as part of its financial aid for treatment in developing 
countries. As will be discussed further in chapters 5-7, each of the countries under review reacted 
differently to the issue of patented and generic AIDS drugs. For instance, South Africa and 
Swaziland both supported ARV treatment plans based on generic drugs but for different reasons. 
Swaziland because of its financial constraints was in agreement with using the cheaper option 
provided by the generic AIDS drugs. At the same time, Swaziland was not against patented 
AIDS drugs if it was provided by international securitising actors. The South Africa government 
took a more ideological stance and openly accused US-backed pharmaceutical companies of 
exploiting the disadvantaged African countries. The government of Botswana on the other hand, 
dealt directly with the US pharmaceutical giant Merck and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and agreed to be supplied with branded AIDS drugs in the public health system.  
This study recognises the consensual agreements signed by governments at international 
gatherings agreeing that HIV and AIDS represents a special type of emergency, which requires 
governments to implement internationally devised best practises to fight the epidemic. As has 
been presented, the explicit and tacit links regarding securitisation of the epidemic were 
consolidated at successive conferences where states’ representatives met and reached agreements 
                                                
7 Chapter 6 will further explore the important role played by the HIV and AIDS advocacy group, the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa. 
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intended to develop a particular understanding of the global epidemic. At these international 
gatherings, the signatories of joint declarations agreed upon general principles, identified specific 
recommendations for state behaviour and established decision-making procedures at the 
multilateral and state levels. However, as will be highlighted later, despite their joint declarations 
and formal commitments at multilateral gatherings, the actual response of governments to the 
global securitisation of HIV and AIDS rested largely on their pre-existing political attitudes 
towards the epidemic. 
4.2 HIV and AIDS epidemic and Global Health Governance8 
The HIV and AIDS epidemic has been viewed and discussed about within academic and policy 
communities as an international security concern. According to Ruston (2007:1), international 
actors do not treat HIV and AIDS “solely as a problem of human or public health or international 
development: it is now widely recognised as a security threat”. Much of the available academic 
literature on the epidemic and security points to the United Nations as being instrumental in the 
‘securitisation’ process, most notably Security Council Resolution 13089. This approach has 
been widely supported in policy circles (Rushton, 2007:1). Dr Peter Piot, the Executive Director 
of UNAIDS asserted that: 
When we look at the history of the fight against AIDS, there is no doubt that resolution 
1308 (2000) is a milestone in the response to the epidemic. By underscoring the fact that 
the spread of HIV/AIDS, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security, the 
Security Council […] has transformed how the world views AIDS. I say “transformed” 
because many now view AIDS as a threat to national security and stability, in addition to 
being a threat to development and public health alone (quoted in Rushton (2007:1-2)).  
The Security Council remains the most influential body in setting the agenda for what constitutes 
a threat to international peace and security. According to Rushton (2007:3), “it is the most 
authorative adjudicator of securitising claims that we have. It is for this reason that Resolution 
                                                
8 While it is not the aim of the thesis to analyse the merits of Global Health Governance, it is useful to demonstrate 
how the epidemic was dealt with at the international level. For more on Global Health Governance please refer to 
Kickbusch, 2002; Kay and Williams 2009; Cooper, et al. 2007; Garrett, 2007; Buse et al. 2009; McCoy, et al. 2009; 
Davies, 2010; and Harman 2012. 
9 For further information refer to G Prins (2004), “AIDS and global security”, International Affairs vol. 80(5) p 931-
952; C McInnes (2006), “HIV/AIDS and security”, International Affairs vol. 82(2) p 315-326; S Elbe (2005), 
“AIDS, Security, Biopolitics”, International Affairs vol. 19(4) p 403-419. 
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1308 has been widely seen as a watershed in the transition of HIV/AIDS from a development to 
a security issue”. In terms of Global Health Governance, this was remarkable development as the 
Security Council was a new entrant in the field. Some of the UN organs such as the World 
Health Organisation, UNDP, The World Food Programme and UNICEF are key actors in Global 
Health Governance. However, for the Security Council this was the first time it dealt with issues 
regarding health specifically10. In addition, Rushton (2007) makes the claim that civil society 
organisations have also become noteworthy actors in global governance and as a result have 
influenced states and conditioned policy responses through various means11.  
4.3 The origins of the HIV and AIDS security approach12 
The Copenhagen School’s approach to securitisation is important in understanding how HIV and 
AIDS were included into the concept of security. From this analytical framework it will be 
demonstrated that security threats are socially constructed. This therefore allows the possibility 
for definitions of what constitutes a ‘security threat’ to be able to change over time, also that they 
can be changed deliberately by actors seeking to identify new security threats as and when 
necessary to do so.  
Not all actors are in a position to lay claim to proclaiming an issue as a security threat. 
According to Waever (1995:54), “[i]n naming a certain development security problem, the 
“state” can claim a special right, one that will in the final instance, always be defined by the state 
and its elites. […] By definition, something is a security threat when the elites declare it to be 
so”. This implies that powerful actors find themselves in a more privileged position with the 
ability to define social issues as security threats. Rushton (2007:3) asserts that the success or 
failure of an attempt to securitise a particular issue may not be determined by power alone, but 
rather that it surely exerts a significant influence over the end result. Buzan et al (1998:32) claim 
that, “To study securitisation is to study the power politics of concept”. From this definition it 
may seem that the role played by civil society actors may be limited in any securitisation 
attempts. Chapters 5 – 7 will empirically examine and test this limitation and demonstrate the 
                                                
10 Interestingly, McInnes and Rushton (2010: 10), make the observation that following Resolution 1308, AIDS 
became a ‘core’ issue for the UNSC. However, by the end of the decade it seemed to have dropped off the agenda. 
“The pattern established by the Council’s 2001, 2003 and 2005 meetings on HIV/AIDS has not continued and there 
has been no formal Council discussion of HIV/AIDS since 2005.” 
11 The role of these civil society actors will be elaborated further on in the thesis in chapters 5 - 7.  
12 A more in depth analysis of the Copenhagen School will be carried out in chapter 4. 
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role played by civil society actors in ensuring the degree of securitisation in each of the case 
study countries.   
4.4 Brief overview of the influential HIV and AIDS global securitising actors 
This section will focus on three key securitising actors namely, the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS), the US government and the role of civil society. All 
of these actors have expressed strong views on the suitable policy approaches necessary for 
responding to the HIV and AIDS epidemic. For purposes of this study, I have chosen to use 
Buzan et al.’s (1998) definition for a securitising actor. According to Buzan et al (1998:40), “a 
security actor is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act”. These actors can 
come from political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups. Buzan 
et al (1998:40) asserts that for the above listed securitising actors, “Their argument will normally 
be that it is necessary to defend the security of the state, nation, civilization, or some other larger 
community, principle, or system”. Therefore, based on this definition securitising actors are 
made up of both state and non-state actors and will be explored as such in each of the case study 
countries. 
4.4.1 UNAIDS 
The formation of UNAIDS in 1996 was in response to the idea that it was not possible to defeat 
HIV and AIDS through the conventional public health institutions and available public policies. 
This was significant as it was first time in the history of the UN that an autonomous bureaucracy 
was created to deal with a single disease. Vieira (2006:75) argues that the existence of this highly 
authoritative organisation can be construed as a sign that the epidemic had gradually moved 
away from the dimension of politicisation. UNAIDS has become a key securitising actor by 
promoting and furthering the current predominant view that links HIV and AIDS and security. In 
July 2005 Piot, while addressing the 3rd IAS Conference on HIV Pathogenesis and Treatment, in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, stressed the special character of the epidemic and the need for an 
exceptional and comprehensive response. Piot (2005) stated: 
I believe we need to move the response to AIDS into another league, on par with other 
critical global issues such as climate change and extreme poverty, and not stay in our 
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AIDS ghetto.  Debating AIDS belongs as much in the UN Security Council as it belongs 
in scientific conferences.  
UNAIDS seeks to galvanise attention devoted to HIV and AIDS concerns, which in turn 
legitimises its existence in the international system (Vieira, 2006). The successful securitisation 
of the epidemic placed UNAIDS as the principal body to lead the global response effort. This 
raised the institutional profile and importance of UNAIDS in the response to the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic. The key function of UNAIDS is to be a coordinating body rather than a direct 
implementing and funding agency.  
At country level UNAIDS operates through the UN Theme Group. Representatives of the 
cosponsoring organisations meet to share information, and to plan and monitor coordinated 
action between themselves and with other partners. They also decide on joint financing of key 
AIDS activities in support of the country’s government and other national partners in the Theme 
Group. The main purpose of the Theme Group is to offer support to the host country’s efforts to 
manage an effective and comprehensive response to the epidemic (UNAIDS, 2006).  
UNAIDS has been able to establish more than 130 UN Theme Groups throughout all the regions 
of the world. In order to have a wider sphere of influence, most Theme Groups have set up 
special work groups, which include donors, NGOs and PLWHA. In countries with high HIV 
prevalence rates the Theme Group make use of a Country Program Advisor (CPA).  The CPA 
has been an influential conduit for UNAIDS’ ideas to be passed on as the officer is tasked with 
providing information and guidance to a whole range of host partners which include government 
departments and civil society actors (Vieira, 2006:80).   
The UNSC Resolution 1308 led to the creation of the UNAIDS Office on AIDS, Security and 
Humanitarian Response (SHR). It was tasked with devising strategies to assist states in meeting 
their multilateral commitments (UNAIDS, 2005). The call for the multilateralisation of HIV and 
AIDS as a security issue gathered momentum as “the intervention of the Security Council in 
2000 was a critical move in securitising HIV and AIDS, constructing the disease as something 
extraordinary which demanded international attention and action” (McInnes, 2006:315).   
Resolution 1308 was important as it empowered UNAIDS with greater institutional legitimacy 
necessary for it to act. In 2001 the UN General Assembly held a special session on HIV and 
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AIDS (UNGASS), which was an important step as it helped to place the epidemic on the 
multilateral agenda. During the special session former US Military Chief of Staff and then 
Secretary of State General Colin Powell declared, that “there is no enemy in war more insidious 
than AIDS” (Behrman, 2004:266). By December 2002, based on recommendations by UNAIDS, 
about 100 states had already set up National HIV and AIDS plans, and UNAIDS has also helped 
85 countries to establish National HIV and AIDS Councils. UNAIDS has also provided support 
to these governments by providing assistance in many technical areas, such as the drafting of 
donor proposals, integrating HIV and AIDS into broader development strategies as well as 
assessing the progress of the national responses (UNAIDS 2004). More significant is the fact that 
UNAIDS/SHR, through its Global Initiative on HIV/AIDS and Security, has systematically 
instilled in governments with the message that HIV and AIDS should be integrated into their 
national and regional security strategies (Vieira, 2006:82). 
4.4.2 The US government 
The US government and its associate agencies also play an important role in the process of 
creating international understanding of the epidemic. Former President William J Clinton’s 
approach to the global HIV and AIDS epidemic favoured multilateral engagement. The Clinton 
administration was instrumental behind the first major initiative to promote the claim that HIV 
and AIDS was a security threat on the global stage. This is highlighted by the successful attempt 
of the Clinton administration to include the epidemic on the agenda of the Security Council 
(Prins, 2004:941). When addressing the Security Council in 2000, Vice-President Al Gore 
stressed the common security challenges posed by the epidemic and the “real and present danger 
to world security posed by the AIDS pandemic” and urged other UN members to “see security 
through a new, wider prism and forever after think about it according to a new, more expansive 
definition” (UNSC, 2000:2). 
In 1999, prior to the historic UNSC meeting, Clinton officially recognised HIV and AIDS as a 
national and international security threat. At the same time the National Security Council (NSC) 
became involved in the US policy to fight the global epidemic. This was significant as it was the 
first time the NSC declared an infectious disease a potential threat to the US (Johnson, 2000). 
Clinton also doubled the budget for international HIV and AIDS relief to US$ 254 million and 
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introduced a new interagency based in the White House, called the Office of National AIDS 
Policy. In addition, Clinton established a Presidential Advisory Council on HIV and AIDS 
(PACHA) which offered expertise on how the federal government should respond to the 
epidemic (Johnson, 2002).  
The arrival of President George W. Bush saw that US policies towards the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic being significantly reframed and implemented further. It can be argued that Bush’s 
approach to the global HIV and AIDS crisis is deeply embedded in the belief that the US is a 
special nation with global responsibilities (Vieira, 2006:85). According to the US Department of 
State (2003), 
You know, the world looks at us and says, they’re strong. And we are; we’re strong 
militarily. But we’ve got a greater strength than that. We’ve got strength in the 
universality of human rights and the human condition. It’s in our country’s history. It’s 
ingrained in our soul. And today we’re going to describe how we’re going to act - not just 
talk, but act, on the basis of our firm beliefs. 
On 31 January 2003 the Bush administration publicly acknowledged the devastating impact of 
the global HIV and AIDS epidemic as a global emergency and seemed to be moving towards its 
securitisation. Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, stated that “bureaucracy as usual was 
unacceptable in dealing with this emergency, and we have moved forward urgently” (US 
Department of State, 2004). This was in reference to the launching of the President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). This new ground-breaking initiative saw the President commit 
US$15 billion over 5 years, making it the largest pledge to HIV and AIDS international 
assistance by a single government. In comparison, assistance from all developed nations to the 
Global Fund13 amounted to only US$6 billion in 2004 (Global Fund - Pledges, 2005). 
Vieira (2006:86-88) argues that since the launch of PEPFAR, the Bush administration has 
redefined its HIV and AIDS global strategy in terms of three main axes. Firstly, it keeps the 
traditional foreign aid approach through initiatives formulated by USAID. This allows the link 
                                                
13 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) is a multi-billion dollar international 
financing mechanism that aims to increase the availability of funding by directing money towards areas of greatest 
need. The organisation works as a partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector (including 
businesses and foundations) and affected communities by combining resources for fighting HIV and AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria through grant programmes. 
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between the US government and domestic NGOs specialising in global HIV and AIDS relief and 
advocacy (mainly faith-based organisations) to be more clearly defined. Faith-based 
organisations have been an important partner for implementing HIV and AIDS policies and 
programmes for USAID for many years. The use of faith-based organisations proved beneficial 
to the US government in order to penetrate the domestic structure of states afflicted by the 
epidemic.  Because of their strong lobby, at least one third of PEPFAR’s US$15 billion is 
earmarked for projects stressing abstinence until marriage as the fundamental preventative 
measure against the epidemic (The Economist, 23 June 2005). In countries being financially 
supported by the US, assistance to HIV and AIDS programmes is attached to stringent moral 
strings. 
Secondly, it explored the multilateral approach. It operates by the placement and participation of 
US officials in key decision-making structures of international organisations such as UNAIDS, 
the Global Fund and the World Bank. All these multilateral bodies are heavily dependent on US 
funding. This is clearly highlighted when looking at the period 1995–2005, where the US 
government contributed more than 20 per cent of the total contributions, making it the principal 
sponsor of UNAIDS (UNAIDS, 2005). Also, the Global Fund is very dependent on US funding, 
with the US government committing US$2.5 billion to the fund for the period 2001–2008. This 
represents 30 per cent of all money pledged by states to the Fund (Global Fund, 2005b). 
The third axis present is PEPFAR, which is run by the State Department and sits hierarchically 
on top of all other HIV and AIDS organs found in the US government structure. Garret 
(2005:12) makes an important observation that PEPFAR “is located inside the State Department, 
where its mission is defined in both foreign aid and national security terms”.  
The launch of PEPFAR may be indicative of the fact that the HIV and AIDS epidemic has been 
securitised within the US. For an issue to be successfully securitised, securitisation theory states 
that a significant audience should be persuaded by a securitising actor that something is 
threatening which may require exceptional measures to deal with it. Vieira (2006:89) asserts that 
in the case of the US political system, the convincing of Congress (representative of a wider 
audience of the American people) could be seen as sufficient evidence of securitisation. The 
Bush administration approach was endorsed and mandated by the US Congress. With Congress’s 
formal approval of Bush’s securitising move, “it can be strongly argued that the Bush 
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administration spoke security successfully while describing the epidemic to its domestic 
constituencies” (Vieira, 2006:89).  
4.4.3 Role of civil society organisations in securitisation attempts 
A concern regarding the securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic relates to the potential 
effect on international spending on the epidemic. By securitising a particular issue, this may 
create a situation, which leads to higher spending levels to address the security threat. Rushton 
(2007:5) argues that “it is precisely for this reason that securitisation is utilised as a political 
strategy”. An example of this has been the increase in spending by the US government for the 
fight against HIV and AIDS. This has resulted in much of the spending being utilised for the 
funding of NGO projects by USAID14. By channelling these large amounts of money to the civil 
society actors to further the US government’s policy agenda it can be interpreted as the link that 
makes these organisations an extension of the US government and gives them an increased status 
as relevant HIV and AIDS securitising actors. This assumption will be further elaborated on later 
in the thesis in each of the three case study countries. 
Civil society organisations play an important role and tend to be at the forefront in dealing with 
the effects of the HIV and AIDS epidemic. There have been numerous international and 
domestic NGOs, faith-based organisations and other organisations that have long been active in 
HIV prevention and care as well as addressing the personal, family and social impact of the 
epidemic. In the developing world this role has been more evident where national governments 
have been unable or even unwilling to adequately address the epidemic, which will be 
demonstrated later in this study. Each of the case studies present unique features in state and 
non-state relations, which will be explore in chapters 5-7. Because of a shift in the way in which 
societal concerns are dealt with and funded (both internationally and domestically), it can be 
argued that this would impact on the work of civil society actors. As a result, Ruston (2007:6) 
states, that “by virtue of their role in relation to HIV it could also be argued that those NGOs 
involved have effectively (and perhaps unwittingly) become security actors.” This study 
demonstrates that civil society actors may not have access to high levels of power and influence 
as enjoyed by the state in the international system, but they can be meaningful security actors 
                                                
14 According to Rushton (2007:5), in 2001 an increase of 10 percent in US funding for HIV and AIDS was seen and 
some 70 percent of the $284 million was spent by USAID on HIV and AIDS was programmed through NGOs. 
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with the ability to adopt and promote a particular perspective or even to show resistance against 
it when necessary.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the chapter traced the journey of HIV and AIDS from biomedical to that of an 
international security threat placed on the political agenda of the international community. It also 
highlighted the process the disease took to be accepted by the international community as a 
security threat requiring urgent attention.  
The chapter concluded with an examination of the link between HIV and AIDS and security. It 
was found that the threat posed by the epidemic does impact on both the individual’s and the 
state’s security. The chapter also demonstrated the influence of UNAIDS, the US government 
and the role of civil society as global securitising actors in advancing the global securitisation 
approach. The differential power positions and political agendas of UNAIDS and the US 
demonstrates that successful securitisation of HIV and AIDS is more than only a function of 
their linguistic competence (Balzacq, 2005). 
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Chapter 5: Policy Issues, Processes and Framing around HIV and AIDS in 
Botswana 
5.1. Introduction 
The overwhelming impact of the HIV and AIDS epidemic on Botswana has placed it firmly in 
the group of countries, which form “the global epicentre of the epidemic” (Hwedie, 2001:55). In 
2001 Botswana was one of four countries whose HIV and AIDS prevalence exceeded what had 
previously been thought to be possible, exceeding 30 per cent and reaching 38.8 per cent 
(UNAIDS/WHO, 2002:17). Botswana’s stable political environment and the government’s 
commitment to managing the spread of the disease attracted the attention of the international 
community of donors, multilateral organisations and NGOs. According to Vieira (2006:105), 
Botswana became an important testing ground for local HIV and AIDS actors and international 
and bilateral agencies aiming to develop strategies to combat the epidemic.  
The chapter focuses on the framing of policy and the processes and factors associated with it in 
Botswana. This approach helps to explain how different factors influence policy framing as part 
of the national response policy to address the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the country. The 
chapter further explores the role of relevant stakeholders such as state, non-state domestic HIV 
and AIDS actors, and multilateral and bilateral agencies in attempting to influence the policy 
decision-making processes in Botswana. This chapter also explores the national response to HIV 
and AIDS in Botswana in the light of three main theoretical approaches to public policy, namely 
Pluralism, Elitism and Statism. Looking at the theoretical perspectives can help explain the 
power dynamics between the actors and how the HIV and AIDS policy was framed. Finally, the 
chapter examines the processes and dynamics around the securitisation of the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic in the country. It is argued that the openness and acceptance of the securitisation 
discourse by Botswana’s former president, Fetus Mogae’s led to a higher degree of securitisation 
of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Botswana.  
The roles of certain transnational actors, notably the UN agencies and the US government, are 
analysed to ascertain the success of their persuasion efforts as promoters of the securitisation 
discourse in the policy decision making processes. It is argued that Botswana’s political 
leadership, primarily President Mogae, created a more open and inviting environment for 
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international HIV and AIDS actors to carry out their work to support the national HIV and AIDS 
response policy. The acceptance of international actors and their ideas led to a more 
collaborative approach towards the framing of policies and processes for the national response 
policy. As a result, in 2002 Botswana became the first African country to launch a national 
antiretroviral treatment project financed in equal measures by the Botswana government, the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation and the pharmaceutical company Merck15. 
It is shown that Botswana’s approach to its domestic HIV and AIDS policies differs from that of 
most other African states, as those states tend to have a higher level of economic dependence on 
international funding (Baylies, 1999). Although the country is still dependent on multilateral and 
bilateral donors to fund its HIV and AIDS activities, unlike most of its South African neighbours 
(excluding South Africa) Botswana is much less in need of foreign aid (Nzau, 2011:100).  
 
While Botswana may not have been as reliant on multilateral and bilateral donor aid as 
Swaziland, the aid it did receive helped to influence policy formulation and implementation. 
Botswana’s political and social structures helped external actors gain access into its domestic 
policy decision-making process. Several factors, including a strong and committed political 
leadership, and a rather weak civil society with very low levels of political activism helped to 
create the internal conditions for the acceptance of international thinking about the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic. It is argued that the role of civil society is important, even though it was 
historically not very strong in Botswana. However, because of civil society participation in the 
HIV and AIDS environment, it was incorporated into the government HIV and AIDS structures, 
resulting in a mutually beneficial relationship that strengthened the HIV and AIDS national 
response policy.  
 
The chapter starts with a brief overview of the dimensions of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in 
Botswana. It looks at different socio-economic features of Botswana and how the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic has impacted on the country. This is followed by an overview of policy responses to 
the epidemic. Here the early efforts to address the epidemic are discussed as is the process 
leading to a change in approach to the policy decision-making process. The third part of this 
                                                
15 This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 86 
 
chapter examines factors that influenced the policy decision-making process. Chief among these 
are the government of Botswana’s relationship with the West and the prevailing social culture in 
Botswana. The next part of the chapter explores the role of relevant stakeholders. The focus of 
this section is to examine the relationships and power dynamics between the domestic non-state 
actors, transnational actors and the Botswana government. The following section deals with the 
securitisation approach in Botswana. It discusses the prevailing political culture in Botswana and 
also the USA as a key-securitising partner.  
5.2 Dimensions of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Botswana 
At the time of Botswana’s independence in 1966 it was regarded as one of the ten poorest 
countries in the world (Murray and Parson, 1990). This extraordinary low level of economic 
development was apparent in the inadequate physical infrastructure and the non-existence of an 
industrial sector, coupled with a fairly weak administrative capacity. The country was mainly 
rural, with the largest urban settlements not exceeding 10 000 inhabitants and 90 per cent of the 
population was based in the underdeveloped rural economy (Murray and Parson, 1990). As 
discussed in chapter 2, large rural-based populations in developing states tend to live more 
widely distributed, and thus geographically further away from the public institutions that make 
important policy decisions impacting on their lives. Therefore in Botswana, this leaves a section 
of the population with little influence on the policy decision-making processes itself and with 
limited access to important decision-makers. According to Grindle and Thomas (1991), this 
creates a situation that isolates these sectors of the population. However, the government rapidly 
expanded the central government institutional apparatus, leading to a significant increase in the 
delivery of public services (Du Toit, 1995:33). Du Toit (1995:47) argues that the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP), which has been in power since independence, has succeeded in 
establishing a technocratic state with an autonomous bureaucracy that “contributed as a vital 
ingredient to the quality of statehood that evolved in post-independence Botswana”. BDP’s post-
independence nationalism was strengthened by the fundamental task of promoting economic 
growth and social development (Taylor, 2005:5). Consequently, the national project was 
embraced and advanced by the political and bureaucratic elites and, concomitantly, it gained 
widespread acceptance amongst both the rural and urban populations (Taylor, 2005:5).  
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Soon after independence prospecting operations revealed a vast potential for diamond and 
copper-nickel mining and the government allocated a large share of public spending and 
administrative capacity to the development of the mining sector. Harvey and Lewis (1990:53) 
have characterised this turning point in 1972-3, when Botswana ceased to rely only on financial 
support from the United Kingdom, as the achievement of “a second independence.” The 1970s 
and 1980s saw the government considerably reduce the rates of child mortality as well as 
malnutrition. In the public health sector Botswana had a per capita expenditure of US$358 
making it the highest in Southern Africa (UNDP, 2003). At independence the per capita income 
was P70 (US$12) and the latest UNDP results show the per capita income to be P18, 340 (US$ 
3,056). The World Bank rates Botswana as an upper-middle-income economy. With diamonds 
constituting almost half of the state’s income, together with import duties and development aid, 
the state has been equipped with financial manoeuvrability, meaning that the state has financial 
systems in place which are able to adjust and respond to changing market conditions. This is 
exceptional in the developing world (Harvey and Lewis, 1990:192-4). Botswana is today a 
relatively wealthy and politically stable country.  
However, Botswana still faces numerous challenges. Chief among these is the urgent need to 
curb and manage the threat posed by the HIV and AIDS epidemic. The first officially recorded 
HIV case there was diagnosed in 1985. Since then the number of infections HAS increased 
exponentially regardless of social grouping or economic class. The spread was extremely rapid 
that in 1989 the cumulative number of people living with the virus was 35, but by 1996, eleven 
years after the first recorded case; it had risen to nearly 4, 00016. The 2008 Report on the Global 
AIDS Epidemic by UNAIDS, placed the figure at 300 000 in 200717 and with an adult prevalence 
rate of 23.9 per cent. With a relatively small population of approximately 1.8 million, this 
amounts to almost one in six of the entire population infected with the disease. Wæver (1995:63) 
asserts that “Putting something on the security agenda persuades us of the need to furnish urgent 
and unprecedented responses; it signals imminent danger and is therefore given a high priority”. 
                                                
16  In a report published by the National AIDS Coordinating Agency, Botswana, December 2000 Botswana 2000 
HIV/AIDS Sero-prevalence and STD Syndrome Sentinel Survey 
17 According to UNAIDS data sourced from the following web link-  
 http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global_report.asp  
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According to an interviewee, “Botswana has a rather unconventional relationship with the 
epidemic as it seems to defy the common belief that economic underdevelopment is directly 
linked to the spread of the HIV virus” (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS Specialist 
UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). While Botswana’s health care system is among 
the best on the African continent, it continues to experience high levels of HIV and AIDS 
prevalence in the population (UNDP, 2004). Since the first recorded case the government has 
been quick to act in accordance with international medical guidelines for action. However, some 
critics noted that while the government was quick to react once the disease had been identified, 
the actions it took did little to prevent a rapid increase in infections in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Games, 2006:8). This may be due to the fact that the full magnitude of the disease had not 
yet been properly understood.  
The impact of the epidemic saw life expectancy falling from 65 years in 1990-1995 to below 40 
years in 2000-2005 - an estimated 28 years lower than it would have been without AIDS 
(UNFPA, 2001). It is estimated that approximately 95,000 children have lost at least one parent 
to the epidemic (UNAIDS, 2008). In order for these children to become productive citizens of 
Botswana, it is vital that they have access to education, but because of their circumstances this is 
challenging for many families already weakened by the epidemic, where children may be forced 
into provide care for ill relatives or supporting siblings (UNAIDS, 2008).  
The loss of the adult population in their productive years has serious economic implications for 
the country (NACA, 2005). This loss is carried through and experienced in the economic output 
of Botswana which in turn is reduced by the loss of workers and skills in the agricultural and 
mining sectors as well as the private and public sectors. At the turn of the millennium it was 
estimated that if the epidemic were not curbed by 2021, Botswana’s GDP will be in the region of 
24-38 per cent less than it would have been without the epidemic (UNDP, 2000:2). While there 
may have been some successes in Botswana’s approach to curbing the epidemic since then, there 
is still a real concern that if more is not done, Botswana’s hard-won social and economic 
achievements may be negatively impacted (Carr-Hill et al., 2002:24).  
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5.3 Observable policy responses 
5.3.1 Early efforts to address the epidemic  
In order to deal with the disease the government had to accept that the HIV and AIDS issue 
should be included in the agenda-setting process. As discussed in chapter 4, Anderson (2000:93) 
argues that at any given time there are a vast number of public problems in the society, and it is 
not possible for all to make it onto the public policy agenda. Policymaking occurs in response to 
a certain societal ill with the aim of providing a remedy or recourse.  Thus, for HIV and AIDS to 
make it onto the public agenda it was elevated to the level of a societal ill, which the government 
believed made it necessary to formulate policy responses.  
Because of the stable political environment and relatively efficient health system, Botswana was 
able to respond to the epidemic earlier than the rest of Southern Africa, including South Africa 
and Swaziland. At this point the government may not have been in a position to comprehend the 
full magnitude of the impending epidemic, but it was preparing the policy environment to 
address the problem. Fourie (2005:23) believes policy processes should be viewed as a series of 
stages which should be contextualised within a policy environment, since they do not occur in a 
social vacuum. The state’s prevailing political culture and the socio-economic conditions are key 
factors in determining what is deemed as important societal issues. 
The Ministry of Health confined the initial responses by the government to a number of policy 
interventions. In 1986 two initiatives were launched one year after the first reported case. First, 
the public health service launched a blood-screening programme in order to eliminate the risk of 
HIV transmission through blood transfusions. Second, the government set up the Minimum 
Programme located in the epidemiology unit of the Ministry of Health. In 1987 the government 
set up the National AIDS Programme (NACP) with the help of the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), which developed a Short Term Plan (STP) for HIV/AIDS (1987-1987). Its primary 
focus was on increasing national public awareness of the disease and the introduction of 
epidemiological surveillance and monitoring.  
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5.3.2 Change of approach in the policy decision making process  
The first attempt of the national response policies in Botswana was from 1987-1993, which 
coincided with the beginning of the worldwide expansion of the epidemic. Due to the expansion 
of the epidemic, the government realised the need for new policy decision-making to best 
address the HIV and AIDS epidemic more effectively. This change in the policy decision-
making process could be the consequence of the unsuitable manner in which the issues (HIV and 
AIDS) were earlier defined and identified in the initial policy decision-making phase (Parsons, 
1997:82-83).  
The STP was followed by a more comprehensive five-year plan, the First Medium-Term Plan 
(MTP I) for the Prevention and Control of HIV and AIDS (1989-1993). During the early 1990s, 
when the disease was spreading at an alarming rate there was an opportunity for the government 
to contain and manage the problem. The MPT I aimed to give policy and strategic guidelines for 
action after the inception of the NACP. Additionally, the MPT I outlined the role of the health 
sector and the Ministry of Health, supported and assisted by other sectors and civil society actors 
concerned with prevention, care and support. 
In 1992 the government launched detailed surveillance for HIV and AIDS focusing on pregnant 
women attending antenatal clinics and male patients being treated for sexually transmitted 
diseases. In an attempt to demonstrate a refocusing of intent in dealing with the disease, the 
government renamed its Sexually Transmitted Diseases Unit, the AIDS/STD Unit. However, the 
government came under criticism for failing to provide adequate funding to the Unit, despite the 
evidence that infections were spreading rapidly (Sidiropoulos, 2006:12). This information came 
to the fore when data showed that HIV prevalence among pregnant women rose from 23.7% to 
42 per cent in Francistown, and from 14.9 per cent to 31 percent in Gaborone from 1992-1999 
(Botswana 2000 HIV Sero-prevalence and STD Syndrome Sentinel Survey).  
In 1993 a revised National Policy was developed because it was felt that there was a need to 
broaden the policy implementation process. It called for a more all-inclusive strategy, which 
meant that in addition to the efforts of the Health Ministry, other government departments, 
relevant civil society bodies and groups from the private sector and the community were 
involved as well. This new revised strategy increased the involvement of development partners 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 91 
 
and international organisations, particularly UNAIDS. This is in line with the pluralists’ belief 
that government agencies are not alone but part of a myriad of actors who through their actions 
are in a position to influence the political leaders of the day. It also focused on five groups of 
actors to help with policymaking, namely national, district, civil society, the armed forces and 
applied research (Ntseane, 2002). According to the Ministry of Health’s review of the MTP 1, 
one major constraint on implementation was the “minimal involvement of the Ministries and 
senior management as well as inadequate involvement of local government structures” (Ministry 
of Health, 1997:31). This was echoed in one of the interviews. At a time when a more aggressive 
policy was required, it seemed as if government officials were not entirely convinced or did not 
fully understand the magnitude of the crisis (interview, Senior Health Officer: SADC, 5/3/08). 
Therefore, there was an urgent need for the change in policy to include as wide a range of actors 
in the response strategy as possible.  
At national level the strategy included the establishment of a focal point for co-ordination of all 
HIV and AIDS-related projects in each Ministry. The aim was to increase policymakers’ 
awareness of the disease and the impact it has on development. Simultaneously management and 
information systems located at national and district levels were established to collect and analyse 
data for policy programme development. At the district level they included the centralisation of 
programmes to each district and then to the village context. At the level of civil society, they 
were used to participate in support activities, primarily through NGOs (Ntseane, 2002). 
During the early 1990s, when the disease was spreading at an alarming rate there was an 
opportunity for the government to contain and manage the problem. However, at a time when a 
more aggressive policy was required, it seemed as if government officials were not entirely 
convinced or did not fully understand the magnitude of the crisis (interview, Senior Health 
Officer: SADC, 5/3/08). This is highlighted by the Ministry of Health’s review of the MTP I, 
which highlighted “minimal involvement of Ministries and senior management as well as 
inadequate involvement of local government structures” (Ministry of Health, 1997:31).  
In 1997 a Second Medium-Term Plan (1997-2002) (MTP II) was adopted to improve efforts to 
combat the epidemic. It called for an expansion of the MTP I, political leadership and 
consolidation. Its goals were to reduce the HIV infection and transmission rates. It substantially 
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changed the focus from a health-based approach to a comprehensive multi-sectoral response 
intended to impact on all levels of society.18 
The adoption of the MPT II highlighted a change in approach and more aligned to the manner in 
which the HIV and AIDS epidemic was understood at the global level. The formulation and 
implementation of the MPT II coincided with the emergence of policy studies and academic 
reports seeking to address the epidemic in non-conventional terms. The launching of the MPT II 
also corresponded at the multilateral level with the establishment of UNAIDS. As shown in 
chapter 4, at this time there were a number of academics, international organisations and state 
organs starting to examine the links between human/national security and HIV and AIDS. 
An ambitious ARV programme was attempted and also launched in 1999. The goal of the 
programme was that by the end of 2002 190 000 people would be on treatment. However, this 
proved to be too optimistic of a goal to achieve. Despite Botswana’s well-developed primary 
health care services, it lacked adequate testing facilities and the capability to staff and maintain 
the infrastructure to supply ARVs on the scale intended (interview, Senior Programme Manager 
with the AED Centre on AIDS and Community Health, 5/3/08).  
Therefore, instead a mass roll-out of ARVs was launched in January 2002 through a programme 
named Masa, the Setswana word for ‘new dawn’. The programme provided free ART to eligible 
citizens living with HIV only. However, whereas Botswana citizens are eligible for free ART, 
their foreign spouses are not (interview, Project Development Worker BONEPWA, 6/03/08). By 
the end of 2004 there were four major centres and a total of 23 sites had been established 
countrywide. According to the African Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Partnership (ACHAP) 
data, from 2005-2006 there were 32 sites and 54,969 patients were on ART. It is estimated that 
85 per cent of all people requiring ART are presently receiving such treatment (UNAIDS, 2008). 
                                                
18 With the adoption of the MTP II, the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) was engaged and became a key 
department in the national response. It is in charge of managing, sustaining and coordinating strategic actions at the 
district level. In order to adapt to the HIV and AIDS bureaucratic structures in the national government, it was dealt 
delegated to the Ministry’s divisions at local level. It controlled the administration of the District Multi-Sectoral 
AIDS Committees (DMSAC). Under the MTP II the DMSACs were established to coordinate all the local 
stakeholders’ inputs. Essentially, it was to become the sole HIV and AIDS local authority recognised by the central 
government. The reason for the relevance of the MLG is due to the fact that the government found enormous 
difficulties in addressing demand at grassroots level (Ministry of Health, 1997) 
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The Masa programme was a partnership between the government, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and the US pharmaceutical Merck Company Foundation. While it was the case that 
most countries in the region invested in the provision of generic AIDS drugs, more so in the case 
of South Africa, the government of Botswana instead decided to partner with the US 
pharmaceutical Merck to provide branded drugs to be distributed through its domestic public 
health system. Vieira (2006) holds the view that with this partnership Mogae’s administration 
revealed a preference for the principles and policy ideas advocated by the US government. This 
was because the characteristics of Botswana’s political and social structures were more open and 
accepting of external actors, which appealed to the US government’s securitising ideals. This 
prevailing openness approach to external securitising actors differed in the cases of South Africa 
and Swaziland as will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7.  
Early reports showed that after an initial rush, patients were slow to come forward. Prior to 2003 
the government’s policy was the opt-in approach. This means that after pre-HIV test counselling, 
they must specifically consent to a HIV test when visiting a health facility. Later the government 
introduced a policy of ‘routine testing’. The ‘routine testing’ called for every person attending a 
public health facility to be tested unless they opt out, or specifically decline. By adopting a more 
unilateral approach towards monitoring the spread of the disease the government was criticised 
by HIV and AIDS activists, who were concerned about the human rights of people living with 
HIV and AIDS. According to Vieira (2011:19) “this system of routine HIV testing is, in fact, a 
recommendation of the US’s CDC without the full backing of UNAIDS and other important 
transnational HIV and AIDS actors”. This is an example of elite theorists at work since in the 
public policy domain these elites are in a position to control and manipulate the agenda-setting 
process. By adopting the recommendation of the CDC rather than UNAIDS and other important 
transnational HIV and AIDS actors, Botswana placed the US government in an advantageous 
position to advance its own political agenda.  
Major challenges and shortcomings of Masa were the critical shortage of skilled personnel and 
the poor infrastructure needed to ensure appropriate, safe and effective use of ART. These 
hindered the successful implementation of the ART programmes. The PACT officer raised the 
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issue about the difficulties experienced in sourcing skilled personnel. Indeed the PACT19 office 
closed down its Botswana office at the end of March 2008 (interview, Pact Regional Programme 
Manager for the Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Prevention Programme: 10/4/08). 
In order to address the challenges and shortcomings, ACHAP, in collaboration with the Harvard 
AIDS Institute and the Ministry of Health, developed a curriculum on HIV and AIDS clinical 
care known as the KITSO (‘knowledge’) programme. Since the start of the programme, it has 
cumulatively trained 6,300 health care workers and 1,500 lay personnel in various training 
modules. A key achievement of the KITSO training programme continues to be the creation of 
human capacity to roll out the ARV programmes to clinics across the country (ACHAP website, 
accessed 22 August 2012).  
5.4 Factors that influenced the policy decision making process 
i) Relations with the West 
Botswana and Britain negotiated a peaceful transition of power that led to Botswana’s 
independence in September 1966. The relationship has continued to prosper. Recently, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr Phandu Skelemani, stated that 
“such a cordial relationship, which predates Botswana’s independence, is particularly beneficial 
in the fields of health care, trade, defence and security, education as well as the support for the 
civil society at large” (MOFAIC, 2011). Botswana has also been able to forge cordial 
relationships with other Western powers built on mutual interests. For instance, “the United 
States considers Botswana an excellent partner and an advocate of and model for stability in 
Africa. The bilateral relationship is strong, grounded in a shared commitment to democracy, 
good governance, and human rights” (US Bureau of African Affairs, 2012). The USA has been a 
major partner in Botswana’s development and Botswana is one of the focus countries for the 
President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR). 
Botswana’s cordial relationship with Western powers was important as it provided transnational 
actors with the necessary political space within which to operate. This access placed them in a 
                                                
19 PACT Globally is a capacity building organisation whose niche is working with small local organisations on 
infrastructure, management, accounting, bookkeeping, basically everything you would need to be a good strong well 
run organisation (regardless of what your mission) according to Kate McNally. 
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position to attempt to influence the government into accepting their ideas. As will be 
demonstrated later in South Africa and to some extent in Swaziland, this was not always the case 
since transnational actors met much resistance in attempting to have their ideas accepted by the 
respective governments.  An interviewee emphasised that in Botswana “any ideological 
underpinnings of policy pragmatism is driven by what the USA want in Botswana” (interview, 
AIDS Expert, University of Johannesburg: 25/04/08). This he believes is the case because of the 
high level of funding made available by the USA and other transnational actors. Because of the 
political environment in Botswana at the time, transnational actors were in a position to forge 
working relationships at a higher level in the policy decision-making structure as opposed to 
merely forming coalitions with domestic civil society actors (interview, AIDS Expert, University 
of Johannesburg: 25/04/08). This can be viewed as evidence of an elitist theoretical perspective 
within the public policy theory, where the political demands emanate from plural sources of elite 
groups. The UN and also the US government would, in this respect, qualify as representatives of 
the political elite. 
ii) Prevailing social culture in Botswana  
As a result of cultural sensitivities there is a deep-rooted unwillingness to discuss sex openly in 
Botswana, partly because of the rules of respect that lie at the foundation of family and kinship 
structures, which in turns limits communication across generations and sexual genders. 
According to an interviewee, “Cultural sensitivities still persist in most parts of the country 
which can and does limit awareness initiatives” (interview, Senior Health Officer AIDS Expert 
SADC, 5/3/08). While the campaigns were well intended, they failed to take into account the 
predominant cultural sensitivities (interview, Project Development Worker: BONEPWA, 
6/03/08). This lack of insight into cultural sensitivities may be attributed to an inadequacy in the 
agenda-setting process since it failed to take into account issues of sexual mores behaviour and 
practices.  
The first national campaign to raise awareness used media platforms such as radio messages, 
bumper stickers and T-shirts to convey the message about the dangers posed by the disease 
(Ingstat, 1990). Specific catchphrases were used in these official campaigns to help spread the 
awareness messages regarding the dangers associated with negligent sexual behaviour and 
practices. These were in line with those endorsed by the WHO, such as “AIDS Kills” and 
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“Avoiding AIDS is as easy as ABC - Abstain, Be faithful and Condomise” (Allen and Heald, 
2004:1144).  
Sex education campaigns are difficult and controversial in most parts of the world, let alone in 
Africa. HIV and AIDS as subject matter has been shrouded in both stigma and silence from the 
family level and permeates the whole community at large. In order to be more effective, policies 
require credibility and should take into account the relevant sensitivities of the intended target 
group. Allen and Heald (2004) are of the opinion that in Botswana there was neither credibility 
nor sensitivity. This they attributed to the government’s initial response to the threat. A limiting 
factor regarding the ABC slogan was the fact that it was presented in English, which meant that a 
significant section of the population was unable to fully understand the intended message. The 
lack of understanding of the intended message lead to the slogan not being fully accepted or 
appreciated, resulting in HIV and AIDS being known as the “radio disease” (Ingstad, 1990:29). 
Allen and Heard (2004) also argue that the campaigns were offensive as they did not heed the 
necessary cultural sensitivities.  
5.5 Role of relevant stakeholders in the policy-framing 
5.5.1 Political space for domestic non-state actors in Botswana - Historically weak civil 
society with close government links 
Several authors have written about the historical absence of a strong civil society movement in 
Botswana (Good, 1996; Tsie, 1996; Holm and Darnolf, 2000; Vieira, 2011). This view was 
echoed by several of the interviewees during my fieldwork in Botswana. “Civil society in 
Botswana is very different from most other countries. The biggest NGOs were all started by the 
government, so therefore the fact that government founded the NGOs it is different” (interview, 
Senior Programme Manager with the AED Centre on AIDS and Community Health, 5/3/08). The 
Executive Director of BONEPWA agreed that the government was indeed very instrumental in 
helping to establish many of the bigger NGOs operating in the country (interview, the Executive 
Director of BONEPWA, 6/03/08). “If you or anyone else was to look at an NGO in Botswana, 
the first thing you need to find out is: who is the leading office-holders in the NGO” (Godsater 
and Soderbaum, 2008:20). Godsater and Soderbaum (2008:20) assert, that this however does not 
mean that every NGO with government links is compromised. NGOs may still demonstrate 
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independence by challenging and criticising the government’s actions and policies. Bauer and 
Taylor (2005:99) confirmed this by arguing that “the general consensus around civil society in 
Botswana seems to be that it has been ‘historically absent’ in the country, only showing signs of 
life from the early 90s onwards.” Botswana’s model of democracy is characterised by a strong 
state bureaucracy, driven by entrenched political elite who limit any potential of an autonomous 
and vibrant civil society (Taylor 2003).  
After independence the government moved to control the growth of civil society organisations 
by incorporating them into the state’s bureaucratic structure. Holm and Darnolf (2000:99) argue 
that; “civil society exists as an extension of the bureaucracy rather than as a set of independent 
actors confronting politicians and civil servants.” Therefore, the relationship between state and 
civil society in Botswana can be characterised as top-down, thus limiting the ability of the latter 
to operate more independently.  
Most of the HIV and AIDS-related civil society organisations experience one or more of the 
following problems: lack of adequate resources, lack of staff capital coupled with shortage of 
technical and professional expertise, (interview, Pact Regional Programme Manager for the 
Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Prevention Programme: 10/4/08; interview, the Executive 
Director of BONEPWA, 6/03/08; interview, Senior Programme Manager with the AED Centre 
on AIDS and Community Health, 5/3/08).  Because of their limitations, the civil society actors 
were either co-opted by or absorbed into the state agencies they were seeking to influence with 
the intention to shape HIV and AIDS policies. This has resulted in them being very limited in 
their capacity to independently influence the process and outcomes of policymaking (interview, 
Senior Health Officer AIDS Expert SADC, 5/3/08).  
However, this assumption was challenged by the Executive Director of BONEPWA (interview, 
6/03/08), who stated in an interview that  
Government felt it could not fight the epidemic alone and as a result wanted the input and 
experiences of civil society, which they may have helped establish. Once established and 
experienced, NGOs in return can advise the government. The relationship has changed 
from a top-down to more mutual benefiting relationship. It has come full circle.  
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This is evidence that forming closer links to the government also gained them a degree of access 
to the government’s policy decision-making structures that NGOs in other countries might not 
have been able to access. This is an advantageous position because it offers the ability to 
influence policy framing in a more direct manner. 
In the context of dealing with the HIV and AIDS epidemic, the coordination of civil society 
takes place on numerous levels. NGOs organise themselves in four key umbrella organisations 
which assist the varied individual organisations:  
i. The Botswana Network of AIDS Service Organisations (BONASO) acts as the umbrella 
body for AIDS service organisations in Botswana. Its main purpose is in supporting HIV 
and AIDS NGOs in terms of capacity building, information sharing, advocacy, assisting 
with accessing resources, lobbying the government and promoting a unified front among 
them;  
ii. Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV and AIDS (BONELA), which includes 
NGOs, members of the legal fraternity, academics and individuals. It addresses issues 
related to human rights of PLWHA and lobbies against the use of punitive action as a 
legal instrument to address the epidemic;  
iii. Botswana Network of People Living with Aids (BONEPWA), an association of people 
living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA) with the objective to facilitate networking and 
support for PLWHA as well as being the representative and spokesperson for PLWHA at 
NACA20;  
iv. Botswana Christian AIDS Intervention Programme (BOCAIP) was created in 1996 and is 
a network of church community organisations to help coordinate the work of the religious 
sector in the government’s multi-sectoral response. 
The above list shows that civil society presence in Botswana is rather high yet they remain 
limited in power to access and directly influence the policy decision-making process structures 
within government. However, some such as BONASO and BONEWPA as umbrella bodies, have 
shown that they have convening power and the ability to network extensively throughout the 
country. Also, more importantly, because of the high number of civil society organisations, their 
                                                
20 NACA is the National AIDS Coordinating Agency that was launched in 1999 by a Cabinet directive under the 
office of the President. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 99 
 
power lies in their strength in numbers, which would greatly benefit the response policies by 
providing a more unified response when necessary to address the epidemic.  
These umbrella organisations work to coordinate their actions with those of the government. 
According to an interviewee, “This relationship between the state and the non-state actors is not 
as politicised as was the case in South Africa and Swaziland and can be considered more 
collaborative (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS Specialist UNDP Regional Service 
Centre Johannesburg, 09/05/08). This follows the constructivist thinking that emerged with the 
revised National Policy in 1993. An official from BONEPWA echoed this, “Government might 
not take all our recommendations, but at least we are given the opportunity and forum to share 
our opinions and be part of the solution” (interview, the Executive Director of BONEPWA, 
6/03/08).  
However, the government strictly regulates the projects and means of funding for these local 
HIV and AIDS NGOs. NACA’s role in this regard is to help distribute the fund allocations from 
donors such as the Global Fund to the local NGOs after they have been released by the Ministry 
of Finance. But this process however has not been without its critics. Daniel Mutating the 
Executive Secretary of BONASO, which was one of the beneficiaries of the Global Fund, 
complained that while NGOs were playing a larger role in implementation, they also wanted to 
be more effective partners and be involved at both the level of management and the disbursement 
of the funds (Daily News, 16/08/06). The Executive Director of BONEPWA supported this 
opinion; “they coordinate and do not take part in the implementation process as such” (interview, 
the Executive Director of BONEPWA, 6/03/08). 
Civil society’s role in the NACA framework was to participate in the discussion forum. The 
discussion forum was important as it presented an opportunity for the participants to assess their 
capacities and highlight any constraints encountered in specific areas so as to ensure that 
progress was being made towards combatting the epidemic. According to an interviewee, “Civil 
society is involved, part of the structure and is represented. Civil society is part of everything we 
do” (interview, Senior Programme Manager with the AED Centre on AIDS and Community 
Health, 5/3/08). Essentially this forum offers the opportunity to raise concerns directly to NACA, 
allowing civil society groups the ability to synchronise and guide their agendas and projects to be 
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in line with the principles and objectives set out in the National Strategy for HIV and AIDS. HIV 
and AIDS civil society groups are required to harmonise their activities with those of the local 
DMSACs. Also, quarterly reports on their progress made in the development of their projects are 
submitted to NACA and other stakeholders in the government as well as to international 
partners. While civil society actors may participate in the policy processes, they are not actual 
policy drivers and as such have a limited influence in the policy framing processes. This is 
evidence that, although there is a constructivist approach to public policy making, the civil 
society actors have little actual power. 
Although civil society organisations may have formal participation in these HIV and AIDS 
structures, they tend to work more as facilitators among international partners and the 
government rather than as actual agenda-setters. This in turn limits their influence in decision-
making processes. They also react to the decisions of their sponsors rather than influence the 
actual process of decision-making. Also at the level of policy implementation, these groups lack 
some capacity. Because of their irregular funding, NGOs dealing with HIV and AIDS have to 
dedicate a large amount of their time to resource mobilisation. As a result, they may be forced to 
adapt their programmes to appease and align them to the policy priorities of the changing donors. 
This situation leads to some confusion and impacts on their commitment to their programmes. 
Civil society organisations in Botswana have remained to a large degree relatively passive. This 
may be due to the political and social stability of the country coupled with a culture of non-
questioning, which is characteristic of many ordinary citizens in Botswana (Mogalakwe and 
Sebudubudi, 2006). Their lack of capacity and adequate resources in turn affects their capacity to 
help implement policy. As a result, these limitations made the domestic actors more dependent 
on the international donors (interview, Senior Programme Manager with the AED Centre on 
AIDS and Community Health, 5/3/08). This situation has created a degree of confusion amongst 
some civil society organisations as some are forced to adjust and align their priorities towards 
those of international donors at the expense of their own priorities (interview, AIDS Expert, 
University of Johannesburg: 25/04/08). 
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BOCAIP on the other hand, has a more established role within Botswana. It is the main partner 
of ACHAP and BOTUSA21 in the civil society sector. ACHAP in partnership with BOCAIP has 
established 11 additional counselling centres. By September 2005 these centres had offered 
training to 447 counsellors and provided services to over 70,000 people (ACHAP Factsheet: 
2005).  
BOCIAP benefitted owing to its alignment to PEPFAR’s guidelines, which favoured a morally 
centred approach founded on abstinence and faithfulness. BOTUSA was able to help BOCAIP 
establish numerous counselling centres for PLWHA throughout the country without much 
trouble. This proved detrimental to civil society organisations’ initiatives, which were perceived 
as not aligned with the PEPFAR guidelines. “PEPFAR does not want their money to be used for 
condoms because it is as if you are encouraging sex. Condoms are for prevention and not 
encouragement” (interview, the Executive Director of BONEPWA, 6/03/08). 
Faith-based organisations supported by the USA become leading actors in the HIV and AIDS 
civil society sector in Botswana (interview, the Executive Director of BONEPWA, 6/03/08). 
Faith-based HIV and AIDS organisations have established a two-tiered strategy in order to reach 
out to the population as well as spreading their own securitisation message. Firstly, these faith-
based organisations actively participate in the coordination mechanisms. The aim of this is to 
ensure that their voice is heard at the highest level of decision-making during the agenda-setting 
process with a view to exerting influence over government and other domestic and international 
partners.  
Secondly, they choose to establish bilateral partnerships, which are done by undertaking 
intensive campaigns focusing on abstinence and faithfulness at the community level. They also 
initiate their own counselling services that are not always in line or integrated into the broader 
national plan. These independent initiatives stem from the strategies of transnational faith-based 
associations for combating the global epidemic. According to an interviewee,  
                                                
21 BOTUSA is a partnership between the CDC and the Government of Botswana to help stop the spread of TB and 
HIV and AIDS. BOTUSA provides training, technical assistance, and research; promotes innovation and evidence-
based best practices; and supports the monitoring and evaluation of prevention, care, and treatment programs for 
HIV and AIDS and TB. 
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This has led to disagreement with the government since its aim is to maintain stricter 
control over the activities of HIV and AIDS NGOs. This has resulted in the government 
not being able to efficiently monitor the true influx of resources as well as monitor the 
relations established between the domestic and international faith-based organisations 
since they tend to bypass government structures (interview, Chief Research Officer 
NACA, 7/3/08).  
UNAIDS recommends having one coordinating authority for the HIV and AIDS national 
response22. Bilateral relationships of this nature counteract the aims of NACA as the one national 
coordinating HIV and AIDS authority in the country.  
5.6 Politics and differing priorities - political space for transnational actors in Botswana  
In addition to the faith-based organisations, Botswana is home to a number of HIV and AIDS 
transnational actors which align themselves more closely with the secular principles of UNAIDS 
and its partners. The leading organisations in Botswana are the William J Clinton Foundation, 
The International Council of AIDS Services Organisations (ICASO) and the International HIV 
and AIDS Alliance (IHAA). This was highlighted in December 2004, when ICASO and IHAA 
articulated in a discussion paper the position of civil society groups in the development of the 
“Three Ones”. They endorsed the “Three Ones” principles to achieve the most effective and 
efficient use of resources, and to ensure rapid action and results-based management:  
i) One agreed HIV and AIDS Action Framework that provides the basis for coordinating 
the work of all partners; 
ii) One National AIDS Coordinating Authority, with a broad-based multi-sectoral 
mandate; 
iii) One agreed country-level Monitoring and Evaluation System  (ICASO and IHAA, 
2005).  
 
Their aim in promoting their discussion paper globally was to improve awareness and increase 
the involvement of local NGOs in the promotion of the “Three Ones” principles at the national 
level. 
                                                
22 This will be discussed in more detail in the next section of the chapter. 
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The major difference between these secular INGOs and the US-sponsored religious groups is 
that the INGOs operate exclusively within the parameters and goals established by the national 
plan (interview, Chief Research Officer NACA, 7/3/08).  They are effective in linking up with 
the responsible local umbrella body such as BONASO to help facilitate coordination and sharing 
information between and with local and international NGOs as well as with the government. The 
ICASO can be credited as being a good example of a transnational HIV and AIDS network that 
has built very complex mechanisms which link the global, regional and local HIV and AIDS 
organisations in Gaborone. At regional level both BONASO and BONEPWA are part of the 
Southern Africa Network of Aids Services Organisations (SANASO), which is part of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) institutional structure and the global 
advocacy network formed by ICASO. ICASO is one of five NGO representatives at the 
UNAIDS’ Programme Coordinating Board tasked with guiding this organ’s response to the 
global HIV and AIDS epidemic. 
From the above it is clear that at their respective levels of political engagement these advocacy 
organisations perform similar institutional tasks as well as sharing the same values and policy 
concepts with regards to the epidemic. This was important in trying to establish entry points into 
the government’s policy decision-making processes. ICASO has been instrumental in working as 
an unofficial supervisory body of the national governments’ commitment to United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS). In Botswana BONASO sends 
periodic reports to ICASO detailing the progress and problems faced by the government. They 
facilitate the coordination of NGO programmes on HIV and AIDS in order to “enhance their role 
and impact the programme delivery level” (BONASO website, accessed 14 August 2010). This 
in turn helps to feed into the above-mentioned transnational networks that have helped to embed 
into the domestic structure of Botswana the principles that were discussed and agreed upon at the 
UN’s global meetings on HIV and AIDS. 
The Merck Foundation has been an influential contributor to the formulation and the 
implementation of projects it supports in Botswana namely ACHAP. Merck refers to their 
relationship as “a unique program developed with and led by the Government of Botswana, 
ACHAP is one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s oldest, most successful public-private partnerships” (Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation Press Release 24 August 2010). Dr Donald de Korte is ACHAP’s 
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project leader and is the former managing director for Africa and CEO of Merck’s subsidiary in 
South Africa (Wharton global website, accessed 27 August 2012). Merck has been active in 
donating ARVs for the appropriate treatment programmes developed by the government of 
Botswana. “Partnership programs must build local capacity, demonstrate a measurable impact on 
the epidemic, be cost-effective, appropriate to the setting in which they are delivered, and 
sustainable beyond the life of the partnership (Merck website, accessed 27 August 2012). A key 
strength of ACHAP has been the ability to fully integrate with the government’s strategy, as well 
as to harness private-sector expertise in support of national efforts to address the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic. All ACHAP projects are planned and developed through extensive consultation with 
all relevant government Ministries. It is also significant that for programmes to be accepted, they 
must fit into the strategic goals of the National Strategic Framework (NSF) for HIV and AIDS 
2003-2009 (interview, Chief Research Officer NACA, 7/3/08). 
Merck’s choice of Botswana as a beneficiary of their programme was strategic. Aside from the 
fact that Botswana was reeling from the effects of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, it had a stable 
government in place that was friendly towards the West and Western institutions. Merck’s 
strategy was to donate its branded ARV drugs in order to avoid the issues caused by locally 
manufactured drugs or the importation of generic drugs.23 Botswana accepted the terms imposed 
by Merck, unlike other developing countries, which had campaigned strongly for an increase in 
access to cheaper generic drugs (interview, Senior Health Officer AIDS Expert SADC, 5/3/08).  
Unlike South Africa, the government of Botswana had still not registered the generic substitutes 
of Nevirapine nor the fixed dose combination of Zidovudine and Lamiduvine, which are 
manufactured by pharmaceutical companies based in India (Druce et al., 2004:17). The funding 
provided by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Merck is attached to strict limitations on 
the government’s autonomy in framing its policies regarding HIV and AIDS treatment. One of 
the conditions for the funding was that the government of Botswana would use only imported 
drugs and not manufacture or procure generic options. Consequently, the government took the 
                                                
23 At the inception of the agreement, Merck agreed to donate its ARV medicines - STOCRIN® (efavirenz) and 
CRIXIVAN® (indinavir sulfate) - to Botswana’s national ARV treatment programme (Masa) for the duration 
partnership. In November 2008 Merck expanded its donations to include ATRIPLA® (efavirenz 600 
mg/emtricitabine 200 mg, tenofovir disoproxil fumarate 300 mg) and ISENTRESS® (raltegravir) 
(www.merckresponsibility.com/priorities-and-performance/access-to-health/community-investment/public-and-
private-partnerships/achap/home.html, accessed 27 August 2012). 
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approach not to register generic drug substitutes. This is a clear example of how their autonomy 
in framing their own policies was limited. Furthermore, if the government failed to adhere to the 
restrictions of the funding agreement, they risked the funding being cut. Therefore, the fear of 
losing the funding may have been a limiting factor in itself. This influenced the power dynamics 
in the public policymaking process involving the government and the influential international 
stakeholders in favour of the latter.  
5.7 Policy processes and power dynamics – engagement between the actors 
Botswana has been an active supporter of and openly receptive to the UN agencies, for example, 
UNDP and UNAIDS had since the mid-1990s been pioneers in the global securitisation of the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic. These UN agencies have played a significant role in assisting the 
government Ministries and other state organs to help them develop policies and programmes in 
order to strengthen their formulation and implementation of the policies.  
The Second Medium Term Plan (MTP II) demonstrated a shift in policy framing with the 
adoption of a more comprehensive transnational approach. This required the inclusion of a 
coalition of actors working under one coordinating authority. This shift in the policymaking 
process was in line with events playing out in the international arena. For instance, the UNDP 
released its seminal report on human security in 1994. In 1996 the UN created its own multi-
sectoral coordinating agency, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). 
UNAIDS was a key influential actor in Botswana in its planning and development of the MTP II.  
Consultations with the multilateral agencies influenced the government in framing its policies 
and activities. In addition to the cooperation with the government, the UN agencies have also 
worked closely with other sectors and actors. UNICEF, for example, has been very active in the 
HIV and AIDS civil society-related projects since the early 1990s24. Also, in a number of 
“programming workshops”, the UNDP created a forum to bring together high-ranking officials 
from several Ministries, NGOs, the private sector as well as international partners. The aim of 
these meetings was to pass knowledge and skills on to the domestic actors involved on how to 
carry out their functions in the new HIV and AIDS policy system established by the MTP II. The 
                                                
24 It has supported various projects developed by organisations such as BONASO, the University of Botswana and 
the Association of Teachers Against AIDS (Ministry of Health, 1997:28-29).   
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Chief Economist of the UNDP’s HIV and AIDS Programme, Des Cohen, and the Director of the 
UNDP’s Regional Project on HIV and AIDS, Roland Msiska, were directly involved in the 
discussions which preceded the launching of MPT II (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS 
Expert UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). 
Being in this elite position sharing their expertise and advice with the government proved 
beneficial for the transnational actors as it provided an entry point to influence the government. 
This is highlighted by the example of the WHO and later UNAIDS, who favoured a greater 
bureaucratic centralisation in coordinating an expanded HIV and AIDS response to include all 
actors both domestic and international. While in the planning stages of the MPT II, a 
WHO/UNDP-led team reviewed the existing HIV and AIDS structure found in Botswana and 
recommended the establishment of a supra-ministerial agency to help coordinate the overall 
national response. The establishment of NACA was a response to this recommendation 
(interview, Chief Research Officer NACA, 7/3/08).   
The inception of the Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS (2003-2009) strengthened and 
formalised the channels of communication between domestic and international HIV and AIDS 
actors. Several forums exist in which developmental partners work together to coordinate their 
activities in either a collective manner amongst themselves or in collaboration with the 
government. At each of these forums an opportunity arises for the government through NACA to 
communicate and agree to the role of each of the development partners within the National 
Response to HIV and AIDS. The forums are: 
i) The Donor Forum: convened by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 
and was constituted in order to consider the financial aspects of government’s 
relations with its development partners; 
ii) The Botswana HIV/AIDS Partnership Forum: coordinated by NACA dealing with the 
specific technical elements of implementation of the National Response in partnership 
with the development partners; 
iii) The Expanded Development Forum: this is a body consisting of UN agencies and 
other multilateral and bilateral development partners;  
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iv) The UN Theme Group on HIV and AIDS: it consists of UN agencies to help manage 
and coordinate their HIV and AIDS activities in Botswana. (interview, Chief 
Research Officer NACA, 7/3/08).   
 
There are two key forums that provide an institutional space which helps to facilitate the 
promotion of persuasion methods; the Expanded Development Partner Forum and the Botswana 
HIV and AIDS Partnership Forum. The Expanded Development Partner Forum was formed to 
allow a common space where both bilateral and multilateral actors can coordinate their activities 
and harmonise their policies. The Botswana HIV and AIDS Partnership Forum, on the other 
hand, is the platform used by international organisations and bilateral donors to interact with 
senior government officials. The decisions made at this forum are discussed at the National Aids 
Council, which is chaired by the President. The advantage of this forum being chaired by the 
President is that it provides the transnational actors an entry point into the decision-making 
processes of the government. This has proved beneficial to the work carried out by the UN 
agencies present in the country (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS Specialist UNDP 
Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08).  
This entry point into the decision-making processes of the government was important for the 
transnational actors, as it placed them in an advantageous position since as it allowed them to 
present their ideas directly to the President to consider for adoption and implement. Whiteside 
concurs and asserts that these transnational actors also have an advantage over SADC, since the 
latter has very little leverage to influence the decision-making processes “as with any regional 
body it is made up of nations and you need to get the nations to put regional interests above 
national interests and this is not going to happen. When has that ever happened?” (telephone 
interview, AIDS Expert, University of Kwazulu-Natal, 9/5/08). This is an example of the 
complexity of the power dynamics in the policymaking process. Both UN-agencies and SADC 
could in this case be considered to be part of the political elite; however, their roles and 
possibilities to exert an influence were very different. 
The high level of access has led to a number of comprehensive studies on the implications of the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic in Botswana, which have impacted on policy decision-making 
processes. One such example is the 2000 UNDP report, National Human Development Report, 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 108 
 
which focuses on how HIV and AIDS is reducing economic growth and increasing poverty. The 
report encouraged public discussion on the accessibility of ARV drugs and whether the 
government should be responsible for providing them. Subsequently, Botswana’s Minister of 
Health tasked the UNDP Resident Representative in Gaborone and the Deputy Governor of the 
Bank of Botswana to explore the financial viability of such an approach. Meetings were 
convened at UNDP with key stakeholders including NACA, the Ministries of Health, Finance 
and Development, and major insurance companies. Those consultations helped lead to the 
decision taken by Mogae to provide free access to ARV drugs to any citizen who needs them 
(UNDP, 2004). 
Another example of the successful exploitation of access to the President was by UNAIDS 
regarding the “The Three Ones” framework in Botswana. In order to ensure more efficient 
working relations between the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) and the Ministry of 
Health, a consultative process driven by the UNAIDS Theme Group worked steadily to establish 
the primacy of NACA regarding the HIV and AIDS institutional architecture. This fulfilled the 
second key principle of the “Three Ones”. When looking at the “Three Ones”, it is clear that with 
the establishment of NACA the second principle has been achieved – “One National AIDS 
Coordinating Authority, with a broad-based multi-sectoral mandate”. With the creation and 
implementation of the new comprehensive action framework for 2003-2009 and Botswana’s 
HIV and AIDS monitoring and evaluation systems the country is moving closer to achieving the 
two other principles (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS Specialist UNDP Regional 
Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). 
NACA was launched in 1999 situated in the office of the President, it was tasked with co-
ordinating and facilitating the country’s response towards the epidemic. It is also responsible for 
the monitoring and evaluation of resource mobilisation. For most of the 1990s the epidemic was 
primarily dealt with as a health issue. The establishment of the NACA significantly changed the 
approach adopted by the government. For instance, potential funders were able to engage 
directly with NACA about funding/initiating programmes to avoid duplication of projects. This 
helped NACA to steer funds to under-funded projects and ensured that unfunded projects 
received funding (interview, the Executive Director of BONEPWA, 6/03/08). Botswana started 
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receiving funding from the Global Fund in July 200425. NACA, however, does not receive the 
money directly it is sent to the Ministry of Finance and from there it is dispensed accordingly 
with NACA’s help (interview, Chief Research Officer NACA, 7/3/08).  
In 2006 Botswana had requested US$ 18.5 million from the Global Fund to scale up its multi-
sectoral response to HIV and AIDS by strengthening and increasing the capacity of care givers, 
NGOs, community-based organisations (CBOs) and local communities. A Global Fund 
communications officer, Nicolas Demey, stipulated the full amount for this grant was set at more 
than US$18.5 million but only US$9 million has been dispensed because of Botswana’s failure 
to justify expenditure (Daily News 16/08/06). The Global Fund dispenses money to a grant on a 
regular time frame on the basis of reports that reflect what has been achieved with the released 
funds. Demey said Botswana had presented certain challenges with the delayed reporting on the 
grant and explained that adequate reporting of activities was a requirement for each 
disbursement, hence only half of the total approved amount had been disbursed thus far. The 
grant had a two-year life span, running from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2006. The Global Fund 
blamed Botswana for the delays in submitting reports implying that the complete expenditure for 
the initial disbursement of over P42 million that was made in 2004 (Daily News 27/11/06).  
The Executive Director of BONEPWA refuted the above claim by the Global Fund. He claimed 
that the stipulated time frame given by the Global Fund made it impossible to meet the deadline 
for the report. Consequently, the funds arrived later than expected, placing the civil society 
organisations at a disadvantage. The Executive Director felt that the Global Fund could have 
remedied the situation. Instead of releasing funds later, a financial audit should have been carried 
out at this point in time (interview, the Executive Director BONEPWA, 6/03/08).  
NACA’s approach was not to apportion blame, believing this would be counterproductive and 
instead it attributed the delay to the failure of a few NGOs and CBOs failures to submit their 
reports. This approach by NACA may be indicative of sound foresight, as apportioning blame 
does not always produce a positive conclusion. Monica Tselayakgosi, an official from NACA, 
stated that there were significant problems with the capacity-building requirements expected of 
NGOs and CBOs. She claimed that these problems were greater than initially envisaged and that 
                                                
25 The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning was the recipients of the first grant of US$ 18 million that 
was to be invested in scaling up Botswana’s response to the epidemic (Global Fund, 2004 website). 
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the reporting mechanism proved to be unduly complex for many of the implementing partners. 
The Global Fund has, however, encouraged Botswana to submit proposals to fight HIV and 
AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria in future funding rounds, even though this grant has reached its 
end date (Daily News 16/08/06 and 27/11/06). 
The position held by certain civil society actors differs from that of NACA’s position regarding 
the Global Fund conflict. An official from BONEPWA argued that the Global Fund money was 
delayed in being distributed to the civil society partners. This delay meant that from the outset 
time was against several civil society organisations being able to carry out their projects 
effectively as well as meet the deadline for submitting their reports. It was also expressed that the 
official employed by the Global Fund based at NACA was “not adequately skilled to manage the 
money” (interview, Officer Project Development Worker BONEPWA, 6/03/08). As a result of 
bureaucratic challenges the distribution of the funds was delayed. The BONEPWA official was 
of the opinion that the Global Fund did not remedy the situation when there was still a chance to 
do so. His solution was that, “instead of giving more money, they should have stopped the 
funding and tried to take account of the money dispensed so far” (interview, Officer Project 
Development Worker BONEPWA, 6/03/08). 
The BONEPWA official therefore proposed that civil society partners should be the principal 
recipients and not only the government in order to ease the bureaucratic constraints. In addition, 
he proposed that professional consultants such as KPMG should be tasked to help with the 
dispensing of the funding. The hope is that this will be able to keep each civil society 
organisation accountable for its lack of performance individually26. The BONEPWA official is 
optimistic that “Botswana has learnt from its mistakes and will be better prepared to handle 
financial accountability in future” (interview, Officer Project Development Worker BONEPWA, 
6/03/08).  
This feeling of optimism was also elaborated on by an official from an international US NGO 
based in Gaborone, who stated that in her view the reason for the financial mismanagement was 
that “the HIV and AIDS money is gone because of mismanagement due to a lack of a proper 
                                                
26 Global Fund has held back $9.5 million. Botswana had to reply by April in order to receive further funding in 
2009.  
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accounting system available. It was not due to fraud or corruption” (interview, Senior 
Programme Manager with the AED Centre on AIDS and Community Health, 5/3/08). Therefore, 
if better capacity-building measures were implemented for the domestic NGOs to strengthen 
their accounting systems this perceived gap may be closed.  
When examining the role of the stakeholders in the policymaking process it is evident that there 
are elements of the constructive thinking of the pluralist public policy theorist in the 
collaborative model of engagement in Botswana. However, there is also clear evidence of the 
kind of elitism that influences the power dynamics between the actors. More specifically in the 
way Western governments and transnational agencies are allowed space to become strong 
policy-influencing actors.  
5.8 Securitisation approach and the relevant actors involved 
After the failure of the Medium-Term Plans of 1989-1997 and 1997-2002, a more aggressive 
policy formulation strategy was necessary. This meant an increased focus on key stakeholders 
such as the President, leading politicians, the private sector and traditional leaders, “with a view 
of turning them into informed campaigners and decision makers” (UNDP, 2001:2). Therefore, 
the challenge for this new strategy was “through research and advocacy, engender a common 
consensus on the magnitude of the HIV and AIDS problem and the threat it posed to governance, 
the economy and the character and stability of society” (UNDP, 2001:2). 
After the process of policy evaluation, through measuring programme effectiveness, it was clear 
that a change in policy was necessary. This change in policy came in the form of the adoption 
and launch of MTP II. This was significant as it demonstrated that the authors of the policy were 
moving towards the concept of securitising HIV and AIDS, as the concept was gaining 
acceptance on the international stage. As already established in chapter 2, the accepted consensus 
was that the HIV and AIDS pendulum had swung from politicisation to the securitisation stage. 
This may not be the case in future, since the disease may eventually be controlled resulting a 
reverse swing back to the politicisation stage.  
The creation of UNAIDS was important, as it influenced various think tanks and transnational 
actors to begin debating the links between the state and human security regarding HIV and 
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AIDS. This new perspective focused on a broad understanding of security that includes not just 
the security of states in the face of external or internal armed threats, but also gives priority to the 
security of people living within states against non-military threats such as disease, environmental 
degradation, economic and social instability etc. Following the lead of the UN, other 
international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
adopted the concept of human security in their policy frameworks. A number of governments 
soon followed suit and embraced the concept in defining their national security policies27.   
At the turn of the millennium a new impetus to the Botswana’s HIV and AIDS response was 
noticed (interview, Chief Research Officer NACA, 7/3/08). While formulating the National 
Strategic Framework (2003-2009), in consultation with UNAIDS, the government included the 
initiative of mainstreaming HIV and AIDS into all of its Ministries’ bureaucracies and all levels 
of decision-making structures. This was facilitated by the establishment of the Ministry of AIDS 
Coordinators (MACs), which acted as the focal point within the Ministries. At present, all 
Ministries have MACs, which are tasked to inform and educate about impact of the HIV and 
AIDS national response (NACA, 2008).  
MACs were tasked to address the needs and vulnerabilities of the staff in the workplace in order 
to formulate internal policies and guidelines. These features were then in turn conveyed to civil 
servants in seminars and workshops organised by MACs. Secondly, they assessed the 
comparative advantages of a particular bureaucracy in adding to the coordinated national 
response to the epidemic. In other words, MACs are responsible for adapting the normal 
functions and business of the Ministries to meet the needs of the national multi-sectoral response 
to HIV and AIDS (interview, Chief Research Officer NACA, 7/3/08).   
President Mogae launched the Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS (2003-2009) in 
September 2002. This new and improved action plan represented the most inclusive and 
comprehensive HIV and AIDS strategy ever seen in Botswana. It incorporated the new 
international developments concerning the conceptualisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic as 
an emergency threat, which is in line with the process of securitising an issue, where political 
authorities demonstrate that it as “an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and 
                                                
27 The human security agenda has been primarily associated with ‘middle-power’ countries as describe earlier.  
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justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998:24). 
Mogae illustrated this more aggressive strategy in the foreword to the framework by stating: 
“Having declared HIV and AIDS a national emergency, this National Strategic Framework is my 
Government’s pronouncement on how we will continue to address this emergency […] outlining 
an aggressive and determined response, this framework brings all the stakeholders together into 
the fight” (NACA, 2003). By choosing to securitise the issue Mogae fulfilled the speech-act and 
understood that placing “something on the security agenda persuades us of the need to furnish 
urgent and unprecedented responses; it signals imminent danger and is therefore given a high 
priority” (Wæver, 1995:63). 
A vital component of the new framework was the much stronger emphasis on policies directed at 
providing anti-retroviral therapy. This deliberate change in policy can be attributed to the 
discovery and successful testing of a more efficient and less harmful combination of HIV and 
AIDS medicine. As a result, a plan was introduced to start a mass roll-out of Antiretroviral 
therapy (ART) to the public. Standard ART dosage consists of the combination of at least three 
antiretroviral (ARV) drugs to maximally suppress the HIV virus and stop the progression of the 
disease. This approach was encouraged by the US government and the international 
pharmaceutical companies, as it was in line with their securitisation ideals which were accepted 
and supported by the government of Botswana. This change in policy made Botswana one of the 
first African states to establish a plan, which aimed at providing ART to those infected. The 
possibility of the mass roll-out policy brought about a renewed impetus across all sectors of 
society in the fight against the epidemic.  
5.9 Prevailing political culture in Botswana 
During the latter part of the 1990s it became apparent that the Ministry of Health could not deal 
on its own with the cross-cutting nature of the disease. The election of President Festus Mogae in 
1998 is a defining moment in Botswana’s national response policy to the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic. Mogae was very active in the National AIDS Council (NAC), which in turn breathed 
new life into the effort of the national response. Shortly after coming into power it became clear 
that Mogae was to be an important role player in the promotion of securitising the HIV and 
AIDS threat in Botswana.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 114 
 
Mogae successfully utilised the securitisation speech-act to address his audience by his use of 
security language and imagery when discussing the epidemic in public. Mogae’s engagement in 
actively promoting the securitisation of the epidemic can be attributed to his acceptance of the 
ideas and the presence of transnational actors who helped to mould his policy decision-making. 
According to Vieira (2011:17), “in this respect, his sympathetic stance towards Western-based 
knowledge of the epidemic, coupled with the need for coherent policy prescriptions in a 
perceived situation of crisis, are crucial elements in explaining the successful securitisation of 
HIV and AIDS in Botswana”.   
Mogae was forceful in highlighting the epidemic as the most urgent threat facing Botswana by 
utilising speech-act. He was very vocal in stating that the epidemic had become a threat to the 
very survival of the Botswana nation. “Half, if not more of today’s natural deaths are caused by 
AIDS […] We stand at the crossroads of a threat to the annihilation of our nation”28. According 
to Buzan et al., (1998:27),  
It is important to note that the security speech-act is not defined by uttering the word 
security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency 
action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant 
audience. 
Mogae aptly coined the phrase Ntwa e bolotse (the war has started) to address the epidemic early 
on in his Presidency. Therefore, Mogae’s proclamations were indicative that the speech-act 
would be part of the style and direction he would follow when describing the epidemic to his 
audience while in office. As discussed in chapter 2, in order to successfully frame something in 
terms of security, a securitising actor has to convince a significant audience that a specific issue 
constitutes an existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998:32). This was achieved through Mogae’s 
continued use of the speech-act to convey his message across to the audience/population. 
As a graduate in economics from Oxford University, Mogae joined the civil service in 1968 as a 
Planning Officer in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. He rose in quickly in the 
                                                
28 President Mogae in an interview with the BBC News on 07/11/2000 
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ranks to hold several senior positions in the government29. In addition, Mogae headed several 
boards running key institutions such as the Bank of Botswana, Debswana and the Botswana 
Development Corporation. From 1976 to 1980 he worked for the IMF in Washington DC. As a 
result, Mogae’s extensive involvement in the government and international agencies may be 
attributed to his closer links to international institutions than was the case with either Mbeki in 
South Africa or Mswati in Swaziland.  
 
Mogae embraced the concept of securitising the epidemic at the same time as the concept was 
gaining acceptance internationally. This is illustrated when comparing a speech made by Mogae 
in 2000 with a UNAIDS assertion in 2000 about the impact of the epidemic in Botswana:  
Let us as Africa take responsibility for ourselves and be true leaders in fighting the 
greatest threat to our development and security. Let us deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
as an emergency and respond with measures that a crisis deserves. Let us divert resources 
from military expenditure to fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic (Mogae, 2000). 
 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Botswana is the deadliest emergency and the biggest social 
and economic crisis facing the country today. After three decades of sustained economic 
growth, HIV is threatening to wipe out hard won gains in social development” (UNAIDS, 
2000:8). 
Mogae’s deliberate use of and strong emphasis of words such as “emergency”, “threat” and 
“war” was in line with the decision taken by both the USA (Clinton administration) and the UN 
Security Council declaring HIV and AIDS a security threat in 200030. Waever (1995:55) explains 
how such statements can work in securitisation: “By uttering ‘security’ a state representative 
moves a certain development into a specific area and thereby claims a special right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block it”. Once an issue has been successfully securitised, there 
is a need for the institutionalisation of the security rhetoric. At this stage the security argument is 
sufficient, since the sense of urgency is implicit in the standards of behaviour, principles, policies 
and bureaucratic processes, established to tackle the problem. The securitisation is 
                                                
29 Mogae became Senior Planning Officer in 1971, Director of Economic Planning in 1972 and Permanent Secretary 
(PS) of the Ministry from 1975 and 1976. 
30 UN Security Council Resolution 1308 17July 2000 
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institutionalised only if the threat (either perceived or real) is resilient enough to demand that the 
bureaucratic procedures be put in place through the formulation and implementation of public 
policies to address the perceived threat. In the case of Botswana, the threat was indeed resilient 
enough to demand the bureaucratic procedures be implemented. 
On occasion, when he felt it was necessary, Mogae adopted a more a unilateral leadership 
approach in his quest to securitise the epidemic. As the government works towards managing a 
threat, it seems only logical to redraw the lines legitimating the borders of politics and limiting 
civil and human rights. The state passes new laws, limitations and prohibitions, with which it 
limits the area of politics and widens that of security. For instance when establishing routine HIV 
testing in Botswana, at a time when this was not common practice in most African states, he 
made the controversial decision to simply ignore opposing views, which defended the 
confidentiality of tests. Additionally, he went as far as putting forward a more controversial 
proposal calling for compulsory HIV and AIDS testing for students who intended to apply for 
government scholarships. When questioned about this proposal, he stated, “I know it won’t be 
popular. But I think we are going to do it anyway” (quoted in the Washington Times 
10/04/2004). Mogae’s actions in this instance should be analysed in the context of the situation. 
It is not reflective of his overall leadership style. This opinion was supported by several of the 
interviewees.   
Several interviewees mentioned Mogae’s deliberate manner in making unilateral decisions when 
it was necessary, while at the same time agreeing that this was necessary in order to strengthen 
the efforts of the national response policy to combat the HIV and AIDS epidemic. According to 
an interviewee, “While we may have disagreed with some of his choices, the President was 
trying to help the fight against the disease” (interview, the Executive Director of BONEPWA, 
6/03/08). “Mogae’s adoption of the US’s policy of opt-out was criticised for infringing on 
people’s human rights. However, at the time the virus was spreading unabated and tough choices 
had to be made” (interview, Senior Health Officer: SADC, 5/3/08).  
BOTUSA/CDC was an influential actor in supporting Mogae’s 2003 decision to implement 
routine testing at all of Botswana’s VCT clinics. The opt-out approach which was favoured by 
the CDC replaced the opt-in approach. The CDC put pressure on the government to change its 
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policy and adopt the opt-out approach. This meant that pre-test counselling was stopped and that 
the patient was notified that an HIV test was to be conducted unless he or she chooses to refuse 
the test. This new policy meant that the patients found themselves in a semi-compulsory testing 
system.  
ACHAP was also a keen supporter of the introduction of routine testing in Botswana. According 
to Whiteside (2008:112), this was important since “knowledge of one’s HIV and AIDS status 
and the normalisation of the epidemic are essential.” From the onset of Masa, a major obstacle 
has been the lack of ability to identify people who are HIV positive and in need of ARV 
treatment unless they consent. Mogae’s new policy approach allowed health workers the right to 
record the names of patients who had tested positive. This was not accepted without criticism 
from UNAIDS officials and human rights activists. Global HIV and AIDS activists saw it as an 
infringement of the rights of patients and PLWHA to confidentiality. 
According to an interviewee, “The securitisation efforts of UNAIDS and UNDP were fairly 
successful as they were able to make it a priority concern for the government of Botswana by 
successfully raising it to the level of the President’s office” (telephone interview, Senior Officer 
AIDS Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). In 2000 Mogae publicly 
declared that the HIV and AIDS epidemic was a national emergency and the primary threat to 
human security in Botswana. Buzan et al., (1998:37-37) asserts that the “securitisation is only 
considered a success when the securitising actor is able to convince a significant audience that 
something constitutes a threat”. In the case of Botswana, Mogae was able to achieve this through 
his words and actions. As already demonstrated, Mogae played an instrumental role in leading 
the country’s HIV and AIDS efforts while he was chairperson of NACA and President of the 
country. Since the late 1990s the government has significantly increased funding for health and 
changed the existing policy to de-link the HIV and AIDS budget from the exclusive control of 
the Ministry of Health. This was done in order to ensure that funding could be released more 
efficiently to other sectors involved in the multi-sectoral national response (interview, Chief 
Research Officer NACA, 7/3/08).   
In the case of Botswana, Mogae as the leader was identified by international securitising actors 
as an important actor. The manner in which he responded to the securitisation claim helped to 
determine the depth and the form of securitisation found in Botswana. Mogae’s leadership 
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characteristics coupled with Botswana’s enabling political culture facilitated the acceptance of 
international securitisation actors’ ideals. As shown, Mogae was able to successfully prioritise 
HIV and AIDS as an immediate threat. He was also able to mobilise institutions, acquire 
resources and make the citizens/audience aware of the negative impact of the epidemic.  
In chapter 2, the three facilitating conditions necessary for a speech-act to be considered 
successful were discussed. Mogae complied with all three of the facilitating conditions required 
for the process of securitisation. He accepted and followed the recognised grammar of security. 
By virtue of his position as President of Botswana, as a securitising actor he was in a position of 
authority to pronounce on the security concerns and was able to raise the level of threat facing 
the population.  
5.10 The USA’s involvement as a key securitisation partner in Botswana  
A key strategic bilateral partner in Botswana’s response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic is the US 
government. When the US government entered the HIV and AIDS political landscape in 
Botswana, there was a subsequent shift in the status quo. Instead of adapting and conforming to 
the existing approach of multilateralism, the US government chose to introduce a more bilateral 
approach. This resulted in the US government developing its own policies and forming coalitions 
without always seeking support from the local government or multilateral agencies (interview, 
Senior Health Officer AIDS Expert SADC, 5/3/08). The choice to partner with the US 
government had less to do with ideological similarities and more to do with funding. According 
to an interviewee, “whoever pays for it that is the ideology you follow. It is that simple!” 
(interview, AIDS Expert, University of Johannesburg: 25/04/08).   
The introduction of PEPFAR in 2003 saw a change in the relationship between the transnational 
actors and the government of Botswana. The programme brought about a new securitising actor 
onto the political landscape. Botswana was chosen as one of the 15 countries to benefit from 
PEPFAR. As a result, the US Embassy formed an interagency team comprising of BOTUSA, the 
US Embassy’s Emergency Plan Team and USAID’s Regional Centre for Southern Africa 
(RCSA), which was tasked with the planning and implementation of the programme in 
Botswana.   
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The most important partnership formed between the US government and the government of 
Botswana to deal with HIV and AIDS was the partnership between the Ministry of Health and 
the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), called the BOTUSA Project. 
BOTUSA’s initial focus was to play a significant role in helping to extend the reach of 
Botswana's national TB response. With the onset of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, there was a 
change in focus as HIV and AIDS become a key part of its mandate from 2000. The partnership 
has seen BOTUSA providing training, technical assistance and the infusion of essential 
resources. 
From 2000 BOTUSA started a phase of rapid growth brought on by the advent of the CDC’s 
Global AIDS Programme to support prevention, treatment, care and surveillance of HIV and 
AIDS. The Clinton administration sought to further its own security agenda with respect to the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic, which had a major impact on BOTUSA’s goals and its relationship 
with the government of Botswana. This began with William J. Clinton’s Global HIV and AIDS 
initiative by considerably increasing funding to BOTUSA. It also did not restrict itself to only 
being concerned with HIV and AIDS research and financial support but also included more 
involvement in the formulation and implementation plans of BOTUSA. This took place at the 
same time as BOTUSA was rolling out a bold project called Tebelopele (look to the future) to 
develop Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centres (VCTs). These VCTs provide immediate 
and confidential VCT services to sexually active people aged between 18 and 49. Since 2000 the 
Government of Botswana and the CDC (through BOTUSA) have supported the Tebelopele 
network of VCT centres, which provide immediate, confidential VCT services for sexually 
active people in Botswana aged 18 to 49. By the end of 2009 the network had provided free VCT 
services to 650,000 visitors (NACA: Botswana - 2010 Country Progress Report).  
With the formalisation of PEPFAR in 2003, and the inclusion of Botswana as one of the 15 focus 
countries, the US government increased its involvement in Botswana’s national response from 
2004. It did so by ensuring that the US Embassy took on a more central role in advancing the 
PEPFAR initiative. It formed an interagency team comprised of BOTUSA, the Embassy’s 
Emergency Plan Team and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Regional HIV-AIDS Program (RHAP) for Southern Africa (which is based in Pretoria, South 
Africa.) They are both tasked with taking charge of the strategic planning and implementation of 
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PEPFAR in Botswana.  The launch of PEPFAR in Botswana has resulted in much more funding 
being made available to HIV and AIDS initiatives. PEPFAR contributed approximately $55 
million to the HIV and AIDS programmes present in Botswana in 2006 alone (The Power of 
Partnerships: Third Annual Report to Congress on PEPFAR: 2007)31. 
An interesting observation made while conducting the interviews was the manner in which 
criticism was levelled by the domestic and international stakeholders. For instance, criticism has 
been levelled at the US government for its ‘go-it-alone’ approach and their inability to be more 
amenable regarding HIV and AIDS policies between the US government and the multilateral 
partners. This sentiment was articulated by a BONEPWA official who referred to it as the 
“Donor-Recipient Relationship conflict in which the donor did not understand the local 
environment” (interview, Officer Project Development Worker BONEPWA, 6/03/08). This 
feeling was predominant amongst the domestic stakeholders interviewed. However, the 
international stakeholders interviewed expressed the opposite view. “The US has not put 
unnecessary pressure on any of its partners working in Botswana” (interview, Senior Programme 
Manager with the AED Centre on AIDS and Community Health, 5/3/08)32. Clearly, there 
remains some confusion as to the approaches adopted by certain international stakeholders and 
the way in which they are received by the domestic stakeholders.  
In Botswana PEPFAR funding has been primarily directed at HIV-prevention programmes with 
a strong emphasis on abstinence and faithfulness projects more in line with the “AB” side of the 
“ABC” paradigm33. It has lent its support to the Ministry of Education to help develop an 
abstinence-based curriculum in schools and supporting similar projects targeting vulnerable 
young people. This can be illustrated by the radio serial drama called Makgabaneng the main 
                                                
31 As of September 30 2008 PEPFAR reports to have fulfilled its commitment to providing funding for support 
treatment for over 2 million people living with HIV and AIDS around the world. At the launch of PEPFAR in 2003, 
it was estimated that only about 50,000 people were receiving treatment for HIV and AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
President Bush stated on 1st December 2008 that PEPFAR currently supports treatment for more than 2 million 
people in Sub-Saharan Africa alone. The programme has been well supported. As of September 30 2008 nearly 9.7 
million people affected by HIV and AIDS in PEPFAR’s 15 focus countries had received compassionate care, 
including nearly 4 million orphans and vulnerable children (http://2006-2009.pepfar.gov/112351.htm, accessed 26 
August 2012). 
32 The official interviewed was from an NGO funded by the US government. 
33 In the fiscal year 2005, of the US$50 million budget was allocated to HIV and AIDS programmes in Botswana, 
the US government allocated US$12 million to HIV prevention programmes (US Department of State, 2005). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 121 
 
sponsor being BOTUSA34. In Botswana radio reaches the largest possible segment of the 
population and serves as an excellent way to transmit awareness information (Fantan, 2004). The 
radio programmes are based on the premise that the audience would tune into the show in order 
to learn more about HIV and AIDS and as a result would identify with the characters and 
(hopefully) imitate their behaviour. Prior to the introduction of PEPFAR to Botswana, the show 
carried a stronger message for sexually active young people to condomise. After the involvement 
of PEPFAR the show’s producers have adapted dialogue and scenes, which tend to place more 
emphasis on “AB” and less on “C”. Makgabaneng’s managing editor, Maungo Mooki, has 
defended the script changes by stating the programme is a “behaviour change communication 
tool” rather than a serial drama or soap opera (Mooki 2004). It must be noted however, as stated 
by a senior SADC official that, “preaching abstinence is important but can only be taught to a 
sober-minded person. A disturbed person cannot be taught abstinence”, (interview, Senior Health 
Officer AIDS Expert SADC, 5/3/08). When addressing behavioural change, it is necessary to 
consider cultural sensitivities to get the message across.  
The relationship between the US government and the Botswana government has not been 
without controversy. There has been tension between PEPFAR and the Ministry of 
Health/ACHAP regarding the ownership of the national ARV treatment programme. The US 
government put forward their case that because it was actively involved in the Botswana 
government’s national ARV programme regarding factors such as financing, training, skills 
transfer, they could make the claim that the rising number of patients on treatment in the country 
was the result of the success of PEPFAR. The Botswana government and its partners at ACHAP 
held a different point of view. They felt that the Masa Programme was their initiative because 
ACHAP was in charge of planning and managing the whole process as well as ensuring the 
everyday running of the clinics and staffing.  
The tensions consequently threatened to fray the cordial relations between the two governments. 
This led to their entering into a dialogue to work out their differences. The government of 
Botswana made the US government understand that the policy decision-making processes had 
occurred prior to their and other donors’ arrival in the country. The role of the donors was to fill 
in where gaps existed in the national response strategy. This understanding is beneficial to 
                                                
34 Makgabaneng means “we fall and we rise” or “rocky road”. 
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current and future projects as it allows for sustainability and continuity. Hence, the hope is that 
even if the donors withdraw from the projects, the projects will continue operating. “It is 
imperative that ownership remains in the hands of Batswana” (interview, the Executive Director 
BONEPWA, 6/03/08). This is important for the continuity of future policy formulation and 
implementation processes for Botswana.  
5.11 Conclusion  
The chapter explored the effects of the reliance on multilateral and bilateral donor aid and 
highlighted the influence this had on the policy decision-making processes and its 
implementation. Among the central findings in this chapter are that unlike many other 
developing countries, Botswana has been less dependent on funding for their HIV and AIDS 
policy. In addition, as a result of historically amicable links with Western institutions Mogae’s 
administration adopted a securitisation view of HIV and AIDS that is in line with transnational 
actors such as the UN. Through declaring war (Ntwa e bolotse) on the HIV and AIDS epidemic, 
the issue was elevated to the level of the President’s office and directly to the centre of the policy 
decision-making structure. This is an example of a top-down approach to securitising the 
epidemic.    
It was argued that Botswana’s elitist political and social structures helped external actors to gain 
access to the domestic policy decision-making process as a consequence of the political 
environment and a rather weak civil society. These factors helped to create the internal 
conditions for Botswana’s acceptance of international thinking on the HIV and AIDS epidemic. 
The government of Botswana’s approach to include development partners and international 
organisations in their policy implementation processes was beneficial for the policy decision-
making processes, as skills and expertise were shared allowing more efficient reframing of 
polices to be formulated. It was also found that a closer working relationship between domestic 
NGOs and the government through the MTP II proved beneficial. This may be an element of 
constructivism as expressed in pluralist public policy theory. Consequently, it is fair to say that 
in Botswana the public policy process has elements of both elitism and pluralism. 
Finally, the chapter examined the processes and dynamics around the securitisation of HIV and 
AIDS in Botswana. It was found that Mogae’s openness and acceptance of the securitisation 
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discourse pursued by influential securitising actors led to the successful securitisation of the HIV 
and AIDS epidemic in Botswana.  
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Chapter 6: Policy Issues, Processes and Framing around HIV and AIDS in 
South Africa 
6.1 Introduction 
According to a UNAIDS (2011) report, an estimated 5.6 million South Africans were living with 
HIV and AIDS in 2009, the highest number of people in any country of the world. In the same 
year, it was estimated that 310,000 South Africans died of AIDS-related causes, indicative of the 
huge number of lives that the country has lost to AIDS over the last three decades (UNAIDS 
2010). South Africa experienced a difficult public policy formulation period dealing with the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic under the presidency and administration of Thabo Mbeki. His response 
to the threat of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, widely criticised, has become a permanent part of 
Mbeki’s presidency and political legacy. 
This chapter focuses on the framing of HIV and AIDS public policy and the processes and 
factors associated with it in South Africa. This helps to explain the way policy has been 
formulated and adopted, or the lack of policy formulation, as part of the national response policy 
to the HIV and AIDS epidemic in South Africa. The role of relevant stakeholders such as state, 
non-state domestic HIV and AIDS actors, and multilateral and bilateral agencies in attempting to 
influence the framing of policy and the decision-making processes is examined. This chapter also 
explores the national response to HIV and AIDS in South Africa in the light of three main 
theoretical approaches to public policy, namely pluralism, elitism and statism.  Focussing on 
these theoretical perspectives can help explain the power dynamics between the actors and the 
way the HIV and AIDS policy was framed. Finally, the chapter examines the processes and 
dynamics around the securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the country. It is argued 
that the prevailing political environment meant that transnational securitising actors had limited 
access to higher-ranking decision-making structures hence, limiting their persuasive influence to 
promote the securitisation approach.  
The responsibility of certain transnational actors – notably the UN agencies and the US 
government – is analysed to ascertain the extent of their persuasion efforts as promoters of the 
securitisation discourse in the policy decision-making processes. It is argued that South Africa’s 
political leadership, centred primarily on Mbeki, created an environment clouded in suspicion 
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towards foreign actors leading to the rejection of international role players and their ideas. The 
prevailing political climate was characterised by a tense working relationship between state and 
non-state actors. This tense working relationship impacted on the framing of policy processes 
impacting on the HIV and AIDS national response policy in South Africa. This tense power 
dynamic emerged because South Africa’s political and social structures prevented external actors 
access to its domestic policy decision-making process. Another contributing factor was a strong 
civil society vastly experienced in political activism. This environment meant that little political 
space and access were available for non-state actors to exert much influence on the policymaking 
processes. It is also pointed out that as a result, domestic HIV and AIDS stakeholders had to 
resort to the judicial route to gain access to the policymaking structure in order to influence their 
policies.  
The contention is that Mbeki, as a key securitising actor, focused on an elite of a few trusted 
individuals who were influential in the way that policy issues and problems were framed and 
how these issues were placed onto the national policy agenda. It is argued that Mbeki’s 
reluctance to conform to the prevailing understanding of the HIV and AIDS epidemic resulted in 
the securitisation discourse pursued by influential international securitising actors having less 
influence on the policy-framing processes. This consequently led to a lesser degree of 
securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in South Africa. 
 
The chapter starts by providing a brief overview of the dimensions of the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic in South Africa. It looks at different socio-economic characteristics of South Africa and 
how the HIV and AIDS epidemic has impacted on the country. This is followed by an overview 
of the policy responses to the epidemic. Here the early efforts to address the epidemic are 
discussed as well as the processes leading to a change in approach to the policy decision-making 
process. The third part of this chapter examines factors that influenced this policy decision-
making process. The three main factors identified are: firstly, the political leadership under 
President Thabo Mbeki; secondly, international and domestic criticism of the South African 
government’s policy approaches; and finally, the transnational actors. The next part of the 
chapter explores the role of the relevant stakeholders. The focus of this section is on examining 
the relationships and power dynamics between the domestic non-state actors, transnational actors 
and the South African government. The section following that deals with the securitisation 
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approach adopted in South Africa. It discusses the prevailing political culture in South Africa 
and also the US government as a key-securitising partner.  
6.2 Dimensions of HIV and AIDS in South Africa  
The HIV and AIDS epidemic spread faster in South Africa than in any other country in the 
world. Between 1990 and 2003 HIV prevalence in South Africa increased dramatically and the 
country fell by 35 places in the Human Development Index. The first recorded case of AIDS in 
South Africa was diagnosed in 198235. It is reported that there are an estimated 5.7 million 
people living with HIV in South Africa, with approximately 3.2 million women and 280,000 
children (ages 0-14) (UNAIDS Fact Sheet, July 2008). According to the UNAIDS 2008 Report, 
South Africa is recorded as having the highest absolute number of people infected with HIV in 
any country in the world36. HIV prevalence among women attending antenatal clinics was 29 per 
cent in 2006. Among adults (ages 15-49) HIV prevalence was 18.3 per cent in 2006. Additional 
evidence points to a significant decline in HIV prevalence among young people (below age 20), 
where prevalence was 13.7 per cent in 2006 compared to 15.9 per cent in 2005. There is 
significant variation in HIV prevalence by province, ranging from the highest at 39.1 per cent in 
KwaZulu-Natal to 15.1 per cent in Western Cape (UNAIDS Country Sheet, July 2008). 
 
AIDS is one of the leading causes of death in contemporary South Africa. According to World 
Bank statistics, the average life expectancy in South Africa is about 51 years, whereas without 
the epidemic it is estimated that it would have been 64 years instead37 (World Bank, South 
Africa Country Brief, April 2012). Hospitals are struggling to cope with the high number of 
HIV-related patients that they have to care for. In 2006 the Health Economics and HIV and 
AIDS Research Division (HEARD) of the University of KwaZulu-Natal estimated that HIV-
positive patients would soon account for approximately 60-70 per cent of all medical expenditure 
in South African hospitals. AIDS patients generally tend to stay in hospital longer than other 
                                                
35 The first two cases of HIV and AIDS were brought to the public’s attention after the death of two South  
African Airways (SAA) flight stewards: Ralph Kretzen and Charles Steyn who died on 26 August 1982 and 1 
January 1983 respectively. 
36 Certain media sources have claimed that India may have surpassed South Africa in the total number of people 
infected with HIV. However, according to the UNAIDS 2008 Report, India is estimated to have only 2.4 million 
Indians living with HIV. 
37 According to Statistics South Africa, the life expectancy of South Africans has increased to 59.6 (57.7 for males 
and 61.4 years for females). 
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patients, because it takes them so much longer to recover from opportunistic diseases. According 
to the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) President Olive Shisana, “HIV-positive 
patients stay on average four times longer in hospital than non-HIV patients” (Palitza, 2006:1).  
 
At the time when the first cases of HIV were being reported in the 1980s South Africa was 
embroiled in a mass state-sponsored violence against the resistance movements, which in turn 
created political instability and social disorder in the townships. This environment and created 
the ideal conditions whereby the disease could progress and spread relatively unabated 
(Whiteside and Sunter, 2000:62). South Africa’s transition from apartheid to a democratic 
dispensation was hailed globally as a ‘miracle’ and led to Archbishop Desmond Tutu coining the 
phrase the “Rainbow Nation”. However, the reality in South Africa since the mid-1990s has been 
that of a society that had been burdened by harsh dividing factors such as political violence, 
forced migration, racial exclusion and family strife. These factors helped contribute to the 
explosive growth of the HIV and AIDS epidemic experienced in South Africa (Fourie, 2005:85).  
South Africa experienced a significant increase in HIV prevalence during the period between 
1993 and 2000, during which time the government of the day was focusing on the major political 
changes playing themselves out in the political arena. After the transition from the apartheid 
regime to a fully democratic state, South Africa found itself in a political dilemma. In order to 
address the urgent political, economic and social inequalities, certain other areas were 
inadvertently overlooked. One important area was the health sector, where HIV was rapidly 
becoming more widespread. With hindsight, it is likely that adopting a sustained plan of action 
during this time could have reduced the severity of the epidemic (telephone interview, Senior 
Officer AIDS Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). 
The first societal group affected by the disease was white male homosexuals. However, as the 
virus continued to spread unabated, it soon impacted on all societal groupings. Recent trends 
indicate that currently the HIV and AIDS epidemic is severely impacting on young heterosexual 
Africans and the economically disadvantaged in the population. Young females continue to bear 
the brunt of the epidemic as they continue to have the highest prevalence rates in the population. 
Because this group makes up a substantial percentage of the population, HIV and AIDS can 
potentially have a very serious impact on social development (Whiteside and Sunter, 2000:58). 
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Terreblanche (2002:44) agrees by noting that black South Africans were more vulnerable to HIV 
as a result of the legacy of apartheid. Terreblanche also notes the massive misdistribution of 
health and other resources, and adds that as long as “comprehensive, coordinated and effective 
policies for alleviating poverty and preventing AIDS are not implemented, poor health and AIDS 
will remain an important and ominous poverty trap leading to the further pauperisation of 
especially the poorer half of the population”.    
Nelson Mandela’s government inherited a public health system with huge discrepancies. The 
healthcare facilities found in the former white urban areas were well equipped and modern. At 
the same time, the healthcare facilities intended for the black population, located mainly in rural 
areas, lacked both equipment and capable staff. This posed a significant challenge for the new 
government, as it had to ensure not only that healthcare facilities were coordinated and run in a 
uniform manner but that the healthcare facilities were accessible to all. This task proved difficult 
to remedy in the short term because of the sheer enormity. Another challenge for the new 
administration was disputes occurring between the newly appointed officials and the 
representatives from the former regime, which did not support the organisational change, leading 
to an extended period of bureaucratic semi-paralysis, which impacted negatively on the 
efficiency and availability of services in all public sectors (Strode and Grant, 2004).  
6.3 Observable policy responses 
6.3.1 Early efforts to address the epidemic  
In response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic, the apartheid regime convened a conference to 
address the potential threat it posed for the country. Consequently, in 1987 AIDS was included in 
the official South African list of communicable diseases. In the same year the first black South 
African was diagnosed with AIDS (McNiel, 2012). 
From the late 1980s South African health professionals and civil servants employed in public 
healthcare facilities became more aware of the threat posed by HIV and AIDS. At that point in 
time government intervention was particularly inconspicuous (Furlong and Ball, 2005). The 
political leadership at the time found that they had more urgent threats to deal with, namely the 
economic sanctions against the regime, the political isolation imposed by the international 
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community, the ever-present threat of hostility from the neighbouring state, widespread social 
unrest in the black townships and the guerrilla campaign promoted by the ANC (Furlong and 
Ball, 2005:131).  
From 1987 onwards reports from the South African Medical Research Council pointed out that 
there was a significant rise in heterosexual transmission among the African mining population 
and other black communities. The apartheid regime had recognised and understood that the 
disease was a real public health threat to the black population as a whole. As a result of its racist 
polices, however, the regime did little to address the threat. Fourie (2005:142) sums this up by 
saying that “the ‘gay plague’ had become the ‘black death’ - an untimely addition to the greater 
National Party pathology of a ‘swart gevaar’ (black danger)”. At the same time certain influential 
voices among the ANC cadres accused the apartheid regime as well as Western governments of 
artificially producing the virus to decimate blacks (Fourie, 2005:96). PW Botha and his 
administration were focused on protecting and maintaining the apartheid system instead of 
prioritising a disease that seemed to affect mainly the African population.  
From 1989 a change in the political landscape occurred. On the political front a change in the 
leadership of the National Party (NP) brought FW de Klerk to power. This ushered in the start of 
a more inclusive participatory political environment in the country, with the inclusion of the 
formerly banned liberation parties and their input and involvement in public policy debates. This 
shift in policy led to a milestone meeting in March 1990 between the NP regime and the ANC 
leaders meeting for the first time in order to discuss the effects and impact of HIV and AIDS in 
South Africa. Following this meeting, a joint request for funding and technical assistance was 
submitted to the WHO’s HIV and AIDS Global Programme (Furlong and Ball, 2005:132). A 
working relationship had already been established between the South African Department of 
Health and the WHO. They provided assistance by establishing eleven HIV and AIDS training, 
information and counselling centres (ATICCs) in South Africa. However, the NP regime 
continued with its discriminatory agenda in the way HIV and AIDS policies were implemented. 
According to Furlong and Ball (2005:133), the ATICCs were strategically located, “where they 
served almost exclusively whites; only in mid-1993 was one for Soweto approved”. 
The first national antenatal survey was conducted in 1990 to test for HIV and the results showed 
that 0.8 per cent of pregnant women were HIV positive (Whiteside, 2003). The number of people 
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in South Africa living with HIV at this time was estimated to be between 74,000 and 120,000 
people. Antenatal surveys have subsequently been carried out annually. The government’s first 
significant response to HIV and AIDS came about through a consultative effort involving the 
ANC, the Department of Health, and a variety of representatives from civil society and the 
business sector (Fourie, 2005). The outcome of the consultative body was the establishment of a 
national body for all HIV and AIDS activities, the National AIDS Convention of South Africa 
(NACOSA), in 1992.  
NACOSA was established to develop more comprehensive policies for dealing with HIV and 
AIDS. The NACOSA plan was endorsed by a wide range of social actors, namely religious 
groups, trade unions, civil society and the private sector (Vieira, 2006:224).  The purpose of 
NACOSA was to bring together a wide range of actors from different sectors of society to 
develop a cohesive response to the crisis. This represented the first time that the main policy 
decision-makers in the South African HIV and AIDS arena assembled. AIDS organisations and 
activists celebrated the perceived commitment of the new government to tackling the disease 
(Fourie, 2005). The meeting that established NACOSA was succinctly described as “an unusual 
show of national unity at a time of complex and sensitive political negotiations, well before an 
election date for a democratically elected government had been decided” (Nattrass, 2004:42). 
In August 1994 President Mandela38 accepted “The National AIDS Plan for South Africa” 
launched by NACOSA. According to McNeil (2012:2), “the Plan focused on prevention of HIV 
through public education campaigns, reducing transmission of HIV through appropriate care, 
treatment and support for the infected, and mobilising local, provincial, national and 
international resources to combat HIV and AIDS”. An interviewee stated that at this point in 
time the government thought that the HIV and AIDS epidemic was still controllable and 
manageable (interview, Senior Researcher - AIDS Expert, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, 
23/4/08). The Mandela administration showed a willingness to actively engage in efforts to 
manage the effects posed by the epidemic. It was clear that, unlike the previous regime, the new 
government acquired a more comprehensive knowledge of both the medical and socio-economic 
effects that HIV and AIDS could have for the South African population (Schneider, 1998:6). It 
                                                
38 While Mandela was an important actor in South Africa’s early national HIV and AIDS response policies, his role 
falls outside of the timeframe of this thesis.  
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has been noted that reports released by the ANC indicated that they had detailed projections 
showing that the threat posed by the HIV and AIDS epidemic was a major concern to public 
health in the country (Butler, 2005:593).  
The change in the political arena, coupled with the policy shift created a more favourable 
environment for a new policy direction to deal with the threat posed by the epidemic. The 
inclusion of all the different actors in the planning and deliberations phase led to the drafting of 
South Africa’s first comprehensive public strategy on HIV and AIDS. This is in line with the 
constructivist thinking of the pluralist and elitist theories on public policy. The Cabinet officially 
adopted the National AIDS Plan (NAP) in October 1994. Following the adoption of the NAP, the 
Department of Health created a designated Directorate of HIV and AIDS and Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases. The NAP had identified the multi-dimensional impact of the epidemic and 
the need for a multi-sectoral partnership to be formed with the aim of creating a more effective 
response towards the epidemic.  
With the support of the government and the wide range of HIV and AIDS stakeholders in place, 
the key objective was to try and contain the HIV prevalence level and to lower it over time.  
However, this commitment was not enough to stem the high HIV prevalence rates for women 
attending antenatal clinics. In 1994 the HIV prevalence rate was 7.6 per cent and, instead of 
decreasing or even stabilising, it spiralled out of control with an exponential increase of over 300 
per cent to 24.5 per cent by the year 2000. According to Whiteside and Sunter (2000:119-20), 
There were major flaws in the NACOSA plan - not in the contents, which are still valid 
today, but in the lack of attention to process and the failure to acknowledge the realities 
of the social, political and economic situation in South Africa at the time. In effect, there 
was no ‘reality-check’, a fundamental principle of good planning.  
In an interview with the BBC in 2003 Mandela admitted that during the run up to the 1994 
elections, “I wanted to win and I didn’t talk about AIDS” and that once he was President he “had 
not time to concentrate on the issue” (BBC News, 02 March 2003).  
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6.4 Changes in the policy decision making environment  
As the 1990s drew to a close, clear divisions between competing paradigms arose in the public 
policy debates on HIV and AIDS in South Africa. The NGO sector and some parts of the health 
establishment were more aligned to UNAIDS, while, the ANC leadership developed its own 
interpretations and policy recommendations for the epidemic.   
In 1997, three years after the implementation of the NAP, it was clear that the necessary tools to 
contain the spread of the epidemic were lacking. Furthermore, there were no attempts to try to 
amend the Plan so that it could be more effective (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS 
Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). A national review of South Africa’s 
HIV and AIDS response to the epidemic entitled Review the Past, Plan the Future, Work 
Together, was released in the same year. The review highlighted the need for the following:  
• Political leadership and public commitment;  
• Meaningful involvement of people living with HIV and AIDS in policy formulation;  
• Responses to be interdepartmental and intersectoral;  
• Widespread capacity building; and  
• An urgent address of human rights abuses and the reduction of stigmatisation 
(Department of Health 1997, Review the Past, Plan the Future, Work Together) 
After the review the government implemented several important changes to address the problems 
of interdepartmental responsibility. An important decision taken was to elevate it to the office of 
the Deputy President who took over the responsibility for the strategy as a whole. Also, it was 
agreed to establish an Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) on HIV and AIDS. The IMC was 
tasked to facilitate better co-ordination between the departments and to strengthen their political 
commitment towards the epidemic. The first IMC was headed by then Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki (The Presidency, press release, 1 December 2006). 
In 2000 the government established the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) to 
develop and oversee a multi-sectoral approach to the HIV and AIDS epidemic (Furlong and Ball, 
2005:128). Establishing a single HIV and AIDS coordinating agency was in line with the 
UNAIDS approach set out in the second key principle of the “Three Ones”. “One National AIDS 
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Coordinating Authority, with a broad-based multi-sectoral mandate” (UNAIDS, Fact Sheet 
2004). 
SANAC is the highest body that advises the government on various issues relating to HIV and 
AIDS. Its key functions include: advising the government on HIV and AIDS policy; mobilising 
resources for the implementation of AIDS programmes; monitoring the implementation of the 
Strategic Plan across all sectors of society; advocating for the effective involvement of sectors 
and organisations in implementing programmes and strategies, and recommending appropriate 
research. SANAC is assisted by the provincial AIDS Councils in the implementation and 
definition of AIDS programmes at district, municipality and community levels (SANAC website, 
accessed 27 September 2013). As noted by Strode and Grant (2004:14), “SANAC had to replace 
the AIDS Advisory Council, as it was not a multi-sectoral body and only made up of technical 
experts”.  
SANAC is composed of the Deputy President, nine Executive Committee members39 tasked to 
manage urgent matters and to oversee the implementation of HIV and AIDS programmes, and a 
plenary body of 33 members (16 from government and 17 from civil society) representing the 
different governmental departments, members of civil society and five technical task teams 
(SANAC website, accessed 27 September 2013)40. SANAC was initially scheduled to convene 
on a monthly basis. However, in 2002 the members agreed that meetings would be held quarterly 
instead. 
Even though SANAC’s inception was welcomed by all, and it had a far-reaching agenda, it was 
unable to fulfil expectations that it would become the leading HIV and AIDS institutional body 
in South Africa (Schneider, 1998).  Since its inception SANAC meetings have been infrequent 
and irregular, which hindered the effective fulfilment of the body’s mandate as concerns to be 
addressed accumulated41. SANAC was described as “one of the most unproductive bodies of this 
kind in Southern Africa” (Vieira, 2006:227). A major criticism levelled was the fact that the 
                                                
39 According to SANAC website these comprise of five Cabinet Ministers, a member of the National Association of 
People Living with HIV/AIDS (NAPWA), a representative of the women’s sector of civil society, a representative 
from the hospital sector and a representative from COSATU. 
40 The technical task teams are comprised of experts in prevention; care and support; information, education, 
communication and social mobilisation; research, monitoring, surveillance and evaluation; and legal issues and 
human rights. 
41 Strode and Grant (2004) note that in 2002 SANAC met only three times. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 134 
 
Department of Health was the sole agenda-setter for all SANAC meetings. According to Strode 
and Grant (2004:23), “the current structure has allowed the Department of Health to dominate 
SANAC. The SANAC’s Secretariat was placed within the Department of Health and they 
effectively set the agenda for all meetings; this meant that other sectors (namely members of 
civil society) were not given equal opportunity to place issues on the SANAC agenda”. This in 
turn prevented other SANAC members from including issues for discussions (Strode and Grant, 
2004:23). This shows that the Department of Health sees its role within SANAC in line with 
elitist theories on public policymaking.  
Strode and Grant (2004:23) elaborate by adding that “SANAC is not accountable to anyone; it 
does not report to any structure and its minutes and proceeding are kept confidential”. Also 
SANAC members were not full-time paid staff, since participation in SANAC was on a 
voluntary basis. This was undoubtedly a contributory factor affecting the commitment of 
members and their obligations to SANAC. Furthermore, the government showed signs of 
scepticism about mainstreaming knowledge about the epidemic, as SANAC excluded chief 
researchers and NGOs, the Medical Research Council and the Medicines’ Control Council 
(Butler, 2005:594). Finally, former Deputy President Jacob Zuma was appointed the first 
Chairperson of SANAC. Most interviewees were in agreement that he did not show the 
necessary leadership skills required, which resulted in several shortcomings under his tenure. 
One interviewee stated, “SANAC almost never met and there was a definite lack of civil society 
participation” (interview, Senior Manager, Centre for the Study of AIDS, 01/08/08). 
According to the HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) Strategic Plan for South 
Africa 2007-2011, the shortcomings of SANAC had to be addressed. This resulted in SANAC 
undergoing major changes at the end of 2006. The newly empowered SANAC would operate on 
three levels by means of: 
• A high level council, meeting twice per annum, chaired by the Deputy President; 
• Sector level co-ordination – with sectors taking responsibility for their own organisation, 
strategic plans, programmes, monitoring and reporting to SANAC;  
• Programme level organisation – led by the social cluster of the government; and 
• SANAC would be allotted with a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. 
(HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007-2011) 
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The new changes developed to strengthen the work and the position of SANAC, can be also 
attributed to the pressure and influence from non-state actors which helped to change the 
policymaking dynamics in South Africa. These changes resulted in the important change brought 
about by the new SANAC. This was done by investigating the roles of the principal 
policymaking actors and domestic and international policy-influencing actors in the national 
response policy present in South Africa. Also it highlighted the discursive processes that featured 
in shaping the policy-framing in the country that led to this important shift in policy. 
6.5 Factors that influenced the policy making process 
i) Political leadership  
Thabo Mbeki’s Presidency was marked by periods of stark conflict and periods of partnership 
with HIV and AIDS stakeholders (Heywood, 2004:3-4). During the period under review South 
Africa experienced a rapid increase in the number of new HIV infections. This section will 
examine the roles played by Mbeki and his Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang in 
influencing the policy decision-making processes.  
Frank Chikane42 writes about Mbeki’s association with the HIV and AIDS epidemic in South 
Africa: 
It loomed so large that some cannot see anything else that he did during his presidency. A 
mention of the name Mbeki anywhere in the world is associated with the HIV/AIDS 
matter, and many have no memory about HIV/AIDS before he fired that shot in October 
1999. That was the moment which changed the whole discourse (The Star, 26 October 
2010). 
Much of the increased centralisation in the ruling party and in high-level policy institutions took 
place during Mbeki’s presidency, which influenced the HIV and AIDS policy decision-making 
process (Vieira, 2006). This can be seen as following elitist theory on public policy, where the 
role players with access to the policymaking process are narrowed to a few influential actors. An 
example of this is that after the establishment of SANAC in 2000, the President moved the 
policy decision-making process from this structure to the office of the Presidency. Mbeki 
                                                
42 Frank Chikane was the Director-General in the President’s office 1999-2009. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 136 
 
motivated the creation of policy-planning clusters, each coordinated by the Presidency, “thus 
usurping the Cabinet’s ability to mobilise knowledge across government” (Butler, 2005:600). 
This move effectively removed all Cabinet’s responsibility to Parliament concerning HIV and 
AIDS planning and implementation programmes. Mbeki has been accused of the “appointment 
of unelected officials who are loyal to [him] but lack political weight and constituencies, [and 
this] has reduced internal debate over AIDS policies” (Patterson, 2006:36). In his understanding 
of the epidemic, Mbeki can therefore be said to view the epidemic “as posing an existential 
threat” thus “justifying the use of extraordinary measures” (Buzan et al. 1998:21). 
Mbeki’s many years in exile influenced his leadership style, as he stands in contrast with the 
leaders of both the unions and the civil society bodies who remained in South Africa and 
engaged in the domestic liberation struggle (The Telegraph, 20 September 2000). Apartheid 
agents repeatedly attempted to penetrate and infiltrate the exile movement. The hierarchical 
military discipline required for an exile guerrilla movement meant that policy decision-making 
was only focused only on a few trusted individuals (Patterson, 2006:36).  
Steven Friedman (2004:239) contends that the exiles’ rise to power in 1999 has coincided with 
the “diminution of democratic practice within the ANC”. In terms of public policy theory, this 
strengthened the position of the elite few. Several of Mbeki’s closest allies are from his time 
spent together in exile. In 2005, out of the 30 cabinet ministers, 17 had spent time together in 
exile. One such ally was the Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang who had been a 
loyal supporter of Mbeki since they both went into exile in 1962. She was an ardent supporter 
and defender of Mbeki. She challenged donors who questioned South Africa’s ARV policies and 
echoed the assertion that ARVs are toxic, and she clashed with civil society organisations on 
many occasions (Patterson, 2006:39). According to an AIDS expert, “her unwavering support for 
Mbeki must be the reason for her reappointment as Minister in 2004 despite her unpopularity” 
(telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 
09/05/08).  
The creation of the Presidential Advisory Panel was justified as a means to learn more about the 
unique nature of the HIV and AIDS strain found in Africa. This opinion influenced Mbeki’s 
speeches. which were indicative of his struggle with the complexity of HIV and AIDS and its 
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relationship to poverty. Mbeki’s critics were not convinced by the scientific rationale for the 
creation of such a panel. According to Nattrass (2004:49-50) the appointment of the Panel  
made it impossible to follow scientific principles in adjudicating between rival theories. 
By giving dissident websites equal status with the Medical Controls Council (MCC), 
South Africa’s political leadership propelled AIDS policy making into a scientific dark 
age. Under these conditions, ‘true statements’ could not be established and, in the end, 
policymaking was determined by power. Initially, that power vested entirely with the 
state president. 
On 3 April 2000 Mbeki wrote a controversial five page letter addressed to world leaders 
asserting his views on the HIV and AIDS issue. He stated that 
Not long ago, in our country people were killed because the established authority 
believed that their views were dangerous and discredited. We are asked now to do 
precisely the same thing that the racist Apartheid tyranny we opposed did, because, it is 
said there exists a scientific view that is supported by the majority, against which dissent 
is prohibited (Mbeki, 2000). 
The manner in which Mbeki encouraged and defended AIDS denialism has been widely 
examined.  Mbeki has not expressly or publicly ever denied a link between HIV and AIDS, but 
he did not publicly affirm that HIV does in fact cause AIDS. According to Heywood (2004:7), 
“Instead, he has left a paper trail of his questions about HIV and hints about his sympathies with 
the denialists, the impact of which can be traced through what was not done by his government 
as well as what was questioned and resisted”. According to Whiteside (2008:88-89), Mbeki’s 
denialist sympathies can be explained by several factors, including the social stigma surrounding 
the origins of HIV and AIDS and sexuality, and the fact that the early messages about HIV and 
AIDS came from the apartheid government, which was known to use scientific explanations to 
further its racial theories43.  
Mbeki’s message was a cause of confusion that resulted in the slow and at times confusing 
framing of policy responses adopted by his administration. According to Statistics South Africa, 
death certification shows more than 1,5 million deaths between the ages 0-49 and more than 2 
                                                
43 For the more detailed list refer to Whiteside, “HIV/AIDS A Very Short Introduction” (2008:88-89). 
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million new infections occurred under Mbeki’s leadership. Furthermore, as a direct consequence 
life expectancy was dropping every year Mbeki was in office (Mail and Guardian, 27 September 
2008).  
Mbeki’s personal views influenced the manner in which his government addressed the epidemic. 
This resulted in various government representatives arguing that deep-rooted social problems 
such as poverty and exclusion led to the immunodeficiency experienced by many black South 
Africans instead of HIV and AIDS. According to Vieira (2006:228), “the government’s 
questioning of the efficiency of AIDS drugs also fundamentally impacted the collective imagery 
of South Africans”. In each of the case studies, leadership figures are very important, therefore, 
Mbeki’s and his Minister of Health’s views regarding ARVs greatly influenced the population’s 
reasoning about whether they should take the drugs or not.  
By questioning the scientific knowledge pertaining to the epidemic, this helped to reinforce 
scepticism and denial, which prevented the necessary behavioural change needed in South 
African society, which negatively impacted on policy responses. The sending of mixed signals 
was very confusing to both government structures as well as the South African public at large. 
The South African government believed that HIV and AIDS was a side effect of decades of 
exploitation, underdevelopment and racism. Whereas, this contrasted with the securitisation 
emphasis of the international securitising actors, asserting that there would be very little that the 
South African government could do in the short-term to fight it. The solution to the AIDS 
problem rested in the formulation of long-term policies addressing social ills such as poverty, 
malnutrition, and poor socioeconomic conditions. 
Mbeki’s stance to remove or lessen the sense of urgency, which was strongly advised and 
promoted by international securitising actors led to the confusion and hampered the government 
response polices. According to Vieira (2006:237), “Mbeki decided to fight two powerful 
adversaries at the same time: the epidemic itself and the international and domestic actors 
promoting its securitisation”44. To accurately pin down Mbeki’s position is rather difficult 
because one is not certain if he is actually using the denialist approach, in order, to legitimise his 
                                                
44 Mbeki demonstrated this behavior in March 2001, in spite of strong international pressure; Mbeki rejected appeals 
to declare HIV and AIDS a national emergency. Also, later in September, the South African government blocked the 
publication of a report from the Medical Research Council, which stated that AIDS was the leading cause of death in 
South Africa (Copson, 2004:4). 
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opinion and challenge the international community or even if he truly believed that HIV and 
AIDS are separate issues. However, what must be noted is the impact of decision-makers’ ideas 
and deep-rooted values in shaping South Africa’s understandings and responses to the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic. By fully understanding both the political and ideological environment wherein 
the epidemic took hold in South Africa, will help to understand how the interpretations of and 
the responses towards the epidemic were influenced by this prevailing environment. 
ii) Domestic and international criticism of the South Africa government’s policy 
approaches  
From April 2002 in the wake of vociferous international and local criticism, Mbeki made the 
decision to distance himself from the AIDS denialists. Mbeki instructed Tshabalala-Msimang to 
write letters to the denialists instructing them not to use his name when signing letters or 
documents. Several denialists had signed “Member of President Mbeki's AIDS Advisory Panel” 
in dissident literature (Vieira, 2006). The South African government released a report which 
stated that Mbeki “will refrain from expressing his personal views in public and will instead 
reiterate the official position when questioned on AIDS” (Makhanya, 21 April 2002). 
Later in 2002 the South African High Court passed a judgement that ordered the government to 
make the drug Nevirapine available to pregnant women to help prevent mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV. Despite international drug companies offering free or cheap antiretroviral 
drugs, the government was hesitant to accept the free drugs to provide treatment for people living 
with HIV (interview, Senior Manager, Centre for the Study of AIDS, 01/08/08). In November 
2003 the government approved a plan to make antiretroviral treatment publicly available. 
Cabinet approved an ambitious antiretroviral treatment roll-out to an estimated 53,000 people by 
the end of March 2005. The judgement passed by the court was a result of a lawsuit filed by a 
local NGO, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), against the Minister of Health and nine 
Provincial Health MECs.  Zackie Achmat the founder and chairperson of the TAC, explained the 
reasons the TAC took the government to court in 2001:  
Our government has ignored science, economics, morality, good planning, good 
governance and the law for more than five years on this issue. We’ve organised, 
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marched, presented petitions and government has ignored every decent plea for them to 
do something. That’s why we've taken this step. (Achmat, 22 August 2001).  
Following the decision by the government to provide ARV therapy to people living with HIV, 
Tshabalala-Msimang began advocating for the promotion of alternative methods for the 
prevention and treatment of HIV and AIDS such as eating garlic, lemon and beetroot. During the 
2006 International AIDS Conference held in Toronto, Canada, Tshabala-Msimang opened the 
South African exhibition stall by displaying vegetables such as beetroot and garlic. She intended 
to promote natural remedies in the treatment of AIDS, but this backfired and generated a flurry 
of negative criticism of South Africa’s national HIV and AIDS response policy. Criticism of the 
government’s response to AIDS heightened, with UN Special Envoy Stephen Lewis attacking 
the government as being “obtuse and negligent” at the Conference (interview with Fox, 18 
August 2006). 
This very public attack by Lewis on the South African government in addition to a combination 
of factors, already listed, influenced the shift in policy change towards the national HIV and 
AIDS response. The public rebuke of the South African government expedited the government’s 
announcement of a draft framework to tackle HIV and AIDS and it pledged to improve 
antiretroviral drug access. Civil society groups were optimistic about this change in policy and 
are of the opinion that this marked a turning point in the government’s response (interview, 
Senior Researcher AIDS Expert, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, 23/4/08). 
While the South African government’s defensive attitude seemed to ease slightly, it still 
remained reluctant to accept international guidelines agreed by national governments at 
multilateral forums of negotiations. For example, in 2006 at the UN High Level Meeting on 
HIV/AIDS, “South African diplomacy worked hard to reverse the UNGASS Declaration of 2001 
with regards to the goal of universal access to treatment” (Vieira, 2006:230). While at the same 
time the government also lobbied against the proposal of setting clear targets for national 
governments in the areas of prevention, care and treatment (Vieira, 2006:230). These actions 
were indicative of the confrontational mentalities, which guided the policy preferences of the 
principle decision-makers in the South African government at that time regarding HIV and 
AIDS.   
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By the end of March 2006 there were 134,473 people accessing the government’s ART 
programme of HIV-suppressing drugs, with an estimated additional 80,000 people receiving 
ARTs through private medical treatment and the non-governmental sector. Since 2006 the Health 
Ministry has led the country’s extensive antiretroviral (ARV) roll-out programme. According to 
statistics from 2008, there were more than 480,000 people receiving ARTs, making South 
Africa’s programme one of the biggest in the world (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 
October 2008). 
In response to the public relations disaster created by Tshabalala-Msimang at the International 
AIDS Conference in Toronto, Former Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka became the 
new chair of SANAC replacing Zuma - much to the relief of civil society as, according to one 
interviewee, Zuma’s lifestyle choices had negatively impacted on the office (telephone 
interview, AIDS Expert, HEARD (University of Durban), 9/5/08). After assuming the chair of 
SANAC, Mlambo-Ngcuka stated that measures would be implemented to strengthen it and to 
mend relations with NGOs working in the field. This “underscored the need to take concrete 
steps to mend relations and raise the level of interaction between government and stakeholder 
groupings” (SA Government press release, 18 September 2006). The shift in policy-framing was 
the foundation necessary to establish better working relations between the state and non-state 
actors. From the perspective of the non-state sector, this heralded a new era in the South African 
government’s national HIV and AIDS response (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS 
Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). 
In March 2007 the South African government proposed a five-year plan that aimed to reduce the 
number of new HIV cases in the country by 50 per cent by 2011, and to provide at least 80 per 
cent of HIV-positive people with access to antiretroviral treatment (South African government 
press release 2007). The plan was presented at a two-day conference held in Gauteng. Several of 
the interviewees believed that the conference was successful, as it created a platform to bring 
together a wide range of influential HIV and AIDS stakeholders from various fields such as 
politics, business and HIV and AIDS advocates to debate methods needed to implement the Plan 
(South African government press release 2007).  
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To achieve its targets, the Plan stressed the importance of empowering women, the need to 
encourage people to test regularly for HIV and to increase efforts to promote behaviour change 
among the country’s youth. This proposal was unanimously approved by Cabinet two months 
later. South Africa’s new AIDS Plan was praised by UNAIDS Executive Director Dr Peter Piot, 
who stated that South Africa was well placed to lead Africa into a new phase in responding to the 
disease. According to Piot, “Failure to reach the ambitious, but necessary goals would be a 
collective failure on all our parts. You have a better chance than any other country in the region 
to deliver on AIDS. If you can’t, who can?” (UNAIDS, 6 June 2007). 
In January 2008 following many years of uncertainty and negative criticism, the Policy 
Committee of the National Health Council adopted new guidelines for the Prevention of Mother 
to Child Transmission (PMTCT). At the heart of the new policy is the addition of a second 
antiretroviral drug, AZT, for pregnant women with HIV and their babies, to complement the 
current treatment of Nevirapine only. This addition of AZT demonstrated that the criticism was 
an influencing factor which led to a significant change in policy formulation and implementation 
by the government as both of these drugs were a source of great tension between the government 
and non-state stakeholders.  
Finally, at the 2008 International AIDS Conference in Mexico City, Mexico it was clear that 
South Africa was a much-changed participant. All the previous negative criticism had forced the 
country to reframe policies and launch a new reframed National Strategic Plan (NSP) and a 
revamped National AIDS Council. South Africa was also given credited for the adoption of new 
Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission guidelines. These enabled pregnant mothers in 
South Africa to receive improved dual therapy, which it hoped would save future lives. The 
Deputy Head of SANAC, Mark Heywood, captured the mood by declaring that, “compared to 
Toronto, we are in a completely different political environment around AIDS” (Mail and 
Guardian, 7 August 2008). The positive outcome of the 2008 International AIDS Conference 
may suggest that South Africa was losing its image as the world’s AIDS pariah (interview, 
Senior Manager AIDS Expert, Centre for the Study of AIDS, 01/08/08). This demonstrates how 
as a response to the criticism the South African government reframed its narrow elitist approach 
to public policy-framing. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 143 
 
iii) Transnational actors  
As was common for Southern African states, South Africa initially accepted the international 
guidelines for action, which prescribed a variety of HIV and AIDS policies, strategies and the 
development of specific institutions to deal with the epidemic (Johnson, 2004:108). The 
UNAIDS has been very influential in introducing certain institutional innovations relating to the 
way in which the South African government manages its relationship with its international 
partners. This can best be illustrated by the government’s approach to the “Three Ones” 
principles, when the Department of Health established a Donor Communication Forum (DCF) in 
2000. This forum is tasked with coordinating activities to ensure avoiding duplication of 
programmes by donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs. This has been beneficial to the South 
African government as it has created a communication link between government and 
international partners, which enables a better developed and more synchronised response to the 
epidemic (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre 
JHB, 09/05/08). In addition, by means of funding from UNDP and the local AIDS Theme Group, 
the Department of Health has been able to develop a useful database (Donor Matrix) aimed at 
monitoring donors’ financial commitment to HIV and AIDS response in South Africa (Ndlovu, 
2005:1). 
After earlier difficulties in the working relationship between the South African government and 
transnational actors such as UNAIDS, the relationship gradually improved. This was 
demonstrated in 2007, when a joint UN Team on AIDS was consolidated as a common platform 
for the coordination and delivery of technical assistance to the HIV and AIDS national response. 
Through the team, the UN collectively supported the development of the National Strategic Plan 
2007-2011 (NSP), the costing and a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework.  
Also UNAIDS took a leading role in several activities in partnership with the South African 
government, namely,  
i) Serving in the national task teams for the development of the NSP and the Monitoring 
and Evaluation Framework;  
ii) Part of the writing team of the NSP, in collaboration with the Department for 
International Development (DFID); 
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iii) Supported the national AIDS council to prepare the national report to UNGASS for 
2008;  
iv) Supported the Department of Health in the analysis of data for the 2006 ANC survey 
and preparation of the 2007 survey.    
According to Vieira (2006:243), the relationship between the government and the transnational 
actors regarding the HIV and AIDS programmes is based on a kind of “cautious cooperation”. 
This is to say that there are well-established bilateral and multilateral means of resource 
allocation and technical assistance among organisations such as the DIFD, UNICEF, Global 
Fund, UNAIDS, UNDP, USAID/PEPFAR and others. There remains a high reliance on public 
sector funding for the South African HIV and AIDS response, which resulted in strengthening 
the government’s own domestic policies at the expense of the agenda of international donors 
(Vieira, 2006). South Africa receives only about 40 per cent of HIV and AIDS funding from 
donors. The South African government has been significantly increasing its share of funds 
allocated for HIV and AIDS programmes since 2000, which resulted in lesser dependence on 
donor funding (Ndlovu, 2005). According to Cloete (2000), many developing world countries 
find themselves trapped in a cycle of international debt. This in turn does not only reduce the 
decision-making autonomy of the developing countries’ governments, but also makes them more 
vulnerable to policy prescriptions from international aid agencies. However, because of South 
Africa’s relative economic strength this was not the case. This is important, as it influenced the 
power dynamics between the South African government and international donors in South 
Africa’s favour.  
During the interviews an important thread emerged regarding the institutional relationship 
between transnational donors and the South African government. Most of their interaction 
seemed confined to the lower ranks of political authority and there was very little, if any, contact 
with top-level decision-makers. For example, a senior officer at the UNDP stated that while they 
had interaction and collaborative activities with the South African Department of Health, they 
have experienced difficulty in making contact with higher-ranking decision-makers (telephone 
interview, Senior Officer AIDS Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08).  This 
is a consequence of Mbeki’s narrow elitist approach to public policy framing, protecting his 
political elite from external influence. As a result, transnational actors had to find alternative 
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means to introduce their ideas into the South African domestic policymaking structure and tilt 
the power dynamics in their favour. They chose to link up with like-minded domestic actors such 
as some provincial governments45 and opposition members in the national parliament. They also 
utilised the judicial route by supporting local NGOs taking the government to court as was in the 
case of TAC. 
6.6 Role of relevant stakeholders  
By the end of the 1990s a change was noticeable in the working relations between the state and 
non-state actors, which meant that the non-state actors’ involvement in HIV and AIDS 
policymaking had decreased (telephone interview, AIDS Expert, HEARD (University of 
Durban), 9/5/08). Reasons for the strained relations experienced between state and non-state 
actors are wide-ranging. After 1994 there was a major influx of former civil society activists 
taking up positions in the government, or who forged formal alliances with it (interview, Senior 
Researcher AIDS Expert, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, 23/4/08). The growing authoritarian 
tendencies of the South African government, under the leadership of Mbeki, led to a very low 
tolerance of policy positions contrary to those of the government (Johnson, 2002:222). Also 
within the government, the decisions taken about the AIDS policy were carried out on a political 
level removed from bureaucrats and top civil servants (Johnson, 2004:121).  
6.6.1 Politics and differing priorities - political space for domestic non-state actors in 
South Africa 
Prior to 1994 the ANC had started working closely with the first few NGOs involved in the HIV 
and AIDS field. The leading NGOs at the time were the AIDS Consortium (a membership-based 
organisation bringing together a network of over 1,000 AIDS service organisations), the AIDS 
Law Project, the National Progressive Primary Health Care Network (NPPHCN) and the 
National Association of People Living with AIDS (NAPWA). These organisations were at the 
forefront in responding to the epidemic, choosing to focus their response policies on human 
rights, non-discrimination and dignity concerns. The good working relations between the NGOs 
and the ANC allowed many successful initiatives to be launched, such as the Charter on HIV and 
AIDS and Human Rights (1992), later endorsed by the first ANC administration, and a Code of 
                                                
45 This point will be elaborated on later in the chapter. 
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Good Conduct on HIV/AIDS in the Workplace. This was turned into policy during Mandela’s 
Presidency (Heywood, 2004:2). 
It is surprising that a country such as South Africa with such a long history of mass mobilisation 
was slow in creating a mass social movement against HIV and AIDS. A senior AIDS expert 
from the UNDP expressed his views on the lack of a mass social movement against HIV and 
AIDS. According to this interviewee,  
I cannot understand why there are not more riots and marching against the government’s 
action taken over the disease as currently being seen and experienced in Africa and the 
rest of the world against the high food prices. Even an extremely militarised environment 
like Somalia, people rioted against the increase in food prices (telephone interview, 
Senior Officer AIDS Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08).  
He argued that South Africa had shown great capacity to organise itself to fight an enemy. Under 
the apartheid system people were able to organise themselves in an environment where there was 
no democracy and they could not talk to one another openly. However, in a democratic South 
Africa there seems to be a lack of agreement by relevant actors on the HIV and AIDS epidemic. 
“I don’t see this level of social mobilisation in the case of HIV and AIDS in spite of the impact it 
has on both the individual and community level (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS 
Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). 
By the end of the 1990s, NGO involvement in HIV and AIDS policymaking had started to 
steadily decline46. There are many non-state organisations specialising in the HIV and AIDS 
field in South Africa47. They were active in monitoring the government’s implementation of 
policies as well as being securitising actors with regards to the politics of HIV and AIDS in 
South Africa. This thesis narrows its focus on the analysis of organisations concerned primarily 
with issues pertaining to lobbying and advocacy while also ensuring that people living with HIV 
and AIDS have their rights protected and that the government upholds its constitutional 
obligations in providing health care and social assistance to them. As a result, three organisations 
                                                
46 The reasons for this deterioration in the exchanges between the state and non-state actors were varied and complex 
and it not the aim of this thesis to discuss them in detail.  
47 According to the AIDS Consortium, it operates as a membership-based organisation that brings together a 
network of over 1000 Community Based Organisations and individuals, locally, nationally and internationally.   
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were identified as particularly influential in fighting for the rights of people living with HIV and 
AIDS. They acted as an alternative voice outside of the state’s the spheres of decision-making, 
namely National Association of people living with HIV and AIDS (NAPWA), The AIDS 
Consortium, The AIDS Law Project and its further upshot, the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC). The TAC has assumed the domestic leadership and gained international recognition for 
its work.  For this reason, the rest of this section will focus on the important role played by the 
TAC in influencing South Africa’s policy decision-making process.  
The TAC was formed in 1998, with the objective of “campaign[ing] for greater access to 
treatment for all South Africans by raising public awareness and understanding about issues 
surrounding the availability, affordability and use of HIV treatments” (TAC website, accessed 20 
September 2013).  The TAC became the largest HIV and AIDS actor in South Africa. Heywood 
(2004:13) believes this is because it is the only organisation that was prepared to robustly and 
unapologetically challenge AIDS denialism, which resulted in souring relations between the 
TAC and the government and consequently further decreasing the TAC’s influence on the 
policymaking process. However, the TAC has been relatively successful in utilising both 
mobilisation campaigns and the legal system in order to further its cause. It has also been 
successful in being able to embrace international discourses of human rights and human security 
as a means to gain national and international support for its cause (interview, AIDS Expert, 
University of Johannesburg (UJ), 25/04/08). 
Heywood (2004) believes that the actions of the TAC may have encouraged Mandela to start 
demanding that the government lead a proper response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic. In July 
2000, in his closing speech at the 13th International AIDS Conference in Durban, South Africa, 
Mandela, while not coming out in direct opposition to Mbeki, for the first time questioned the 
actions of his successor. Speaking on behalf of “the ordinary people of the continent and the 
world – and particularly the poor who, on our continent, will again carry a disproportionate 
burden of this scourge” he requested “that we proceed to address the needs and concerns of those 
suffering and dying. And this can only be done in partnership” (Conference Media Release 
2000). 
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6.7 Policy power dynamics – engagement between the state and domestic actors  
In 1998 Mbeki defended his Minister of Health’s decision to stop providing Zidovudine (AZT) 
to HIV-positive pregnant women. By the end of the 1990s Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang 
claimed that the drugs were toxic and questioned the motives of the manufacturers. Mbeki chose 
not to address his critics, but instead went on the offensive and labelled them “sell-outs” to 
Western drug companies. He claimed that the drug companies were financing the TAC, who had 
demanded ARV access in order to create demand for the companies’ products (The Star, 31 
January, 2000). Mbeki also chose to accuse the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of 
promoting the view that HIV causes AIDS with the intention that African countries would 
purchase US produced ARVs (Agence France-Press, 6 October, 2000). 
The TAC challenged the government in various ways, most notably the already mentioned 
lawsuits and the 2003 campaign for ARVs. They also successfully used civil disobedience, for 
example, illegally smuggling in generic ARVs for its own pilot treatment programmes. The TAC 
has been able to use the media for its own benefit. The confrontational strategies were effective 
partly because the TAC was able to set the media agenda by issuing timely press releases 
containing medical arguments for ARVs and it referred journalists to scientific experts for 
comments. By utilising these tactics, the TAC acted as a knowledge broker, thereby challenging 
the role of the government as the centre of policy expertise (Mbali, 2005:45). Most of the 
interviewees agreed that the policies used by the TAC helped to further their cause at the expense 
of the government’s image in dealing with the HIV and AIDS epidemic.  
The relationship between the TAC and the government experienced extreme highs and lows. 
Although initially excluded from SANAC, the TAC managed through their efforts to garner 
support from several council members by 2004. This show of support proved useful, as it led to 
several TAC members being consulted and included in the task team established to study the 
financial costs of the ARV roll-out in 2002. The TAC understood that in order to achieve their 
aim of treatment, they had to work in conjunction with the government, because without them 
the ARV roll-out would not work sufficiently (telephone interview, AIDS Expert, HEARD 
(University of Durban), 9/5/08). 
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After the initial tensions between the state and non-state domestic actors, a welcome thawing in 
relations occurred. The appointment of Mark Heywood in 2007 as the first deputy chair for 
SANAC was a key sign of the change, as Heywood came from the civil society sector. World 
AIDS Day 2008 proved to cemented the unprecedented show of unity between the South African 
government and the domestic non-state actors and the international AIDS community coming 
together to combat the HIV and AIDS epidemic collectively for the first time (UNAIDS, 2008). 
An insight offered during the interview process regarding the state-non-state power dynamic in 
the HIV and AIDS activist community, is the need for a balanced approach (telephone interview, 
AIDS Expert, HEARD (University of Durban), 9/5/08). Following this logic, the policy-framing 
process should be open to both state and non-state actors, allowing for a more constructivist 
approach to public policymaking and moving away from the narrower elitist approach that had 
prevailed in South Africa. 
6.8 Politics and differing priorities - political space for international non-state actors in 
South Africa  
During the apartheid period South Africa was excluded from the WHO and did not participate in 
the intensive HIV and AIDS planning in the mid-1980s (Iliffe, 2006:72). This changed in 1990, 
when the NP regime and the ANC leadership jointly requested the WHO’s assistance. This joint 
call for assistance led to the international organisation’s entry into the South African HIV and 
AIDS arena and enabled them to take a more proactive role. This move was very much in line 
with the changing political changes taking place South Africa at the time.  
When Mandela came to power, the WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) was already 
engaged in sending technical support personnel to help in the implementation of NAP. This was 
the beginning of a more consultative and participatory decision-making process, which led many 
to believe that all domestic and international HIV and AIDS stakeholders would work together in 
a constructivist response to the epidemic.  
At the same time, as already discussed in chapter 4, on the international front there was the 
securitisation move that led to the creation of UNAIDS in 1996. UNAIDS has become a key 
securitising actor by promoting and furthering the current predominant view that link HIV and 
AIDS and security. This resulted in the international community advocating for countries to 
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adopt a multi-sectoral approach towards the epidemic, which was to be coordinated by a single 
body placed at the top of the national policymaking structure. The government was in support of 
this new policy and looked to be moving towards its implementation (Johnson, 2004:108). As to 
be expected, in the early stages of the NAP the lack of locally trained personnel created a 
situation in which foreign experts especially from the WHO and UNAIDS, became influential 
advisors to the government. Even though the environment may have been sufficiently 
accommodating to allow international actors access to South Africa, the reality of the day was 
that South Africa was undergoing a political transition. This meant that the international 
agencies, including UNAIDS, were confronted with a state bureaucracy undergoing a process of 
extensive restructuring.  
As of 2000 the institutional format for coordinated action amongst international development 
agencies, multilateral bodies, donor states and the South African government was set out in the 
“The Three One’s” framework. SANAC was the coordinating authority in the country in addition 
to being South Africa’s Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) to the Global Fund. In April 
2002 the Global Fund authorised a grant of $72 million to be used over two years on 
programmes covering HIV and AIDS and tuberculosis. Due to the high HIV prevalence in 
KwaZulu-Natal it was decided that this province would be the first beneficiary (Baleta, 2002). 
However by June 2002 the relationship between the government and the multilateral 
organisations had become more strained. The government had attempted to stop the Global 
Fund’s grant to KwaZulu-Natal, accusing the province of bypassing the national government 
when submitting its application. The Minister of Health claimed that the proper procedure to be 
followed was for the issue to have been discussed at SANAC before being submitted to the 
Global Fund. In response, the Kwazulu-Natal provincial government replied that the reason they 
applied directly to the Global Fund was because the government still had to establish a CCM at 
the time of the application48. A year later, after continued strained working relations, a final 
agreement was reached between the South African government and the Global Fund in August 
2003 (Ndlovu, 2005:12-13). The issue was finally settled after the Global Fund agreed that the 
National Treasury would act as the main recipient of the money and that SANAC would 
coordinate the implementation proposals.  
                                                
48 A month later in July 2002, SANC was chosen as South Africa’s CCM to the Global Fund. 
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The US government has been an important development partner for South Africa as far as the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic is concerned. USAID is the largest bilateral donor and second largest 
overall donor in South Africa after the European Union, which works in the areas of HIV and 
AIDS, capacity building, civil society, governance and environment (USAID Country Fact Sheet 
2006). Through USAID and the CDC, the US government has aided the South African 
government in developing primary health care structures. From 2000 the Clinton Global 
Initiative on AIDS directed large amounts of funding to South Africa’s struggle against the HIV 
and AIDS epidemic. Currently, the US government is the largest bilateral donor to South 
Africa’s health sector. For instance, under the PEPFAR, a total of US$100 million in financial 
support was given in 2004, with the majority of it allocated for programmes related to HIV and 
AIDS prevention, care and treatment (US Department of State, 2005:9). 
Even with the considerable backing by the US government in supporting South Africa’s HIV and 
AIDS initiatives, the bilateral relations between the two countries have experienced periods of 
discontent. A major reason for the tense relationship was the pharmaceutical manufacturers, with 
the backing of the US government, lobbying for a South African law enacted in 1997 enabling 
the government to import and produce generic substitutes of patented drugs. In 1997 the 
Department of Health passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 
(Medicine Act). The Act enabled the government to parallel import ARVs from third countries 
instead of paying exorbitant fees to large pharmaceutical firms in exchange for the drugs (Fourie, 
2005:183). The respective South African governments have followed a policy cutting the costs of 
branded drugs by advocating for the local manufacturing of cheaper generic drugs. This 
advocacy by the government has benefitted the South African economy, while also boosting the 
local drug industry, making it the largest in Africa (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS 
Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). In addition, the legislation also 
enabled the government to activate compulsory licensing that would transfer pharmaceutical 
technologies to local manufacturers, making it cheaper to produce locally (Bond 2001:156).  
6.9 Policy power dynamics – engagement between the state and international Actors  
After 1999 the HIV and AIDS policy environment had become highly politicised in South Africa 
resulting in strained working relations with UNAIDS (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS 
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Specialist UNDP Regional Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). The Donor Matrix had shortcomings 
which impacted on the government’s ability to accurately record the donor funding entering 
South Africa from international partners. It failed to provide a reliable guide to donor spending in 
the country, since it was based on donor commitments over an extended period as opposed to the 
actual allocation and disbursement of the money. Thus the lack of adequate control created a 
loophole which allowed international donors to exploit the system for their own purposes. This 
loophole enabled them to deal directly with the local government structures and NGOs, therefore 
bypassing the structures of the national government. Since donors direct their funds to service 
providers and research institutes, the government does not collect comprehensive information on 
these resources (Ndlovu, 2005:4). The fact that the funds could have been accessed more easily 
by allowing intended programmes to be implemented or to continue operating may have been 
considered a step in the right direction towards a more effective national response to the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic, but the government did not view it in this way. Instead this only helped to 
strengthen the government’s belief that they were being undermined by international agencies 
promoting their own agendas. According to an interviewee, “what was necessary were better 
communication channels between government and the international agencies to help them both 
achieve their goals” (interview, Senior Researcher AIDS Expert, the Centre for Conflict 
Resolution, 23/4/08). 
With the end of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa (PMA) lawsuit, it 
was anticipated that both parties would want to find common ground to work towards the same 
goal. This was not to be as in December 2004 the ANC published a strongly worded attack on 
the US government health officials, accusing them of “treating Africans like ‘guinea pigs’ in 
order to promote AIDS drugs” (ANC, 2004). The attack by the ANC was related to the 
controversy over the drug Nevirapine. The article stated that Dr Edmund Tramont, Chief of the 
US National Institutes of Health (NIH), who led the project in Uganda, “[…] entered into a 
conspiracy with a pharmaceutical company to tell lies to promote the sales of Nevirapine in 
Africa, with absolutely no consideration of the health impact of those lies on the lives of millions 
of Africans” (ANC, 2004). It also claimed, that “upon learning of the potential lethal side effects 
of Nevirapine, President Bush and his administration did nothing to stop the shipment and usage 
of the drug in Africa. They must be held accountable for their inaction (ANC, 2004).  
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The perceived efforts of the US government to safeguard the interests of the pharmaceutical 
industry were interpreted by the ANC leadership as an imperialist plot against the millions of 
Africans in need of the life-saving drugs. The US government’s continued support of the 
pharmaceutical industry was thus viewed by the ANC leadership as being part of a strategy that 
prioritised the economic interests of the pharmaceutical companies ahead of the lives of Africans 
who were in dire need of the life-saving drugs. It was interpreted as resembling the colonial 
system of imperial Britain in which state power ensured an environment suitable for companies 
to exploit the locals and benefit at their expense. Therefore pushing for the local production of 
generic versions of the ARV drugs may be interpreted as a symbolic effort to break the 
hegemony of Western capitalism and science by transferring essential medical skill to Africans, 
thus promoting African and self-empowerment.  
When examining the role of the stakeholders in the policymaking process it is evident that during 
Mbeki’s presidency there was an elitist approach to the public policy-framing process. This was 
influenced by the centralisation of power within the ANC and the government, and as a 
consequence the power dynamics between the political elite and non-state actors were clearly in 
the favour of the political elite. However, after responding to international criticism of their HIV 
and AIDS policies, and because of a strong civil society sector in the country, there was a shift in 
policy framing allowing non-state actors more access to the policy decision-making structures. 
6.10 Securitisation approach and the relevant actors involved  
i) President Thabo Mbeki 
Despite the serious threat posed by HIV and AIDS, Mbeki and his close advisers, including his 
Minister of Health, constantly defied the mainstream international approaches to the epidemic. 
Mbeki linked the epidemics’ spread to poverty and the deep-rooted legacies of the apartheid 
regime. He also claimed that HIV and AIDS are not related and that Pharmaceutical Companies, 
who are backed by powerful states, are exploiting (one could also say securitising) the epidemic 
exclusively for achieve financial gain (The Economist, 21 February 2002). As highlighted earlier, 
instead the South African government took a more radical stance instead, openly accusing the 
US-backed pharmaceutical companies of exploiting the suffering of impoverished Africans. 
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Mbeki’s leadership role can be used to explain a need for the securitisation process in a country 
where the spread of HIV represented a real and existential threat to the entire population. Elbe 
(2006:132) argues that in the case of South Africa securitising HIV and AIDS would not imply 
removing it from the political sphere and shifting it into the security sphere, “but instead to shift 
it out of its non-politicised status and to begin a proper politicisation of the issue”. In 2000, 
Mbeki refused to consider HIV and AIDS as an urgent matter; instead he claimed that since the 
main cause of the spread of the virus was extreme poverty, efforts should therefore be taken to 
tackle the latter rather than the former (BBC News, 14 October 2008). Even though there is a 
correlation between extreme poverty/inequality and the spread of HIV, this is a disease which 
affects all social classes. As a result, it is problematic to regard poverty alone as the main 
underlying cause of HIV.  
Chikane (2010) asserts that a major flaw in Mbeki’s approach was that he tended to articulate his 
concerns to the public too quickly without the necessary foresight and consultation. According to 
Chikane (2010), if Mbeki was a researcher and had done research on these drugs and published 
his research findings, this would have been normal and maybe accepted by the public at large. 
However as the leader of South Africa he exposed himself to attack, “so his views would have 
consequences for the use of the drugs in the rest of the developing world”. This flaw may have 
been a contributory factor in South Africa’s framing of policies as well as the associated 
processes in the national response policy towards the epidemic.   
What Mbeki and his supporters initially failed to recognise is that securitisation on a national 
level may have been able to overcome the problem of scarce medication available for the 
population. By framing HIV and AIDS as a security threat to the population, it is in fact possible 
for developing countries to overcome the restrictive and expensive patents that protect most of 
the ARV medication. These patents, which are protected under the legislation of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), impede poorer countries from producing generic ARVs therapies and other 
medicines in general at lower prices (Elbe, 2006:133). However, by appealing to the ‘security 
exceptions’ included in these patents, developing countries are able to invoke the raison d’état to 
overrule these legal agreements, increasing the domestic production of medication or importing 
it from other countries at more competitive prices (Elbe, 2006). 
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When examining the language used by Mbeki in explaining his views on the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic, it is evident he draws from the human security discourse. Human security emerged as 
a way to link various humanitarian, economic, and social issues in order to alleviate human 
suffering and assure security. As a result, Mbeki ensured that poverty coupled with the legacy of 
apartheid, was blamed for many of the social ills in the country, and was the driving force for his 
advocacy. In essence, Mbeki’s emphasis was primarily on the poverty and social ills unleashed 
by the epidemic, while ignoring the viral aspect. This meant that Mbeki failed to get the full 
message across to his audience. It was communicated so ineffectively that it became a failure 
which hampered the policy decision-making processes in South Africa regarding the response 
policies aims at addressing the HIV and AIDS epidemic. According to an interviewee, “By 
Mbeki taking the virus out altogether, he really shot himself in the foot. If he had kept it and said 
the virus thrives in conditions of severe poverty which is the real underlying factor that really 
would have won him praise (interview, AIDS Expert, University of Johannesburg (UJ), 
25/04/08).  
While Mbeki failed to fully embrace the concept of using speech-act during his tenure, he did at 
times adopt a more security-orientated language approach by referring to the “escalating HIV 
and AIDS pandemic” as a “pressing crisis” (Chikane, 26 October 2010). Chikane (2010) defends 
this approach by arguing that Mbeki’s speeches were used instead for purposes of highlighting 
the challenges of the epidemic while meetings were held to further raise awareness. Mbeki failed 
to go as far as Mogae and Mswati in his efforts to fully adopt the speech-act to securitise the HIV 
and AIDS epidemic and as a result the South African case study is indicative of a failed 
securitisation attempt. At this stage the security argument would have been enough, but in the 
case of South Africa it failed since there was no sense of urgency therefore securitisation was not 
implicit in the standards of behaviour, principles, policies and bureaucratic processes which were 
required to tackle the problem. 
Chapter 2, discussed how three facilitating conditions were necessary for a speech act to be 
considered successful in the process of securitisation. Mbeki failed to comply with all three of 
the facilitating conditions required for the process of securitisation. He remained hesitant to fully 
accept and follow the recognised grammar of security regarding the HIV and AIDS epidemic. By 
virtue of his position as President of South Africa, as a securitising actor he was in a position of 
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authority to pronounce on the security concerns however, he was not willing to fully raise the 
level of threat facing the population. 
ii) Domestic actors -Treatment Action Campaign 
As already set out in chapter 2, according to Buzan et al. (1998:40), “a security actor is someone, 
or a group, who performs the security speech-act”. These actors can come from political leaders, 
bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups. Based on this definition, TAC can be 
considered a securitising actor in South Africa. The TAC proceeded by combining the 
international representation of the epidemic as a human rights as well as a security concern by 
using strong images related to the anti-apartheid struggle. It also utilised other key strategies 
such as adopting language as a means to help securitise the epidemic. This was successful, as it 
allowed the TAC to successfully construct a speech-act that drew on the long-term sensitivities 
of the South African society. By adopting a human rights perspective, TAC ensured that any 
stigma that may have been created through the securitisation would be included and addressed. 
Additionally, it also campaigns against “the view that AIDS is a ‘death sentence’” (TAC website, 
accessed 30 January 2013). The TAC used traditional anti-apartheid human rights slogans for its 
national campaigns, for example, the “Defiance Campaign” and the “Civil Disobedience 
Campaign”. Acharya (2004:248) asserts that, “while the initiative to spread transnational norms 
can be undertaken either by local or foreign entrepreneurs, diffusion strategies that accommodate 
local sensitivity are more likely to succeed than those who seek to supplant the latter”.  
The TAC’s ability to successfully utilise social mobilisation methods was very important in 
promoting its cause. The amount of actual time spent in the communities through door-to-door 
campaigns brought the organisation closer to the realities of the people they sought to assist. This 
approach helped to sustain and strengthen their grassroots relations as people become more 
familiar with the organisation, its aims and objectives, thereby expanding their audience reach. 
According to Buzan et al. (1998:32), a condition for a securitising move is that, “the social 
conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitising actor that is, the relationship 
between the speaker and the audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the 
claims made in a securitising attempt”. Therefore, because of its social mobilisation approach, 
the TAC was able to be in a position to meet the above condition. The TAC’s use a social 
mobilisation strategy allowed the organisation to gain access to local news and information about 
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challenges affecting the targeted communities, while at the same time ensuring that the 
organisation’s name became known and familiar to the communities, and make them more 
willing to accept the securitising attempt.   
Interestingly, when examining the methods the TAC used to confront the government about its 
inaction regarding the security threat posed by the HIV and AIDS epidemic, it becomes evident 
that the organisation employed similar persuasion strategies to those adopted by the liberation 
movements during the apartheid era (interview, Senior Researcher AIDS Expert, the Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, 23/4/08). During the apartheid era it was the norm for transnational actors to 
work in unison with resistance groups in South Africa and those in exile to apply pressure on the 
apartheid state (Black, 1999). The TAC’s language and action strategies were based on the 
international norm of racial equality, within a broadening human rights perspective, which was 
then applied to the particular context of South Africa (Klotz, 1995:44). This strategy was 
advantageous as it placed the TAC in a position to promote the need for the epidemic to be 
securitised and led to it being a persuasive agent of change.   
The TAC, having learnt from the liberation experiences of the ANC, also built up a multifaceted 
system by forming partnerships with both state and non-state actors on different levels of both 
political and social interactions. The TAC makes use of various strategies depending on whether 
it is interacting with international actors or domestic actors. Internationally, the TAC actively 
pursued a policy of interacting at global AIDS conferences and other multilateral meetings with 
international organisations and other transnational NGOs that share similar interests and 
opinions. Domestically, it shared information, carried out mass mobilisation campaigns and 
liaised with other activist organisations of PLWHA. When challenging the government, it made 
use of the political and justice systems available in South Africa. The TAC’s campaigns have 
drawn strongly upon a human rights discourse, with international support from agencies such as 
UNAIDS. Some scholars are of the opinion that a change in approach may be necessary as a 
more multi-faceted approach is needed to successfully combat the epidemic (interview, AIDS 
Expert, University of Johannesburg (UJ), 25/04/08). 
From the late 1990s the TAC participated intensively in transnational advocacy networks, which 
succeeded in influencing domestic change in South Africa. An important victory for the TAC, 
which influenced the prevailing opinion among donors, the governments and the UN system 
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itself, was establishing the view that therapy with ARVs was far too complex for health systems 
in the Third World and that prevention campaigns were more cost effective than treatment 
(Heywood, 2004). This success achieved by the TAC resulted in international actors being re-
socialised with new ideas regarding more effective responses to the epidemic. The TAC also 
began pressuring several governments, including the South African government, to apply 
national HIV and AIDS plans that emphasise the importance of the provision of treatment to 
people infected with HIV. All of this made the TAC an important securitisation actor in the case 
of South Africa.  
The South African government had previously strongly opposed most efforts by both domestic 
and international pressure groups to change its HIV and AIDS policies. This hard stance led to 
the TAC seeking legal recourse against the government. As a direct result of the court action, a 
new comprehensive plan for the roll-out of ARVs was formulated and successfully implemented. 
In an attempt to raise doubts about the growing legitimacy and credibility of the TAC, Mbeki 
and his administration sought to use ideological arguments as a means to undermine the TAC. 
For instance, regarding the provision of Nevirapine, the government accused TAC of 
representing the interests of the pharmaceutical companies as opposed to the interests of the 
South African people. Heywood (2004:9) asserts that, “in 2000 it is alleged that Mbeki told the 
ANC parliamentary caucus that TAC was a front for drug companies, and had successfully 
‘infiltrated’ the trade union movement”. The government accused the TAC of representing the 
interests of the pharmaceutical companies at the expense of the South African population, which 
proved not to be the case (telephone interview, Senior Officer AIDS Specialist UNDP Regional 
Service Centre JHB, 09/05/08). 
The TAC has been able to carry out its dual strategy with great effect for several reasons. Firstly, 
it acquired the organisational strength to be able to either challenge and/or to cooperate with the 
government. Secondly, it was financially independent from the government and therefore had no 
obligation to the government. Thirdly, through its global networking the TAC has created 
supportive alliances that have mobilised global public opinion and provided funding. Finally, the 
TAC has skilfully built what its leaders term “moral consensus” on ARV treatment.  
The TAC proved very effective in pressuring the government through both political and judicial 
routes. Because the TAC’s campaigns adopted a human rights approach, this drew support from 
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international actors such as UNAIDS. As highlighted, TAC’s use of language differed somewhat 
from the more straightforward state security approach of other securitising actors such as the US 
government. TAC has therefore, strategically constructed a speech-act which appealed to the 
long term sensitivities of the South African society. According to Buzan et al, (1998:27), “It is 
important to note that the security speech-act is not defined by uttering the word security. What 
is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special 
measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience”. 
The TAC has adopted the moral argument “that no one should die from AIDS because of a lack 
of affordable treatment, since there are available medicines that are proven to be effective,” 
which has indeed been a powerful motivator for action (Patterson, 2006:125-126). The TAC has 
used this moral argument against the government to great effect. Since the ANC was the party 
that liberated South Africa, it had acquired a great moral stature. When the TAC made the point 
that the ANC government had failed HIV-positive citizens, many of whom are black, coupled 
with the fact that government continued to argue that access to treatment was too expensive, the 
government lost ground on the moral argument (interview, Senior Researcher AIDS Expert, the 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, 23/4/08). Therefore, the TAC’s strategy was in line with the 
basic premise that to successfully frame something in terms of security, a securitising actor has 
to convince a significant audience that a specific issue constitutes an existential threat (Buzan et 
al, 1998:32). 
TAC complied with two of the three facilitating conditions required for the process of 
securitisation that were discussed in chapter 2. TAC accepted and followed the recognised 
grammar of security. However, by virtue of it being a non-state actor it was not in a position of 
authority to pronounce on the security. However, TAC was able to successfully raise the level of 
threat facing the population.  
iii) The USA as a key-securitisation actor in South Africa  
As mentioned earlier, in 1997 the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa 
(PMA) sued the South African government over the new legislation related to the Medicine Act. 
The court case continued over three years and resulted in intense international and domestic 
lobbying, but the PMA dropped its lawsuit in 2001. The US government acting on behalf of the 
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pharmaceutical industry, resisted all attempts by the South African government to defend the 
legality of South Africa’s position at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Bond, 1999). 
Furthermore, since the introduction of PEPFAR to South Africa, USAID has insisted that the 
South African government adopt a policy of using the financial assistance of the US government 
to buy branded ARVs from US pharmaceutical companies as opposed to buying cheaper non-
branded generic drugs from other countries. Unlike Botswana, South Africa was strongly 
opposed to this option. The intention behind this US strategy was essentially a skilful 
manoeuvring tactic guaranteeing that the aid money would eventually be redirected back into the 
US economy. A criticism directed at PEPFAR’s investment in HIV and AIDS treatment was that 
it sought to help restore the global image of the USA. Former US President George Bush’s 2003 
State of the Union address makes the point, while talking about HIV and AIDS, that in order to 
address emergencies, countries often require outside help and that the US has the experience and 
expertise to offer help,  
[Maintaining] human dignity has been part of our history for a long time. We fed the 
hungry after World War I. This country carried out the Marshall Plan and the Berlin 
airlift […] It’s nothing new for our country. But there’s a pandemic which we must 
address now, before it’s too late. 
In accordance with its broader HIV and AIDS securitisation strategy, as promoted by PEPFAR 
in 2003, the US government established its own system of aid provision in South Africa. This 
resulted in all US HIV and AIDS programmes being integrated into PEPFAR under the control 
of USAID/CDC and the American Embassy in Pretoria. Approval of funds for the 
implementation of plans was subject to the US Global Aids Coordinator at the State Department 
in Washington and PEPFAR’s projects being managed by the US Ambassador in Pretoria (US 
Department of State, 2005). The US representatives in South Africa refrained from engaging 
directly with the pre-existing multilateral mechanisms already in place to coordinate the work of 
international partners. Instead, they chose to deal bilaterally with over 200 partners in the public, 
private and non-profit sectors (US Department of State, 2005). 
In the case of South Africa, the US did not have much access to the South African national 
structure of the policy decision-making process. Unsurprisingly, and because of the tense HIV 
and AIDS policy environment, Mbeki and his Cabinet closed ranks in order to shield themselves 
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from any interference by external and domestic actors whose views were contrary to those of the 
government. However, this proved beneficial to PEPFAR as it facilitated its broad strategies of 
avoiding national coordinating to achieve its objectives, and meant that it was in a position to 
rapidly mobilise groups as well as being able to address concerns at the grassroots level 
(interview, Senior Researcher AIDS Expert, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, 23/4/08). This in 
turn led to a response by the government, with the then Minister Tshabalala-Msimang calling for 
PEPFAR to be more closely integrated into the government structures that deal with external 
funding matters. The Minister stated that South Africa “had not asked for PEPFAR’s assistance” 
and that the Ministry’s coordination efforts to support South Africa’s response to HIV and AIDS 
epidemic should not be at risk of duplication or of unaccountable initiatives by international 
partners (Aidsmap, 23/06/2006). 
Regarding the HIV-prevention policies promoted by PEPFAR’s “ABC” approach, they were not 
readily accepted in South Africa. The only organisations promoting this approach are a number 
of Christian groups operating in South Africa that are financed by the US government49. The 
majority of civil society groups and the government departments dealing with HIV and AIDS in 
South Africa have adopted a more pragmatic approach of using multilateral agencies (interview, 
AIDS Expert, University of Johannesburg (UJ), 25/04/08). Therefore, regardless of the funding 
offered by PEPFAR, most have rejected the US government’s moralistic approach to HIV and 
AIDS prevention by continuing to focus on awareness campaigns and on the distribution of 
condoms as part of their response to the epidemic.  
From 2003 the US government, represented by CDC in South Africa, has been a keen advocate 
of the introduction of the routine or ‘opt-out’ HIV testing in the public health care system. 
However, because of the sensitive nature of the issue, voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) 
continues to be the accepted policy in order to promote the protection of individual human rights. 
The protection of human rights of people testing positive for HIV has always been an important 
factor in South Africa’s response to the epidemic50. The majority of the interviewees were in 
                                                
49 This still applies presently in 2013. 
50 The Constitution of South Africa has enshrined the rights of people living with HIV and AIDS and the Bill of 
Rights makes any discrimination action against them illegal.  
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agreement that this should remain the status quo as it supports the fight against the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic.  
Interestingly, however, a leading AIDS expert believes that the South African human rights 
approach is misleading and a better option should be found by marrying the human rights 
approach with the public health approach in South Africa. There seems to be a bit of momentum 
in that direction but it is not enough. South Africa’s strong liberal constitution means that it is 
only natural to follow a human rights approach, but this stops short of providing a holistic 
solution. The human rights approach may have run its course and the response strategy should 
perhaps move on to a more pragmatic intervention as in public health (interview, AIDS Expert, 
University of Johannesburg (UJ), 25/04/08).  
6.11 Conclusion  
The HIV and AIDS epidemic in South Africa is fuelled by several factors such as poverty, 
gender inequalities, and social and racial exclusion. Walker et al. (2004:19), stress that “the 
spread of the disease is also influenced by personal choices, political responses and cultural 
factors.” South Africa is an economic and political power in the region with a strong economy 
and stable democracy with relatively efficient social infrastructure in place. However, South 
Africa has struggled to achieve similar success in combating HIV and AIDS than countries with 
much lower levels of socio-economic development.  
This chapter found that the political leadership in their framing of policy the political leadership 
was influenced by the controversial denialists. This was coupled with the urgent need to address 
the legacy of social injustices left by the apartheid regime. As a result the government’s response 
was a degree of inaction and a slow response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic from key policy 
decision-makers. According to Anderson (2000:7), even the failure to formulate a policy will 
become policy since “inaction becomes a public policy when officials decline to act on a 
problem”. 
Also, the chapter indicated and discussed the causes, extent and implication of this suspicion by 
the government about the true intentions of the Western governments and the interests of 
international pharmaceutical companies operating in South Africa. This suspicion led to the 
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rejection of international thinking on the HIV and AIDS epidemic, and influenced the 
policymaking processes accordingly. 
It was argued that the leadership, under the direction of Mbeki, drew on the advice of a few 
trusted individuals. This left little space for non-state actors in the policy formulation structures.  
The ability of domestic and international securitising actors to exert an influence on key policy 
decision-makers was therefore limited. The relationship between the government and domestic 
non-state actors was at an all-time low in the late 1990s. In an attempt to remedy this, the TAC 
used the judicial route as a means to influence the policymaking process. This was illustrated by 
the court ordering the government to provide the AIDS drug Nevirapine to prevent mother-to-
child transmission.  
As a result of the tense HIV and AIDS policy environment, the TAC adopted a strategy of 
linking up with transnational actors to exert external pressure on the South African government. 
It was demonstrated that the TAC’s action took the form of lobbying and communicating directly 
with the international community at various international gatherings such as Global AIDS 
Conferences and at the UN General Assembly’s Special Meetings on HIV and AIDS. These 
strategies proved useful to the TAC, as they provided the organisation with an opening access to 
and influence the framing of policy.  
It was argued that South Africa’s narrow elitist political and social structures restricted external 
actors from gaining access into the domestic policy decision-making structure. This was due to 
the centralisation of power within the ANC and the government under Mbeki’s presidency as 
well as the suspicions about Western influence. In response to this, the international actors 
aligned themselves with like-minded domestic non-state actors. Unlike in Botswana, South 
Africa had a strong civil society opposing the government’s HIV and AIDS policy responses and 
that was prepared to use the judicial system to influence policy formulation and implementation. 
After criticism from international and domestic actors the South African government opened up 
its policymaking processes to include non-state actors. Although this is still mainly an elitist 
approach, the access to the policymaking process has widened and now includes elements of 
constructivism.  
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The chapter examined the processes and dynamics around the securitisation of HIV and AIDS in 
South Africa. It was found that Mbeki’s suspicion of foreign securitising actors led to reluctance 
to accept the securitisation discourse. This led to the unsuccessful securitisation of the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic in South Africa. It was also found that as a result of the tense political 
environment, transnational actors had limited access to high-ranking decision-making structures, 
hence limiting their persuasive influence to promote the securitisation approach. At the same 
time the TAC also made a securitisation attempt through the use of securitisation speech-acts. 
Although they managed to reach a wide audience, their securitisation attempt was constrained 
because of their lack of access into the policymaking structure. This is interesting as it is an 
example of a bottom-up approach to securitising the epidemic.     
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Chapter 7:  Policy Issues, Processes and Framing around HIV and AIDS in 
Swaziland 
7.1 Introduction 
Swaziland holds the unenviable distinction of having the highest HIV-prevalence in the world at 
26.3 per cent (USAID Swaziland Country Profile, October 2010). The consequences of the 
epidemic are becoming more apparent and are reflected in deteriorating socio-economic 
indicators51. This situation has unfolded slowly and unobtrusively since the early 1990s. As is the 
case with Botswana and South Africa, Swaziland too finds itself in “the global epicentre of the 
epidemic” (Hwedie 2001:55). Early reporting by UNICEF on HIV and AIDS in Swaziland 
indicated that “even if no new infections [occur] after 1999, infection levels will remain high 
through at least 2010 [and] deaths will not level off until after 2020” (UNICEF, 1999:13). 
Currently, infection levels remain relatively high. 
This chapter focuses on the framing of policy and the processes and factors associated with it in 
Swaziland. Examining the public policy discourse on HIV and AIDS should reveal how public 
policy on HIV and AIDS was framed. A central part of this is looking at the policymaking 
dynamics and what factors influenced them. The chapter further explores the role of relevant 
stakeholders such as state, non-state domestic HIV and AIDS actors, and multilateral and 
bilateral agencies in attempting to influence the policy decision-making processes in Swaziland 
in the roles of policymaking actors and policy-influencing actors. Finally, the chapter examines 
the processes and dynamics around the securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the 
country. It is argued that because of the political environment transnational securitising actors 
initially had limited access to higher-ranking decision-making structures, since there were social 
and cultural barriers to overcome. This severely limited the persuasive influence of these actors 
in promoting the securitisation approach. However, once the political space for the acceptance of 
the securitisation discourse pursued by influential securitising actors was created, the 
securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Swaziland became possible and was eventually 
partially successful. 
                                                
51 For a more comprehensive review of these socio-economic indicators see, “The Socio-Economic Impact of 
HIV/AIDS in Swaziland” by Whiteside et al, 2006.  
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As in Chapters 5 and 6, the roles of certain transnational actors - notably the UN agencies and 
the US government - are analysed to ascertain the scope of their persuasion efforts as promoters 
of the securitisation discourse in the policy decision-making processes. It is argued that 
Swaziland’s political leadership under King Mswati III created a political environment that was 
initially not very open to the acceptance of international actors and their ideas. This approach had 
elements of elitist public policy theory, in which only a trusted elite is part of the policymaking 
discourse. The prevailing political environment created a tense working relationship for state and 
non-state actors. As a result, this tense relationship impacted on the framing of HIV and AIDS 
policy and processes in Swaziland. However, it will also be demonstrated that despite the tense 
political environment the domestic and international HIV and AIDS actors were able to find and 
create a political space, which gained them access to, and to some degree influence over, the 
policymaking processes. For the purposes of this study political space will be defined as “the 
presence of allies and support groups; the availability of meaningful access points in the political 
system” (Brockett, 1991: 254). 
It is also argued that Mswati’s leadership and lifestyle choices sent many confusing signals. This 
in turn affected and influenced the process of how policy issues and problems were framed and 
how these issues were placed on the policy agenda. The fact that Mswati is a traditionalist 
practising polygamy caused tensions with international HIV and AIDS actors as this practice did 
not fit neatly into their generic global awareness campaigns.  
Swaziland reveals a few of Cloete’s (2000) characteristics of developing countries, such as a low 
per capita income, an agriculture-dependent economy and a large rural population. Swaziland is 
heavily dependent on donor aid. It is argued that this dependence on donor aid led to the creation 
and opening of access points in to the political system for non-state actors and exert some 
influence on the policymaking structures.   
7.2 Dimensions of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Swaziland  
Swaziland ranks as a lower-middle-income country, approximately 75 per cent of the population 
are employed in some form of subsistence farming and 60 per cent of the population live on less 
than the equivalent of US$1.25 per day (UNDP, 2008). Swaziland has experienced several years 
of wavering economic growth, which has been exacerbated by the economy’s failure to aid job 
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creation to meet the rate of new job seekers entering the market. The emergence of the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic coupled with slow economic growth placed a heavy strain on the government’s 
ability to provide much-needed social services, such as health care and education (UNAIDS 
Epidemic, 2009).  
With an estimated adult prevalence of 26.3 per cent, Swaziland has the world’s most severe HIV 
and AIDS epidemic, posing a serious challenge to the country’s economic development. Since 
Swaziland’s first AIDS case was reported, the epidemic has spread across all parts of the 
country. According to UNAIDS Epidemic Update 2009, average Swazi life expectancy fell by 
half between 1990 and 2007, in great part due to the epidemic. Approximately 190,000 people in 
Swaziland are HIV positive, including 15,000 children under the age of 15 (UNAIDS Epidemic 
Update 2009).  
After visiting Swaziland in February 2010, UNAIDS Executive Director Michel Sidibe presented 
a report estimating that three in every 100 people in Swaziland will be infected with HIV every 
year, leading to an expected 18,000 new infections each year by 2012 (UNAIDS, February 
2010). While he praised prevention of mother-to-child transmission initiatives, he expressed the 
view that much progress still to be made. According to the UNAIDS World AIDS Day Report 
2011, overall rates of new HIV infections in Sub-Saharan Africa appear to have peaked in the 
late 1990s, and HIV prevalence seems to have declined slightly (UNAIDS, 2011).  
As a consequence of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, approximately 10 per cent of all households 
in Swaziland are now headed by children and 60 per cent of the country’s population lives below 
the poverty line (UNICEF 2005). The probability of a young Swazi aged 15 today reaching the 
age of 50 is 28 per cent for males and 22 per cent for females (Patterson, 2006:45). Swaziland 
has not been very successful in curbing new infections. At the end of 2007 there were 
approximately 190,000 people living with HIV, including 15,000 children aged 0-14. HIV 
prevalence for the 15-24 age group remained steady at 39.4 per cent between 2002 and 2004, and 
levelled off at 34.6 per cent in 2006 (UNGASS Swaziland Country Progress Report 2007).  
The deaths of many adults left behind a youthful population in Swaziland. Many children are 
orphaned and left in the care of grandparents. If there are no grandparents, they are left to fend 
for themselves in child-headed families. Increasing economic decline may push Swaziland into 
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further poverty or economic migration, potentially escalating the scale of the epidemic. This 
huge scale of AIDS-related illnesses and deaths is weakening the government’s capacity to 
deliver adequate healthcare and other essential services, with serious consequences for food 
security, economic growth and human development (Patterson, 2006).  
7.3 Observable policy responses 
7.3.1 Early efforts to address the epidemic  
Swaziland’s first HIV-positive case was reported in 1986. According to the WHO, the 
government has “demonstrated a high level of political commitment to fight HIV and AIDS 
since the start of the epidemic” (WHO, Swaziland Country Profile 2005). The government 
responded almost immediately by establishing the National AIDS Prevention and Control 
Programme (NAPCP), later renamed the Swaziland National AIDS/STI Programme (SNAP), 
with support from the WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS (GPA). The aim of the programme 
was to develop policies, and to coordinate and strengthen the national response policy on the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic. As was the norm in most countries in the late 1990s, a standard 
package of HIV and AIDS interventions was implemented. In addition, from 1992 SNAP was 
tasked with conducting the sentinel surveillance of HIV prevalence every two years. 
The first interventions took the form of the Short-Term Plan (1986-1988), which later evolved 
into the Medium-Term Plan (1989-1992). Both these plans focused primarily on awareness 
programmes which provided information and education on HIV and AIDS, promoted condom 
usage, attempted to manage the spread of sexually transmitted infections, and ensure safe blood 
screening. While these plans were strategically aimed at providing valuable information about 
the disease, the message failed to resonate sufficiently with the nation. The disease soon spread 
exponentially across all sectors of Swazi society. An interviewee believed that the reason for the 
failure was that while the intervention did indeed raise awareness about the disease, it failed to 
adequately address behavioural change concerns (interview, UNAIDS-Social Mobilisation and 
Partnership Advisor, Swaziland, 14/04/08). The plans were flawed because they did not 
adequately address the issue of behaviour change which is a key driver for limiting the spread of 
the disease. 
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According to Whiteside (2003:6), the government’s initial response to the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic was in line with international norms, and “indeed in many cases has gone beyond 
them”. He illustrates his point by recalling a meeting led by the NAPCP in 1993 calling for the 
Cabinet to make a firm commitment to fight the disease. This was significant as it led to 
Swaziland being credited as being one of the first countries to include and make mention of HIV 
in its national development plans. Additionally, the government was the first to commission a 
study on the socio-economic impact of the HIV and AIDS epidemic; more importantly a senior 
government official was open about his HIV status and the need for behaviour change as early as 
the mid-1990s (Whiteside, 2003:6). While this may have been true of the initial policy response 
initiatives, today Swaziland has one of the highest HIV rates in the world.   
During the first few years of the epidemic in Swaziland it was reported that there was a steady 
increase in incidence from the first reported HIV and AIDS case to over 150 in 1993. HIV 
surveillance was introduced in 1992 and by that time 3.9 per cent of pregnant women tested were 
HIV positive (Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland, Policy Document on HIV/AIDS and 
STD Prevention and Control, 1998:1). In order to formulate and implement a more efficient 
policy response, the HIV and AIDS national policy was restructured in 1993. The restructuring 
included the formulation and development of the National Strategic Plans of 1994-1997 and 
1998-2000.  
In February 1999 two key events took place, which represent turning points in raising the Swazi 
population’s awareness levels of the full impact of the disease and the government’s approach to 
containing the spread of the disease. Firstly, UNICEF published a report in the Times of 
Swaziland newspaper on the likely long-term impact of the epidemic, focusing on the projected 
number of children who will be orphaned as a result of the disease. Secondly, shortly afterwards, 
Mswati declared the HIV and AIDS epidemic a national disaster and the Crisis Management and 
Technical Committee (CMTC) was established to lead the formulation and implementation of a 
new national response policy on the epidemic. This was Mswati’s first attempt at securitising the 
epidemic. As already discussed in chapter 2, in order to successfully frame something in terms of 
security, a securitising actor has to convince a significant audience that a specific issue 
constitutes an existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998:32). By his declaration, he was fulfilling part 
of the speech-act requirement for the securitisation process.  
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According to the Copenhagen School, for the securitisation process to be initiated, there must be 
an “existential threat requiring emergency action” to be identified, and a significant part of the 
audience must accept that account (Buzan et al., 1998:27). The type of threat requires a political 
actor to build a persuasive case for securitising the threat. Mswati, in his position as the absolute 
ruler, was indeed such a political actor who had access to the entire population and the power to 
have his message conveyed to a significant part of the population/audience.  
The CMTC developed the National Strategic Plan for 2000-2005. This focused on improving 
health services; changing behaviour by means of mass media outlets, schools and workplaces; 
and minimising the future impact of the epidemic, especially for vulnerable groups such as 
orphans (Swaziland National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS 2000-2005). These two events proved 
instrumental in heightening the population’s awareness of the disease, while at the same time it 
demonstrated the government’s resolve to intervene more aggressively by reframing, formulating 
and implementing new public policy programmes to help curb the spread of the virus (interview, 
UNAIDS - Social Mobilisation and Partnership Advisor, Swaziland, 14/04/08). This highlighted 
part of the policymaking dynamics as related to the HIV and AIDS epidemic by presenting the 
roles of the principal policymaking actors in Swaziland.  
While early successes may have been experienced and can be described as being constructive 
initiatives to help combat the disease, they unfortunately did not translate into reduced infection 
numbers. Several of the interviewees expressed the view that previous response attempts by both 
the Health Ministry and non-state HIV and AIDS actors lacked a unified and multi-sectoral 
dimension in addressing the epidemic, which resulted in programmes being hampered and hence 
limited successes. Similar to Botswana and South Africa, Swaziland’s government saw a need 
for a more inclusive approach along the lines of constructivist theories of pluralism and elitism. 
The low success rates of the government’s initial policy approaches towards the epidemic 
necessitated the change in the government’s policy-making processes, leading to new policies 
being formulated and implemented as part of the new national response policy.  
7.4 Changes in the policymaking environment  
The continuing rise in HIV prevalence led to a process of policy evaluation, which in turn 
necessitated new policy formulations as part of the national response to the HIV and AIDS 
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epidemic in Swaziland. A state’s political and social culture and the prevailing socio-economic 
conditions will have a significant impact on what will be deemed important societal issues 
(Anderson 2000:45). The government recognised HIV as an important societal issue. 
Importantly, the government also realised that the epidemic was not only a health problem, but 
also a development problem that had social, economic and cultural implications (interview, 
Director of NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/04/08). As a result, the new policy decisions formulated 
focused on three key areas, namely prevention, care and support, as well as on impact mitigation. 
Swaziland’s then Prime Minister, Barnabas Sibusiso Dlamini, stated on 1 February 1999, “If we 
don’t act fast and resolutely, the spread of HIV and AIDS through our nation will be [...] as nerve 
gas in a gentle breeze” (UNICEF 1999:13). This declaration by the Prime Minister is further 
proof of government representatives acting as securitising actors to bring the danger/emergency 
of the epidemic to the attention of the wider audience. According to Buzan et al., (1998:27) “It is 
important to note that the security speech-act is not defined by uttering the word security. What 
is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special 
measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience”.  
Several of the interviewees concurred that with the adoption of the new policy approach the 
government was indicating a better understanding of the impact of the disease on the society as 
whole. In order to achieve better success rates, there was a need to reframe the policy response, 
which led to a more decentralised multi-sectoral approach. This included the addition of multiple 
sectors of government departments and relevant non-state entities. This approach seeks to 
encourage greater collaboration among the different partners contributing to Swaziland’s 
national response policy to address the HIV and AIDS epidemic. This is in line with the 
constructivist elements of elite theory on public policy, where a select elite influences the 
policymaking. In Swaziland, as was demonstrated in the other two cases, there was an increased 
understanding of the need to open up to allow for a wider inclusion of policymaking actors, 
leading to this change in policy response.  
Having identified the shortcomings of earlier policy approaches, the focus of the new NSP was 
to frame policy around specifically targeting behaviour change in conjunction with continued 
focus on awareness programmes. Social messages were disseminated through national media in 
schools and workplaces in order to improve health services and minimise the future impact of the 
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epidemic, especially for vulnerable groups such as orphans (Swaziland National Strategic Plan 
for HIV and AIDS 2000-2005, 2000).  
In September 2000 the CMTC developed the Swaziland National Strategic Plan for HIV and 
AIDS 2000-2005, which was Cabinet approved. In November 2001, the Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare (MOHSW) published a policy document on HIV and AIDS and STI prevention 
and control. The key objectives of the policy were to:  
• maintain a sustained political commitment at all levels for HIV and AIDS prevention and 
control;  
• expand the national response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic by strengthening and 
maintaining a multi-sector approach;  
• improve coordination of HIV and AIDS prevention and control activities at all levels; 
• increase the capacity of women, youths and other vulnerable or disadvantaged groups 
(for example, disabled persons, sex workers and street children) to protect themselves 
against HIV and AIDS and STIs;  
• safeguard the human rights of people living with HIV and AIDS; and  
• promote HIV and AIDS-related research and surveillance activities.  
(Report on the 8th HIV Sentinel Survey, Swaziland Government, Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare, Mbabane, 2001). 
The government announced that the year 2000 and beyond “will be the time of delivery” for HIV 
and AIDS policy in Swaziland (Swaziland National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS 2000-2005). 
This assumption is based on the fact that in the year 2000 HIV prevalence was 34.2 per cent for 
pregnant women in Swaziland (WHO Country Factsheet, 2004). This bold statement was 
necessary considering that all previous national policy response efforts were largely ineffective 
(interview, AIDS Specialist William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of 
Health and NERCHA) 11/4/08). This was evidence of the principal policymaking actors actively 
seeking to make policy changes to better address the epidemic. 
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7.5 Factors that influenced the policy making process in Swaziland  
7.5.1 King Mswati III, the traditionalist - prevailing cultural values and practices 
From the interviews conducted it became clear that customs and traditions play a vital role in the 
fight against HIV and AIDS, since they are important factors in encouraging social cohesion and 
building strong communities. However there is a feeling that Mswati’s behaviour sent mixed 
messages relating to customs and traditions, which are rooted in gender inequality. The sending 
of mixed signals was also experienced and highlighted in the South African case study because 
of Mbeki’s actions. In each of the case studies, leadership figures are very important, therefore, 
Mswati sending mixed signals regarding the HIV and AIDS policies prevented the necessary 
behavioural change needed in Swazi society which negatively impacted on policy responses. 
This gender inequality has been a main contributing factor to the spread of HIV in the country. 
By adopting policies which combined traditional and modern approaches, according to 
Whiteside (2005:121), “there is a tendency for political, economic and cultural leaders to say, 
‘Do as I say, not as I do’ in Swaziland. Typically, older men advocate abstinence and fidelity, 
but their behaviour contradicts this”. Thus, in a country where political power is centralised in 
the monarch and his chosen administration, the opportunities and political space available for 
other organisations to counter the confusing mixed messages are limited.  
In order to overcome the heavy burdens faced by women and children, it is essential that the 
ingrained traditions and customs prevailing in Swaziland are addressed (telephone interview, 
UNDP – RSC Johannesburg, RSA, 8/5/08). These factors are significant challenges that face the 
political leadership as it seeks to curb the rampant spread of HIV. Swazi culture has a long and 
strong polygamous tradition that encourages males to enter into polygamous marriages with as 
many wives as they are able to sustain financially. This led to confusion in early HIV and AIDS 
prevention posters which in most countries promoted “Sticking to One Partner”. In Swaziland 
this had to be adapted since polygamy is socially accepted, with Mswati marrying several wives. 
The posters had to use a less than catchy message, “Be Faithful in your polygamous Family” 
(Whiteside, 2008:44). The issue of polygamy is not as pronounced in South Africa52 and to even 
                                                
52 Although in South Africa some political and traditional leaders have polygamous families, including Jacob Zuma. 
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a lesser degree in Botswana. Therefore, this is a unique factor that must be addressed by the 
principal policymaking actors in Swaziland when formulating the necessary policies.   
Mswati’s polygamous lifestyle has drawn criticism from both domestic and international 
stakeholders. Mswati has 13 wives53, each with a retinue, a palace and the use of a fleet of luxury 
vehicles. It was reported that about $30 million of the government’s 2009 budget was set aside 
for “royal emoluments” (New York Times, 07/02/2009)54.  
According to one interviewee, “the monarch must set a better example regarding concurrent 
sexual relations. People look at him and say that if the king is doing it, it is not wrong. What they 
are not realising is that the king [most probably] has a full-time medical team to make sure all the 
wives are tested” (interview, UNAIDS Social Mobilisation and Partnership Advisor, Swaziland, 
14/2/08). 
This viewpoint is disputed by another interviewee who claimed that, “polygamy is not wrong per 
se. Unfaithful polygamy relationships are wrong. The King would therefore be hypocritical to 
talk of sexual faithfulness or issues as such due to the fact that he has so many sexual partners” 
(interview, AIDS Specialist  William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of 
Health and NERCHA) 11/4/08).  
According to a 2008 UNDP report, when one sexual partner in a polygamous relationship is 
HIV-positive and the sex is unprotected, this practice becomes an important driver of the 
epidemic (UNDP’s Swaziland Human Development Report for 2008).  
An interviewee expressed that, 
Mswati could still give a positive message regarding the issue of polygamy by 
emphasising the need for a faithful polygamous relationship. By not raising the issue you 
think that he is avoiding dealing with it, therefore, the King should be more vocal on this 
issue. More importantly, in a polygamous society where you have social support for 
multiple concurrent partnering, i.e. a polygamous system, you are not going to have 
                                                
53 This was the reported number of wives of Mswati at the time the study was conducted.  
54 Forbes.com recently listed Mswati as the world’s 15th wealthiest monarch, estimating his fortune at $200 million, 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2008/0901/038.html 
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successful interventions if you don’t address these systemic issues (interview, AIDS 
Specialist William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of Health 
and NERCHA) 11/4/08). 
Mswati’s authority and legitimacy does not derive from constitutional powers or popular 
election, but from family lineage and traditional rule. Because of the fundamental weakness of 
formal political institutions in Swaziland such as the legislature and the judiciary means that the 
monarch becomes an important actor in the fight against HIV and AIDS. Whiteside (2005:120) 
argues that Mswati’s response record on HIV and AIDS is mixed. Even though in Swaziland 
there are formal HIV and AIDS institutions, centralisation of decision-making power within the 
monarchy impedes the government’s attempts to combat the HIV and AIDS epidemic 
successfully. Also, Mswati’s autocratic rule has led to policy decisions made with limited input 
from non-state actors, which resulted in a lack of transparency and minimal influence from non-
state actors. It can be argued using elitist theory on public policy that in Swaziland, because of 
the nature of Mswati’s rule, the elite with policy-influencing powers is smaller than in the other 
two cases, which are also elitist. According to an interviewee, “the monarchy does not always 
show political commitment as it is not always outspoken on the epidemic, neither does it praise 
the positive work that has been done by actors in the field” (interview, AIDS Specialist William 
J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of Health and NERCHA) 11/4/08). 
Since Mswati plays such a central role in Swaziland’s political system, which provides very little 
political space for other actors, his actions are key in the framing of policy and processes 
regarding decision-making in the HIV and AIDS national response policy. Mswati’s leadership 
skills regarding the empowerment of women and making them less vulnerable to HIV remain 
questionable and even entirely lacking. For example, an important Swazi cultural event is the 
holding of the annual Reed Dance. Thousands of young virgins dance bare-breasted and the King 
chooses a new wife from among them. However, this custom has caused a public outcry against 
the royal house. In November 2002 a mother filed a lawsuit to prevent Mswati from marrying 
her 17-year old daughter, whom he had identified at the Reed Dance. Mswati responded by 
claiming that the mother had “no respect for tradition,” since Swazi custom allows the King to 
choose wives from among the thousands of dancing maidens (Rana, 2004:1). Mswati’s public 
rejection of the lawsuit severely undermined the independence of the Swazi judiciary in being 
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able to preside fairly over cases involving the government and AIDS actors. Mswati’s apparent 
disregard of human and women’s rights were denounced by Amnesty International and several 
other international organisations (Amnesty International Report 2005: Swaziland, 25/05/2005).  
Mswati was also criticised for his choice of such a young bride, as it occurred so soon after his 
own rule banning all girls under the age of 18 from participating in any form of sexual 
intercourse. The law declared that all Swazi girls were expected to wear a bundle of bright 
traditional tassels, known as an Umcwasho. The tassels signified celibacy and hung around the 
back of the neck and below the shoulders, like a pair of floppy ponytails, warding off potential 
suitors. If a couple is found guilty of contravening the law, the offender is liable to pay a fine in 
the form of a cow. Mswati has claimed that the Umcwasho policy was implemented as a 
preventive measure to counter the spread of HIV and AIDS (Meldrum, 2005). By disregarding 
his own law, Mswati was criticised for setting a poor example for his people and more 
specifically the youth who are vulnerable55. Possibly in response to all the criticism by local HIV 
and AIDS activists, international journalists and donor officials, or because Mswati finally 
realised that more was needed than simply reviving a dormant tradition to help curb the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic, he abandoned the Umcwasho custom in August 2005 (The Independent, 
23/08/05). 
Mswati’s shortcomings have been clearly highlighted. However, he has also shown a willingness 
to adopt a more proactive leadership role in Swaziland’s HIV and AIDS policy response. This he 
displayed by participating in several HIV and AIDS awareness campaigns which were carried 
out domestically, regionally and internationally. Mswati also travelled extensively to obtain 
funding for the many AIDS orphans and programmes linked to orphans in Swaziland (BBC 
News, 04/12/01). A major initiative he undertook was a fundraising tour of the USA for a project 
called the Royal Initiative to Combat AIDS (RICA). Through this project, Mswati appealed to 
several American musicians, entertainers and artists to record an album called Songs for Life. 
The proceeds of the album were to be used for setting up a fund to help the fight against HIV and 
AIDS in Swaziland as well as in the SADC region56. Mswati’s actions in this regard reinforce the 
view expressed by an interviewee that as long as Mswati and the work of his government was 
                                                
55 In an attempt to rectify his actions and set a better example, Mswati later paid the fine for breaking the tradition. 
56 The success of the project has so far not been evaluated. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 177 
 
not questioned, he would support most initiatives aimed at combating the epidemic (interview, 
AIDS Specialist William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of Health and 
NERCHA), 11/4/08). This was an important finding by the non-state actors since it availed them 
more political space to operate within. Importantly, with the access to more political space, this 
also helped to empower the non-state actors with more autonomy to carry out their work and 
pursue securitisation ideals without the fear of being targeted by government agents.  
It is rather difficult to accurately gauge what the majority of the Swazi population truly feel 
about the monarchy. In Swaziland the majority of the population reside in rural areas. Most of 
the rural population are dependent on the goodwill of the Chiefs, who are answerable to Mswati, 
for their livelihoods and land occupation. Swazi society is deeply traditional and throughout 
history people have venerated their monarchs as rulers ordained by God, fathers and protectors 
of the nation and custodians of culture (Corrigan, 2008:2). Swazi royalists have promoted this 
belief, to the extent that clergy who support them have condemned democracy as anti-Christian. 
However, the mystique seems to be unravelling as Swaziland has experienced unparalleled levels 
of discontent with the royal house.  
7.5.2 Prevailing political and social gender bias society 
At a UN conference in 2001 Mswati remarked that “my people are dying. They are dying before 
their time, leaving behind their children as orphans, and a nation in a continuous state of 
mourning”57. This speech by Mswati revealed that he was in agreement with the global 
securitising actors at the time about the reality of the impact of the HIV and AIDS epidemic.  
In this instance, Mswati complied with all three of the facilitating conditions required for the 
process of securitisation, as discussed in chapter 2. He accepted and followed the recognised 
grammar of security. By virtue of his position as King of Swaziland, and absolute ruler, as a 
securitising actor he was in a position of authority to pronounce on the security concerns and was 
able to raise the level of threat facing the population. However as will be revealed later, Mswati 
                                                
57 Mswati’s opening comments at the 2001 UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS. Swaziland is 
an absolute Monarchy ruled by King Mswati III. He has been the absolute ruler since the onset of the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic in Swaziland. 
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was not always in agreement with the recognised grammar of security when he perceived it to 
attack his cultural norms and traditions. 
While King Mswati’s remarks are valid, it is important to understand that the disease affects all 
sectors of Swazi society differently. The role of the head of government is important in the 
institutional agenda setting and agenda building process (Fourie, 2005:7). Mswati’s reaction was 
similar that of Mogae in Botswana, who accepted and understood the impact of the epidemic and 
was prepared to act while Mbeki in South Africa remained hesitant to fully accept the impact of 
the epidemic. Public problems tend to affect a substantial number of people with further 
consequences for people who are not directly involved (Anderson 2000:88). However, the 
mortality rate differs significantly between different sectors of society. The effects of HIV and 
AIDS on a population “depends on who the individuals are, their place in society and the 
resources they, their households, communities and societies have available” (Barnett and 
Whiteside, 2002:182). In the African context women, children, migrants and the poor tend to be 
more susceptible to the effects of the disease. In the case of Swaziland, women and children bear 
the brunt of the effects of the epidemic (Patterson, 2006:44). 
In Swaziland the law has traditionally been shown to favour men at the expense of women 
(Patterson, 2006:45). This point is well demonstrated by examining the different definitions of 
adultery applicable to men and women. For instance, for women adultery is defined as voluntary 
sexual intercourse between a married woman and a man other than her husband while for a man, 
sexual intercourse between a married man and an unmarried woman or girl does not constitute 
adultery. In fact, sexual relationships between a married man and his younger, unmarried sister-
in-law are considered acceptable (Kasenene 1993:113-114). This means that for a man adultery 
occurs only in the context of sexual intercourse with a married woman. Thus the struggle to 
combat the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Swaziland is played out in a country where moral and 
legal traditions permit males more leeway in their sexual behaviour at the expense of female 
liberties. These cultural assumptions act as an impediment to the kinds of learned behaviours 
required to contain the impact of the epidemic (Daly, 2001:25).  
The lack of equal rights for women in Swaziland has also been a key factor in ensuring that 
women remain in a condition of dependence in their society. Swazi law allows regional chiefs 
(with the approval of the King) to maintain their own tribal traditions. These include a vast 
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system of unwritten laws and customs, whose eventual documentation will require extensive and 
painstaking research (Rweyemamu, 1990). For instance, a married woman was considered a 
dependent minor for as long as her husband was alive and if she relied on her in-laws for her 
livelihood. If she becomes a widow, she would become a dependent of her grown son, or of her 
husband’s brother, or of the chief if there was no other male sponsor. In addition, women were 
not allowed to obtain a passport, open a personal or business banking account, move from one 
tribal region to another, purchase a car, buy land or a home without securing the approval of the 
sponsor (e.g., husband, father, brother, or chief) (Women and Law in Southern Africa Research 
Trust, 1998:167). Divorce is not a viable option and it affects only unhappily married women, 
since men have recourse to multiple marriages. Only as recently as February 2010 did the High 
Court of Swaziland rule that some married women will be allowed to register property in their 
own name. It has been five years since the new Constitution granted women equal status (IRIN 
news, February 2010).  
In October 2002 Mswati summoned the editors of The Times of Swaziland newspaper, the 
country’s only independent newspaper, to a meeting with his royal advisors. Mswati warned 
them that it would be unpatriotic to publish a UNDP report, Gender focused responses to 
HIV/AIDS: The needs of women infected with and affected by HIV/AIDS, which suggested 
cultural practices were fuelling the spread of HIV and AIDS. Mswati demonstrated contradictory 
ideals towards the HIV and AIDS epidemic, at the above mentioned 2001 UN General Assembly 
Special Session on HIV and AIDS, he agreed with and accepted the recommendations made by 
the international securitising actors that more focused policies were needed to address the 
epidemic. However, when the required policy responses appeared to challenge his cultural norms 
and traditions, Mswati was quick to defend his kingdom’s cultural norms and traditions even at 
the expense of well-intended response policies to deal with the epidemic. This again impacted 
negatively on the country’s policy making processes.  
This particular UNDP report stated that some age-old Swazi customs intended to keep girls 
chaste before marriage, such as, for instance, arranged marriages, society’s approval of multiple 
sexual partners for men and widow inheritance, placed more people at risk of infection. “The 
Swazi society expects women to be subordinate and submissive; allows men to have multiple 
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sexual partners; and polygamy, which exposes women to HIV infection, is legal in the country,” 
(UNDP, 2002). 
Daphne Mthembu, an advisor to the Swaziland branch of Women in Law in Southern Africa 
(WLSA) observed that the lack of acceptance by Mswati of the idea that cultural practices may 
contribute to the spread of HIV and AIDS is one of the obstacles to the eradication of stigma and 
the discrimination of people living with AIDS. In response to the government’s efforts to stifle 
any debate regarding the UNDP report, Mthembu noted the following, “If our leaders deny that 
having multiple sexual partners or inheriting a widow whose husband might have died of HIV 
and AIDS may lead to new infections then campaigns to encourage people infected with the 
disease to come out in the open would come to naught” (Mthembu quoted in Nyathi, 2002).  
Swaziland’s leadership has also been criticised by Special HIV and AIDS Envoy to Africa 
Stephen Lewis, for the way in which it has dealt with the epidemic.  
The kingdom’s leadership was too slow to recognise the threat of HIV and AIDS on 
people’s lives and their response may have come rather too late for the kingdom to 
overcome the crisis it was faced with. Leadership must take a leading role in addressing 
the spread of the epidemic. There are a lot of things that are contributing to the spread of 
the epidemic and that includes those customs that renders women minors while it exposes 
them to the epidemic (Agence France-Presse, 21/03/04).  
Swaziland is an example of how weak political institutions and patriarchal attitudes affect 
women’s vulnerability to the HIV and AIDS epidemic (interview, Regional Programme Manager 
PACT, Southern Africa, 10/4/08). This in turn negatively impacts on the success of policies 
targeted at addressing this serious concern. Since women tend to be more vulnerable to the 
effects of the epidemic it is necessary to ensure that the principal policymaking actors formulate 
and implement the required polices to strengthen the response polices to tackle the epidemic. 
7.5.3 Neopatrimonialism 
As already established in chapter 2, neopatrimonialism is linked to statism. The form of 
neopatrimonialism present in Swaziland stems from the centralisation of political power, which 
has impacted on the policy decision-making processes in the country. This approach can be 
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linked to the theory of statism, which describes the viewpoint in public policy that a government 
should control either economic or social policy or both to some degree (Levy, 2006:469). 
Sharing elements with elite theory, statism notes that elites may be positioned in state agencies 
where they influence public policy to advance their own political agendas. Swaziland is an 
example of this process in operation. Mswati’s spending habits demonstrate Patrick Chabal and 
Jean-Pascal Daloz’s (1999:160) argument that neopatrimonial state leaders engage in 
consumption and not production: “Ostentation remains, and is likely to remain, one of the chief 
political virtues in Africa”.  
For his 36th birthday in 2004 Mswati was accused of spending US$600,000 on new vehicles, 
accommodation and food (The New York Times, 17/04/04). The following year his birthday party 
budget allegedly increased to US $1.7 million (iol news, 11/04/05). The same year the Swazi 
Federation of Trade Unions called for and organised a two-day strike over the monarch’s 
expenses (International Crisis Group Policy Briefing, 2005:7). The lack of accountability creates 
a space for corruption to take hold and grow, which in turn may prove detrimental to the efforts 
entailed in the policy response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic.  
In 2008 to honour Mswati’s 40th birthday and the nation’s 40th year of independence, a new 
15,000-seat stadium was built and a fleet of sedans was ordered to transport the visiting 
dignitaries. The cost was estimated to be several million dollars (The New York Times, 05/09/08). 
Mswati’s spending habits led to much disapproval throughout the country. However, because of 
his position, his unilateral spending habits were beyond accountability. Frustration levels 
heightened over Mswati’s costly celebrations and the discontent was demonstrated by the first 
time all-women protest against the royal shopping trip as part of the 40-40 celebrations. The 
protestors claimed that the money should have been used for anti-retroviral drugs instead of the 
celebrations (Guerin, 2008). 
Patterson (2006:48) asserts that “high neopatrimonialism will have a negative impact on AIDS 
efforts because state leaders will divert resources from AIDS programmes to patronage.” She 
also argues that “neopatrimonialism will drive donors from providing needed funding to fight 
AIDS” Patterson (2006:48). The Coordinating Assembly of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(CANGO) reported a general decline in grant aid extended to the country over the last few years. 
In Swaziland there is a definitive contrast in spending habits between expenditure on the royal 
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family and expenditure on health issues, which demonstrates the negative effect of 
neopatrimonialism for the citizens’ general welfare. In 2004 Mswati spent $14 million on new 
palaces for each of his wives, $2.8 million for luxury homes for relatives, $11 million for palace 
building programmes and $45 million for a private jet. At the same time the government 
allocated only $30.8 million for all national health services (International Crisis Group Policy 
Briefing, 2005:9-10). While it is true that it is impossible to directly link corruption to low 
spending on health services, it does however give some insight into that fact that the upkeep of 
the royal household is prioritised.  
Swaziland finds itself in a rather difficult position in that it continues to record poor economic 
performance indicators, a high incidence of poverty, recurring drought and famine, and the 
adverse impact of the HIV and AIDS epidemic. Because these harsh conditions are present in 
Swaziland, one would assume that there would be a willingness by donors to come to the aid of 
the country, but several donors have demonstrated a reluctance to become more involved there. 
According to media reports, “Accessing funds for development has remained a serious challenge 
for NGOs in Swaziland, as donors continue to shun the country” (IRIN News, 18/01/07). 
According to an interviewee, “Swaziland’s blame should go to the donors. Swaziland does not 
get a lot of support from donors because of a non-HIV and AIDS political environment” 
(telephone interview, UNDP – RSC Johannesburg, RSA, 8/5/08). As a result of this donor 
apathy, CANGO has advocated for better working partnerships between civil society and the 
government, as it is believed that this would reassure donors and encourage them to assist and 
operate more willingly in Swaziland. 
Neopatrimonialism coupled with Mswati’s personal behaviour has led to a situation where some 
donors are less eager about participating in the national response policy to deal with the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic in Swaziland (interview, AIDS Specialist William J Clinton Foundation 
(formerly with Ministry of Health and NERCHA) 11/4/08). This point is highlighted by the fact 
that from 2005 Swaziland received only $15 million of a $50 million grant from the Global 
Fund. Also, Swaziland was not considered to be one of the focus countries under the PEPFAR 
programme, despite its high HIV prevalence rate. In 2003 the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) decreased its overall assistance to Swaziland from 3.1 million Pounds in 
1999 to 907,000 Pounds. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) followed 
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suit and decreased its funding between 1999 and 2003 (CIDA, 2005). Mswati spent almost the 
same amount of money on his birthday celebrations in 2005 as the UK gives in aid to Swaziland. 
This led to DFID officials rethinking their aid pledges to Swaziland (Sunday Telegraph, 
16/02/05). A multilateral donor official conceded: “There is no question that unfavourable 
reports about the country are making Swaziland a harder sell” (Hall, 2004:1). The above 
highlights the negative consequences of Swaziland’s neopatrimonial system, which may hamper 
the national response policy effort. Regardless of how well intended the HIV and AIDS policies 
are, this political culture may deter donors. Neopatrimonialism negatively affects policy 
decision-making processes, especially development projects, and is responsible for the misuse of 
donor aid and state budgets. Because of Swaziland’s neopatrimonial system, this impacts both on 
existing and potential donors. It can be assumed that the donors do not want to fund or be 
perceived as funding the extravagant lifestyle of Mswati at the expense of the Swazi population.  
7.5.4 Funding concerns 
As discussed above, reluctant funding from donors has proved problematic in Swaziland. As a 
result, the National Emergency Response Committee on HIV AND AIDS (NERCHA) has had to 
develop mechanisms to deal with any funding issues. A key reframed policy decision made was 
to encourage civil society members to source funding for their own projects “as we don’t want 
them to become over-reliant on us to fund them” (interview, Senior AIDS Officer NERCHA, 
Swaziland 11/4/08). Once an organisation has successfully sourced funding, it is required to 
inform NERCHA about the type of activity intended to be funded. This process allows for 
unfunded activities in the NSP to be identified and promoted more easily so, as to be addressed 
at a later date (interview, Senior AIDS Officer NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08). NERCHA has 
therefore provided a platform for civil society to participate actively in the national response 
policy in terms of access to funding (interview, Ministry of Health: In Charge of the National 
Referral Laboratory at the Mbabane Government Hospital: Swaziland, 10/04/08). This policy 
was implemented so that funding remains monitored but not regulated thereby allowing the 
domestic stakeholders and the donors to collaborate without much interference. 
This initiative by NERCHA to encourage civil society organisations to source their own funding 
was another important breakthrough. It helped further empower and reinforce civil society 
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autonomy. This allowed them to partner with like-minded international securitising actors and 
act as their conduits to help spread their securitisation ideals. Therefore, by sourcing their own 
funding it provided them a higher degree of authority as they became less dependent on state 
funding. This created a situation whereby they were in a better positioned to try and influence the 
policymaking processes.  
A shortcoming regarding the funding environment is the unintended bureaucracy, which ends up 
being a major obstacle in the distribution of the funds. The NGOs claimed that the way in which 
the funding takes place does not allow it to trickle all the way to the grassroots communities who 
are in dire need of the funding and programmes. According to an interviewee,  
This process does not help because people who set up an organisation stop the money 
from trickling all the way down as the money gets used up mainly for administrative 
purposes. It has been suggested that donors should develop a culture of tracing funds 
from top to bottom and training PLWHA to trace funding from the proposal development 
to implementation from the secretariat down to the grassroots level (interview, Regional 
Co-ordinator Shiselweni Region, SWANEPWA, Swaziland, 11/04/08). 
It was hoped that implementing this process would ensure that the funding would filter all the 
way down to the grassroots level where it is urgently required. Training PLWHA to efficiently 
trace the funding builds capacity both in terms of being able to absorb the funds and also to 
implement and successfully carry out their programmes.  
Even though funding might not be channelled directly through the government, it is still 
coordinated through NERCHA. For example, the William J Clinton Foundation funds paediatrics 
as this has been cleared by NERCHA since it is one of the activities in the NSP (interview, AIDS 
Specialist William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of Health and 
NERCHA) 11/4/08.) The interviewee shared her experience that funding directly to an 
organisation took place because no good mechanism was in place for funnelling the money 
through government channels. As a result, the interviewee is of the opinion that it is more 
efficient for donors to fund domestic organisations directly. This resulted in the international 
donors gaining access points into the domestic policymaking structures as they were able to exert 
influence over the domestic non-state actors in order to receive funding.  
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An interviewee from NERCHA stated that funding is sent to the applicant organisation directly. 
This is a standard mechanism of regulation – with the NSP a National Action Plan (NAP) is 
devised and it identified areas of concern that need funding. The donors are asked to identify 
areas from the Plan that they intend supporting. Therefore, this is a means of self-regulation 
which ensures that all areas of concern are sufficiently covered by all donors and relevant HIV 
and AIDS stakeholders. Thus, the areas of concern not covered by donors will be identified and 
additional funding can be sourced specifically for the unfunded activities (interview, Senior 
AIDS Officer NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08). 
Some HIV and AIDS activists as well as some donors have been critical of NERCHA’s policy 
implementation regarding budget spending programmes. Critics have questioned the reasons 
behind NERCHA’s spending large amounts of money on new community centres for orphans 
while community-based programmes already exist. Further criticism directed at NERCHA 
included resisting ARV’s until 2004, its bureaucratic foot-dragging tendencies in negotiations 
with the Global Fund, as well as not doing more to educate traditional leaders about ARV 
treatment (allAfrica.com, 06/12/05). Commenting on the criticism, a Senior NERCHA official 
stated that NERCHA has learnt from these projects and they have taken it upon themselves to 
seek out their own projects, which will enable the organisation to carry out its programmes more 
efficiently (interview, Senior AIDS Officer NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08). 
7.6 Politics and differing priorities - political space for domestic non-state actors in 
Swaziland 
7.6.1 Role of relevant stakeholders 
CANGO was formed in 1983 and has a membership of 70 associated NGOs covering a wide 
range of social issues such as; child abuse, population control, women’s empowerment and the 
elderly; groups devoted to the welfare of ex-prisoners, traditional healers, youth and orphans; 
and social service organisations such as the Boy Scouts and the Salvation Army. An HIV and 
AIDS Consortium was established within CANGO. The consortium is made up of all NGOs 
involved in activities related to HIV and AIDS, and its goal is to coordinate and solicit funds for 
HIV and AIDS activities. The first organisation of people living with HIV was established in 
1993, and currently there are a number of such organisations in the country.  
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CANGO has been allowed to operate within the political space, since it has chosen a strategy 
which differs from that of Swaziland’s trade unions and banned political organisations in that it 
seeks dialogue and partnership rather than adopting a confrontational approach towards the 
government (interview, UNAIDS - Social Mobilisation and Partnership Advisor, Swaziland, 
14/04/08). Several of the interviewees mentioned that because of the nature of the political 
environment in Swaziland this approach worked best even if it meant taking longer to get the 
desired outcome. 
However, a serious shortcoming on the part of the NGOs has been a lack of capacity in most of 
the organisations. According to an interviewee,  
A problem we face is that organisations that we work with have no basic infrastructure in 
place such as staff, offices, computers etc., and yet the donors expect miracles. The irony 
is that the donors want these types of organisations to be funded, yet there is limited 
flexibility in their required outcomes (interview, Regional Programme Manager for the 
Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Prevention Programme - PACT: 10/4/08). 
An official from UNAIDS shared the above opinion and agreed that in most countries civil 
society works in partnership with the government in its HIV and AIDS national response 
strategies. “However, the quality of the people that comprise the civil society representation can 
be a problem as experienced in Swaziland” (interview, Regional Programme Manager for the 
Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Prevention Programme - PACT: 10/4/08).  
According to CANGO’s Executive Director Emmanuel Ndlangamandla,  
A strong and sustained civil society voice is required to address national challenges. 
Through effective citizen participation in governance, monitoring of national strategies, 
policies and programmes, and engaging policy and legislation, NGOs and civil society 
could effectively lobby the government to address challenges (IRIN News, 18/01/07).  
Although Ndlangamandla makes a valid point, the monarchy continues to be suspicious of 
NGOs, which are known to be critical of the government, which hampered the nation response 
policy. Ndlangamandla’s point regarding the monarchy was supported by several of the 
interviewees. While agreeing that Mswati does not look too favourably on NGOs, who are 
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deemed too critical of the government, there was consensus that he has shown a readiness to be 
more open to supporting NGOs that dealt only and specifically with HIV and AIDS concerns and 
not issues critical of the government. A key finding drawn from the interviewees regarding 
political space was that civil society actors felt that the government showed a bias towards 
certain NGOs. According to Amos Ndwandwe, who works as a counsellor for an HIV and AIDS 
NGO (which he declined to identify), “It has been building for some years. The deeper 
Swaziland sinks into poverty, hunger and AIDS, and the more dependent we become on non-
governmental organisations, the more hostile government officials, like MPs and some chiefs, 
come to NGOs” (Norwegian Council for Africa, 1 October 2009). 
According to an interviewee, the government tends to question the agendas of NGOs they 
perceived as suspicious, and it questions the intentions of their funders as they are more often 
than not foreign based (interview, AIDS Specialist William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland 
(formerly with Ministry of Health and NERCHA) 11/4/08). This was in conflict with NERCHA 
since it actively encouraged NGOs to source their own funding for their programmes. This 
situation created an environment in which the political space for NGOs in the country was 
limited, which directly impacted on their influence to shape policy and influence the country’s 
leadership to accept their ideas. This is in line with statist theory on public policy. The NGOs 
responded to the lack of political space by stating that their sole interest is to help benefit the 
Swazi people and not too meddle in local or national politics (interview, AIDS Specialist 
William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of Health and NERCHA) 
11/4/08).  
In an important move to appear more progressive, the government tacitly ceded the handling of 
certain critical humanitarian situations over to civil society, for example dealing with the food 
crisis and engaging in the national response to HIV and AIDS (interview, UNAIDS - Social 
Mobilisation and Partnership Advisor, Swaziland, 14/04/08). This meant that more political 
space was freed up which benefitted and strengthened the policy decision-making formulation 
processes in the country as it became more inclusive of all relevant actors that were previously 
excluded because of (perceived) political differences. However, as discussed earlier, civil society 
actors have experienced a drop in donor support, which has detrimentally affected their activities 
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and ability to implement programmes. According to Ndlangamandla, “some of the NGOs have 
scaled down their programmes, whilst others are closing shop” (IRIN News, 18/01/07).  
7.6.2 Weak civil society 
Because of its history and political landscape, Swaziland does not have a long history of vibrant 
social movements. There have been instances where a nascent social movement seemed to be 
taking root but the absolutist political status quo it did not always allow it to prosper. Recently, 
there have been positive changes noticed with the growth of more organisations being 
established to deal with social concerns (interview, Regional Co-ordinator Shiselweni Region, 
SWANEPWA, Swaziland 11/04/08). 
According to CANGO, “the country’s weak civil society voice, coupled with citizen apathy, 
made glaring the fact that the Swaziland government and the private sector lacked an effective 
civil society partner for the country to effectively address these daunting challenges” (ReliefWeb 
Report, 18/01/07). CANGO blames Swaziland’s weak civil society which it believes is 
hampering efforts to adequately address the humanitarian crisis in the country (IRIN News, 
18/01/07). CANGO itself however, fails to address the failures of government to also play its 
part in addressing the humanitarian crisis facing Swaziland. CANGO’s position may be based on 
the fact that openly challenging the government may have repercussions.  
However as expressed earlier, while traditionally civil society in Swaziland was relatively weak 
two important occurrences took place to challenge this status quo. Firstly, civil society actors 
made the realisation that they could access more political space if they focused solely on 
humanitarian and HIV and AIDS issues and not issues targeting the government or Msawti 
directly. The outcome of this was the freeing up of more political space, which meant that more 
civil society actors were able to become a part of and able to exert a degree of influence over the 
policymaking processes in Swaziland on HIV and AIDS issues. Secondly, NERCHA permitted 
civil society organisations to source their own funding for their programmes. This situation 
opened up a conduit through the domestic non-state actors’ access, for international non-state 
actors, to influence and access the policy decision-making structure in Swaziland. This also 
allowed the international securitising actors to spread their ideals through this process that had 
previously been closed or rather difficult to access.  
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7.7 Policy power dynamics – engagement between the state and domestic actors 
In December 2001 NERCHA was established, in line with the promotion of the “Three Ones” 
principles, and replaced the CMTC. NERCHA was elevated to the Office of the Prime Minister. 
Situating it in the office of the Prime Minister showed a renewed determination and a reframing 
of the understanding of the urgency of the need to deal with the epidemic (interview, the Director 
of NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08). It was tasked with converting the CMTC’s national strategic 
plan for HIV and AIDS into an action plan. NERCHA was also tasked with coordinating and 
mobilising resources for an expanded and coordinated national response in the country. In 
addition, it promoted a wider and more inclusive multi-sector involvement of all HIV and AIDS 
stakeholders. Dye (1995:23) states that pluralists support the idea that the conduct of politics in 
society begins with the interaction among groups, with the latter constituted of “individuals with 
common interests”. 
NERCHA has been instrumental in conducting research in addition to working with multilateral 
donors to help develop HIV and AIDS policies (Whiteside, 2005:98). The NERCHA committee 
attained council status by an act of Parliament. The key objectives of the council are to 
coordinate and facilitate:  
• the achievement of preventive behaviour towards the transmission and contracting of 
HIV and AIDS;  
• the provision of comprehensive and appropriate care and support for people infected and 
affected by HIV and AIDS;  
• the minimisation of the impact of HIV and AIDS on society;  
• the monitoring and evaluation of services as well as measuring the impact of HIV and 
AIDS on the Swazi people;  
• the mobilisation of financial and technical resources, including the management and 
allocation of these to implementing agencies; and  
• the periodic review and updating of HIV and AIDS-related policies and guidelines. 
(Policy Document on HIV AND AIDS and STD Prevention and Control, Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare, Swaziland Government, 2001)  
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According to an AIDS expert, NERCHA is strong with good leadership58 in place and capable of 
carrying out its objectives, and it has worked closely with the Global Fund and UNAIDS 
(interview, AIDS Expert, University of Johannesburg (UJ), 25/04/08). “That cooperation is fairly 
unique and constructive” (interview, AIDS Expert University of Johannesburg: 25/04/08). 
NERCHA carried out policy agenda-setting processes that created an environment within which 
donors and NGOs seeking funding were able to work together. This led to the promotion of 
further interaction between the government and non-state stakeholders working together to 
combat the epidemic. According to an interviewee, “there is political commitment in the fight 
against HIV and AIDS in Swaziland” (interview, Director of NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08) 
which if maintained, will strengthen the HIV and AIDS national response policy effort. 
In 2003 the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) launched the Emergency Care and 
Treatment Implementation Plan to provide free antiretroviral therapy (ART) to people living 
with HIV and AIDS. This reframed policy decision brought about a significant increase in the 
number of health facilities in the country, which rose from 3 in 2003 to 17 in 2005. This was in 
line with the global securitising actors call for securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic as it 
permitted the purchase of cheaper generic AIDS drugs. Swaziland experienced financial 
difficulties and as a result the ability to purchase the generic AIDS drugs was a benefit brought 
about by the securitisation of the epidemic. Also, unlike the situation in South Africa, Swaziland 
was not opposed to the provision of patented AIDS drugs. Presently, international sources still 
cover the majority of Swaziland’s HIV response at 60 per cent in 2010, up from 55 per cent in 
2009, while domestic funding remains at around 44 per cent (UNAIDS, 2012, March). 
According to the 2007 WHO/UNAIDS/UNICEF report, Towards Universal Access, 42 per cent 
of HIV-infected people in Swaziland are receiving treatment. However, a UN report released in 
December 2008 revealed that revised projections indicated that twice as many HIV-positive 
Swazis are in need of ARV drugs than initially predicted (UNAIDS, 2008). 
While there were certain successes, several factors led to Swaziland’s ARV programme failing to 
meet its objectives. As a result of financial constraints the government hospital in Mbabane, the 
capital city’s main ARV distribution point, periodically runs out of the drugs (interview, 
                                                
58 The interviewee expressed his faith in the leadership qualities and capabilities of NERCHA’s Director Dr Derek 
von Wissel. 
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Ministry of Health Official: In Charge of the National Referral Laboratory at the Mbabane 
Government Hospital: Swaziland, 10/04/08). In 2007, 8,000 patients, almost a quarter of all 
patients on ARVs, disappeared from the ARV treatment programme. A survey conducted by the 
MOHSW found that irregular drug shortages were not the only reason; a lack of health facilities 
distributing the drugs and inadequate adherence counselling were also obstacles to patients 
staying on treatment (IRIN Plus News, 3/12/08). An ARV therapy coordinator at SNAP claimed 
that “the distance to hospitals was given as the main reason people became defaulters (stopped 
taking their drugs). They either couldn’t get to the ARV distribution centres at hospitals in the 
towns, or they didn’t have money for transport” (IRIN Plus News, 3/12/08).  
In an attempt to resolve the problem, a reframed policy decision was made to decentralise ARV 
drug distribution from a small number of provincial hospitals to 196 clinics across the country. 
Once patients were deemed stable, which takes place after about six months on ARV treatment, 
they are referred from a provincial hospital to their local clinic. It was estimated that about 
185,000 of Swaziland’s one million population were HIV positive, while only about 30 000 were 
receiving ARV treatment at the time (UNGASS Swaziland Country Report 2008). 
While many international donors appeared to be reluctant to sponsor programmes in Swaziland, 
in January 2005 Bristol-Myers Squibb announced the construction of Swaziland’s first paediatric 
HIV and AIDS centre to provide care and treatment to children living with HIV and AIDS, and 
to provide support to the families. This proved that while donors may have been reluctant to 
donate they preferred to sponsor programmes such as these where no actual money was handed 
over in the process. Also in 2005, under the supervision of NERCHA, the first National Strategic 
Plan was reviewed by a broad group of national stakeholders. Based on this review, a new 
National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan for 2006-2008, a National HIV and AIDS Action Plan, 
and the National Multi-sectoral HIV and AIDS Policy were developed in 2006 to help coordinate 
the policy for the national response. NERCHA identified six key priority areas to be covered in 
the new national response plan: prevention; care and support; impact mitigation; 
communications; monitoring and evaluation; and management and coordination.  
In 2006 the government announced that as a result of these successful efforts there was a slight 
decline in Swaziland’s HIV prevalence rate among pregnant women, which had dropped from 
42.6 per cent in 2004 to 39.2 per cent. NERCHA’s Director, Dr Derek von Wissel, proclaimed in 
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2006, “We are cautiously optimistic that our prevention strategies are beginning to take hold” 
(IRIN News, 5/12/2006). However, this decline in percentage has not been maintained and a 
recent study by the government referred to in the media has claimed that about 42 per cent of 
pregnant women in Swaziland are HIV positive, a 3 per cent increase from 2008. The report also 
stated that the increase in 2008 was partly because more women were taking life-prolonging 
ARV medication (USAID: Swaziland, October 2010) 
In essence, the events described above can be attributed to the process of framing and reframing 
of policymaking which was necessary for strengthening the national response policy to address 
the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Swaziland.  
7.8 Domestic cooperation 
Several NGOs and community based organisations (CBOs) dealt solely with HIV and AIDS 
issues59, while others started mainstreaming HIV and AIDS within their core programmes60. The 
Churches United Against HIV and AIDS in Eastern and Southern Africa Ambassadors of Hope 
Programme is one faith-based programme seeking to establish PLHWA support groups within 
churches. At the municipal level, the Alliance of Mayors Initiative for Community Action on 
AIDS at the Local Level (AMICAALL) and NGOs have carried out programmes which have 
resulted in the establishment of youth organisations (UN AMICAALL Partnership Programme, 
December 2005).  
According to the UNGASS Swaziland Country Report 2008, civil society members in Swaziland 
believe that their involvement in the national policy response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic has 
improved over the years, but scored its involvement as 40 per cent in 2007, the same score as in 
2005. This may be attributed to the freeing up of political space for these actors. Civil society 
organisations are involved in the activities of the Global Fund, since they are members of the 
Country Coordinating Mechanism. However, civil society has very limited involvement in non-
Global Fund-supported activities. To establish a more meaningful and effective involvement on 
                                                
59 These include The AIDS Support Centre, Swaziland AIDS Support Organisation (SASO) and Hospice at Home. 
60 Examples include amongst others, World Vision, Save the Children Fund, Lutheran Development Services, Africa 
Cooperative Action Trust, Caritas, Council of Swaziland Churches, Baphalai Swaziland Red Cross, Swaziland 
Action Group Against Abuse (SWAGAA), Umptapo Women’s Resources Centre and Save Our Souls.  
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an on-going basis in the national response, civil society members have recommended the 
following:   
i) They should be included in the overall policy and planning processes at all times, since 
they are responsible for a reasonable bulk of the response in home based care (HBC), 
care and support, clinical care, information, education and communication (IEC), and 
BCC programmes; 
ii) They should have more targeted representation in decision-making forums, whether at 
the local, regional or national level;   
iii) They should be more involved in technical forums or working groups, such as 
research committees, planning and budgeting committees and committees developing 
guidelines (UNGASS Swaziland Country Report 2008). 
An important development in the country has been the formation of several PLWHA 
organisations. The first organisation formed by and for PLWHA, was the Swaziland AIDS 
Support Organisation, established as early as 1993. Several other organisations have been 
established such as Swazis for Positive Living (SWAPOL), Women Together and Imphilo 
Isachubeka (Life Goes On). In 2004 the International Community of Women Living with HIV 
opened a regional office in Swaziland.  
After analysing the interviews, a finding was that several interviewees mentioned the need for 
the formation of a mass social movement to support and strengthen the national response policy 
to deal with the HIV and AIDS epidemic. According to the Director of NERCHA, there is an 
urgent need for a social movement to mobilise the population to do their part in helping to 
confront the epidemic (interview, the Director of NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08). According to 
an interviewee, 
Get the grassroots working - creating a social movement. Most of the population lives in 
the rural areas, but you find the implementers operating from the semi-urban areas 
mainly. If we could have a social movement who will help. People should not always 
wait for someone to come and help them. They need to get up and mobilise themselves so 
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they can better understand the impact of the disease on their communities (interview, 
UNAIDS - Social Mobilisation and Partnership Advisor, Swaziland, 14/2/08). 
The interviewees expressed an explicit need to get the grassroots population empowered. This is 
so that they will be able to demand the service they are entitled to receive. In this way they may 
be able to put pressure on their local government structures to be provided with better health 
facilities and access to medicine. 
We believe that grassroots groups, which for years have focused on particular social ills, 
have garnered expertise and experience that would be valuable in national policymaking, 
and the execution of those policies. But NGOs are frustrated by this feeling – it’s more 
than a feeling, actually – that government does not see them as equal partners (IRIN 
News, 18/01/07). 
The interviewees’ use of the term ‘social movement’ suggests they see a social movement as 
both organised or unorganised/spontaneous mobilisation and collaboration for a specific purpose. 
An interviewee stated that to further strengthen the national response policy, it was necessary to 
get the grassroots working by creating such a social movement where everyone is committed to 
be contributing to the national response policy (interview, UNAIDS – Social Mobilisation and 
Partnership Advisor, Swaziland, 14/2/08). Additionally, another interviewee stated that 
awareness programmes must be implemented educating the population to understand that 
complaining and establishing a mass social movement against the HIV and AIDS epidemic is not 
an attack against the King. “A mass social movement enables a forum to be created to formulate 
better strategies to tackle the impact of the epidemic, thus creating the political space needed for 
this emergency as opposed to merely criticising Mswati’s rule” (interview, AIDS Specialist 
William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of Health and NERCHA), 
11/4/08). Therefore, as highlighted earlier, in order to address the concerns related to perceived 
attacks on the King, it is necessary to ensure that HIV and AIDS programmes do not include 
criticism of Mswati as this will hamper the successful implementation of such programmes.  
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7.9 Politics and differing priorities – political space for international non-state actors in 
Swaziland 
By adopting a more progressive reframed policy approach towards the HIV and AIDS epidemic, 
the government opened the political space for domestic and international HIV and AIDS 
stakeholders to operate within Swaziland in support of the national response policy. However, 
this new approach by the government was open to abuse by certain organisations, which sought 
more political space and access into the policymaking processes than what was made available to 
them. For instance, from the interviews conducted it was mentioned that Medicins Sans 
Frontieres (MSF), who had arrived recently in Swaziland and been very vocal and raised 
concerns about the HIV and AIDS emergency that exists in the country. This has resulted in calls 
of resistance to MSF’s perceived aggressive methods. Their approach cannot be explained away 
by simply stating that MSF does not understand the culture of the Swazi people. According to an 
interviewee, “you can work with people to get things working. You cannot arrive and think your 
way is always the correct or only way. Or even that the locals are being too slow and they cannot 
wait for the locals to catch up before implementing their own programmes” (interview, AIDS 
Specialist William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of Health and 
NERCHA) 11/4/08). 
As a result, MSF is experiencing more problems trying to get things done. The interviewee 
asserts that, 
Most organisations know that they have to get along to be able to get the work done. It 
depends on the organisation and how long they have been in the country. Even the ones 
who seem to be doing very little are in effect the ones getting the most done. MSF needs 
to learn this … there is a right approach (interview, AIDS Specialist William J Clinton 
Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of Health and NERCHA) 11/4/08).  
Having learnt from similar experiences, since HIV and AIDS was declared a national disaster, all 
the UN agencies assistance has moved from their traditional mandate to focusing on HIV and 
AIDS as part of the joint programming of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). The UN 
agencies WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, UNESCO, UNFPA and the UNAIDS Secretariat 
are members of the UN Theme Group on HIV and AIDS in Swaziland and convene monthly 
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meetings. The Inter-Agency Technical Working Group comprising of HIV and AIDS focal 
persons from each agency meets weekly. In 2002 the UN Theme Group membership was 
extended to include other development partners, donors and NERCHA, who meet quarterly. 
More recently, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare was also incorporated into this group 
(UNAIDS at Country Level Progress Report, 2004:90). This was an important initiative by the 
international securitising actors as it gave them asses to influence the policymaking structures 
and processes in the country. This helped these securitising actors to influence and set the HIV 
and AIDS policy agenda in Swaziland. The UN Theme Group has supported the government of 
Swaziland in the development of several national frameworks and policies for the improved 
management of the national response towards HIV and AIDS, advocacy activities, training and 
capacity-building initiatives, research, and increasing availability and accessibility of HIV and 
AIDS services (UNDP Swaziland Country Profile, 2009). 
Several examples highlight the times when the UN Theme Group jointly undertook programmes 
in Swaziland such as the funding of initiatives specifically targeting adolescents in the 
country. The focus areas included capacity development of youth NGOs, provision of youth-
friendly services, orphans care, and support for people living with HIV and AIDS as well as 
community mobilisation. The UN agencies involved in this initiative were UNDP, UNICEF, 
WHO and UNFPA. Each of the agencies undertook activities in line with their corporate 
mandates. Building on this experience, UNDP, WHO, UNAIDS, UNFPA, FAO, WFP, and 
UNESCO in collaboration with their partners are currently developing joint programmes in the 
areas of HIV and AIDS prevention; impact mitigation; care, support and treatment; and 
Management of the National Response (UNDP: Swaziland Country Profile, 2009).  
UNAIDS has long been an important partner in the national response policy addressing the 
epidemic in Swaziland. The role that UNAIDS performs at country level is no different from its 
role at the global level. UNAIDS is a facilitator working in conjunction with the government 
which retains the role of implementer (interview, UNAIDS - Social Mobilisation and Partnership 
Advisor, Swaziland, 14/2/08). It has been influential in providing technical support to NERCHA 
to advocate for the importance of having a national Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plan that 
would not only help monitor and evaluate the actions that have already been financed, but also to 
support Swaziland’s in dealing with donors. In partnership activities with NERCHA and Support 
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to International Partnership Against AIDS in Africa (SIPAA), UNAIDS has facilitated a rapid 
assessment of organisations of people living with HIV by PLWHAs themselves. In addition, 
UNAIDS has provided a technical assistant in order to support the government in its preparations 
for the Global Fund proposals applications. UNAIDS speaks about a multi-sectoral approach 
which involves all relevant stakeholders and not necessarily of a security approach (interview, 
UNAIDS - Social Mobilisation and Partnership Advisor, Swaziland, 14/2/08).  
Responding to a call in March 2003 by the UN Secretary-General for a renewed commitment 
and a reinvigorated campaign to challenge the HIV and AIDS crisis the UNCT gathered and 
developed a six-month emergency plan of action. The gathering concluded that the UNCT 
should identify certain areas where it would be able to support NERCHA so as to form closer 
working relations in order to address the threat posed by the HIV and AIDS emergency. 
Interestingly, there have been calls for the HIV and AIDS crisis not to be treated as an 
emergency any longer. “The whole managing by crisis should stop. HIV and AIDS is not an 
emergency it is here already. We must deal with it and accept it so that we can move sufficiently 
forward as opposed to playing catch up all the time” (interview, Ministry of Health: In Charge of 
the National Referral Laboratory at the Mbabane Government Hospital: Swaziland, 10/04/08). 
When developing its yearly plan of action on HIV and AIDS in support of the national policy 
response strategy, the UN Theme Group identified five priority areas; antiretroviral therapy, 
orphans and vulnerable children, food security and nutrition, communication, and capacity 
building and replenishment. The process is carried out in consultation with its cooperating 
partners (UNAIDS Swaziland Country Level Progress Report, 2004:90). With the inclusion of 
more securitising actors in the policy decision-making process the international securitising 
actors found an access point into the decision-making structure which they were able to exert a 
degree of influence over. 
7.10 Policy power dynamics – engagement between the state and international actors in 
Swaziland 
The UN has encountered several challenges in the course of carrying out its work in Swaziland. 
A factor such as depleted human resources, especially in the health sector, is a major challenge. 
A depleted health sector means that it may become very difficult to provide the much-needed 
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health care to the population. This opinion is echoed by an interviewee, who stated that if the 
infrastructure is not sound, then the work carried out cannot be expected to be sound 
(interviewed, Regional Co-ordinator Shiselweni Region, SWANEPWA official, Swaziland, 
11/04/08). The on-going food shortages have added to the burden of the humanitarian crisis 
aggravated by the HIV and AIDS epidemic. The high percentage and ever-increasing of number 
of orphans and vulnerable children also requires special attention. According to an interviewee, 
“Only 24 per cent of children are growing up in a dual-parent household” (interview, the 
Director of NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08). Finally, there is a need for an overall 
communication strategy as part of the national response policy to include more relevant 
information on antiretroviral therapy for the general public. According to an interviewee,  
You cannot isolate one element as more important than the other but nutrition alone does 
not cure aids while at the same time ARVs without food kills. Furthermore, wording 
ARVs as poisonous is negligent as it is toxic but with proper nutrition it works. Religious 
people must not merely pray for you, they need to pray for you and the ARVs to work 
(interview, the Director of NERCHA, Swaziland 11/4/08). 
There have been claims that the US government has taken too much credit for the success of 
HIV and AIDS programmes in Swaziland. According to an interviewee, “donors still want the 
credit. Just attend the meetings and you will see that credit has been taken” (interview, Ministry 
of Health: In Charge of the National Referral Laboratory at the Mbabane Government Hospital: 
Swaziland, 10/04/08). This approach by the donors has strained the working relations with both 
the government and domestic AIDS stakeholders, which impacts negatively on policy.  
In order to motivate domestic stakeholders, it is important for them to receive the necessary 
recognition for their successes as motivation and encouragement. According to a UNAIDS 
official, this “used to be the norm but there is a change that is taking place amongst the donors 
and they are recognising the need to give credit where it is due” (interview, UNAIDS - Social 
Mobilisation and Partnership Advisor, Swaziland, 14/2/08). Recognition of work carried out is 
important and strengthens working relationships between international and domestic non-state 
actors.  
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NERCHA has raised a concern regarding the coordination efforts in the national response policy. 
According to an interviewee, “coordination is a problem; we are trying very hard to coordinate”. 
It becomes more difficult when, “USG [the US government] will not reveal their figures to 
NERCHA so the coordination problem is not just with local civil society” (interview, the 
Director of NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08). At the end of the year the US government figures 
are requested, but they are not always released. All the relevant stakeholders want better 
coordination channels, yet at the same time they do not want to be coordinated. He added that the 
problem with coordination is that “trying to coordinate is like herding cats, not sheep. They don’t 
all go in one direction” (interview, the Director of NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08). 
UNAIDS was instrumental in initiating the move from the Expanded Theme Group to a 
Partnership Forum. This Partnership Forum includes HIV and AIDS stakeholders from NGOs, 
the private sector, faith-based organisations, people living with HIV, the media, youth groups 
and key government Ministries (UNAIDS Country Level Progress Report, 2004:91). The 
UNAIDS office has been sharing best practices documents, position papers and publications with 
its partners in the country. NERCHA’s intention to open a resource centre/library was supported 
by UNAIDS in principle as well as the provision of essential materials.  
UNAIDS has continued to report on the severity of the serious human resource problem 
experienced throughout the country. The Ministry of Health is burdened as trained nurses leave 
the country for better opportunities on a continuing basis. Thus there is a problem regarding 
capable personnel required to implement the formulated policies. Several of the interviewees 
suggested that local community representatives should be utilised to carry out such work. 
According to an interviewee, “the people on the ground know better than people looking in from 
outside. Listen to the actual needs of the locals before you offer help” (interview, Regional Co-
ordinator Shiselweni Region, SWANEPWA, Swaziland, 11/04/08). This will help empower the 
local people to become more actively and productively involved to support and strengthen the 
national response policy.  
The WHO has also been a very influential actor in the fight against the HIV and AIDS epidemic 
in Swaziland. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare remains the lead actor in delivering 
HIV-prevention, care and treatment services. The WHO has provided technical support for 
developing clinical guidelines for HIV care and treatment, voluntary counselling and testing, 
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human capacity building, drug procurement and supply management (WHO Swaziland profile, 
December 2005). The health workforce was comprehensively analysed in 2004 with support 
from the WHO. Also strategies to strengthen the human resource base were identified, as well as 
ensuring that the existing health workforce is utilised to its optimum, recruiting and retaining 
additional health professionals and inspiring leadership and motivation among workers.  
As illustrated above, the most important priority of the strategy, according to the Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare, is to build the capacity of “rural health motivators” - primary health 
care workers. According to an interviewee, “the people of the country understand the 
problem/impact better than outsiders” (interview, UNAIDS - Social Mobilisation and Partnership 
Advisor, Swaziland 14/2/08). Health workers are being trained with support from the WHO, 
using the Integrated Management of Adult and Adolescent Illness (IMAI) strategy. Swaziland 
has a relatively good infrastructure of roads, electricity and water and community networks, 
which can be beneficial for the national response policy. 
Lastly, the WHO was also influential in the evaluation of the Health Sector Response Plan for 
HIV and AIDS for 2003-2005 and for further developing a health sector response plan for 2006-
2008. Because of its extensive experience, the WHO expressed its intention to help the 
government by providing continued support in strengthening the mechanisms for procuring and 
supplying drugs to fight the epidemic. Additionally, the WHO will support the development and 
implementation of a countrywide information, education and communication strategy, which will 
target the general public and specific groups, including health workers, people living with HIV 
and AIDS, teenagers, schoolchildren and the mass media. It is hoped that having a better 
education and communication policy strategy in place will encourage a change in sexual 
practices and behaviour.  
7.11 Securitisation approach and the relevant actors involved 
7.11.1 Domestic securitising actors - NERCHA and SWANEPWA  
As already set out in chapter 2, according to Buzan et al. (1998:40), “a security actor is someone, 
or a group, who performs the security speech-act”. These actors can come from political leaders, 
bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups. According to this definition, both 
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NERCHA and SWANEPWA can be considered securitising actors in Swaziland. As Swaziland’s 
key HIV and AIDS policy decision-making body, NERCHA is an important securitising actor in 
leading the national policy response strategy for dealing with the HIV and AIDS epidemic. 
Interestingly, NERCHA’s emblem is a short-range close-contact Swazi fighting spear with the 
caption Nation at War. This deliberate use of security imagery symbolises the fact that 
Swaziland is at war with the epidemic. This is in line with basic premise of this thesis, that is, to 
successfully frame something in terms of security, a securitising actor has to convince a 
significant audience that a specific issue constitutes an existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998:32). 
This is done through the action of speech-act which NERCHA was able to achieve through the 
use of security imagery. This is similar to the approach demonstrated by NACA in Botswana 
utilising the imagery and language of wartime security.  
An important civil society AIDS securitising actor in Swaziland is the Swaziland National 
Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (SWANEPWA) which is an umbrella 
organisation established for PLWHA in 2004. The organisation provides free ARV drugs 
provided through the Global Fund and the government of Swaziland (interview, Regional Co-
ordinator Shiselweni Region, SWANEPWA, Swaziland, 11/04/08). SWANEPWA has been 
instrumental in promoting the approach of making donors realise that “people on the ground 
know better than people looking in from outside. Listen before you offer help” (interview, 
Regional Co-ordinator Shiselweni Region, SWANEPWA, Swaziland, 11/04/08). SWANEPWA 
positions itself as the voice for all people living with HIV and AIDS, while also striving to 
improve the quality of life for these people. SWANEPWA position as an umbrella body allowed 
the organisation to reach a wider audience of the society.  
Importantly, SWANEPWA’s efforts helped in decentralising the ARV treatment to the 
communities, so that people do not have to travel so as far to health centres for treatment, as 
many are poor and unemployed (interview, Regional Co-ordinator Shiselweni Region, 
SWANEPWA, Swaziland, 11/04/08). This thinking was in line with thinking of internationals 
actors, namely UNAIDS, which promoted the decentralisation of ARV treatment to the 
communities. This was an important contribution that influenced and persuaded role players to 
reframe the policymaking processes in Swaziland, leading to the decentralisation. The objective 
of SWANEPWA is to strengthen support groups at community level so they can become self-
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sufficient advocates on their own at various community levels. This strengthened their position 
to access help from the government directly in a more decentralised system of the government.   
The involvement and participation of communities in providing care and support to people living 
with HIV and orphans in Swaziland has been heralded as a prime example of ‘best practice’ 
within the AIDS response (interview, Director of NERCHA, Swaziland, 11/4/08).  
At a meeting with the Prime Minister Themba Dlamini, UNAIDS’s Peter Piot applauded the 
excellent examples in Swaziland of where the decentralisation of the HIV and AIDS national 
response policy by using local community structures has helped reach the people most in need 
and at risk of succumbing to the epidemic. Piot encouraged Swaziland to continue to build on 
these positive experiences to ensure future successes and explained that, “Swaziland is a country 
facing extreme challenges, with high HIV prevalence levels - but the country has shown that by 
decentralising the response, more people can be reached and engaged, with the community 
becoming a central force of the response” (UNAIDS, 01/05/07).  
In chapter 2, three facilitating conditions were necessary for a speech-act to be considered 
successful were discussed. Both NERCHA and SWANEPWA complied with some of the 
facilitating conditions required for the process of securitisation. Both actors accepted and 
followed the recognised grammar of security. But they were both were not in a position of 
authority to pronounce on the security concerns. However, more importantly, they were able to 
raise the level of threat facing the population. 
7.11.2 The USA as a key-securitisation actor in Swaziland  
As in Botswana and South Africa, the US government is a very important bilateral actor in 
Swaziland, with bilateral relations dating back to independence in 1968. The USA is Swaziland’s 
largest bilateral donor in that it provides one-third of the Global Fund’s total contributions. For 
the fiscal year of 2008 Swaziland received $8.33 million through the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), for essential HIV and AIDS programs and services 
(USAID Swaziland HIV/AIDS Health Profile, 2008). USAID programs in Swaziland are 
implemented in collaboration with the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR).  
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In order to be in line for PEPFAR’s overarching goal of treating two million people with HIV 
and AIDS, a country must have a large number of HIV-positive people. Even though Swaziland 
has very high HIV prevalence rates, it was excluded because of its relatively small population 
(UNAIDS, 2004:191). Although Swaziland is not one of PEPFAR’s 15 focus countries, it does 
benefit from the bilateral assistance. According to a NERCHA official, “Swaziland is a non-
PEPFAR country yet we are benefiting from it” (interview, Senior Planning Officer NERCHA, 
Swaziland 11/4/08). 
On July 30 2008 PEPFAR was re-authorised to the amount of $39 billion for HIV and AIDS 
bilateral programmes and contributions to the Global Fund. This is evidence of the continued 
commitment by the US government to fight the global HIV and AIDS pandemic. By working in 
partnership with host nations, the new initiative will support antiretroviral treatment for at least 3 
million people, prevention of 12 million new HIV infections, and care and support for 12 million 
people, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children (USAID Swaziland: HIV and AIDS 
Health Profile, September 2008). The PEPFAR team comprises of several US government 
agencies, namely USAID, the Department of Health and Human Services/Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention (HHS/CDC), the Department of Defence, the Peace Corps, the 
Department of State (DOS), and the Department of Labour (USAID Swaziland: HIV AND AIDS 
Health Profile, September 2008).  
The PEPFAR programme carries out activities in all the regions of Swaziland and is organised 
around four main technical areas: prevention, care and treatment, human capacity development, 
and strategic information. By working in close collaboration with and by utilising the particular 
technical expertise of each agency, the PEPFAR programme is working to implement a 
sustainable, evidence-based, results-oriented programme (USAID Swaziland: HIV and AIDS 
Health Profile, September 2008).   
USAID administers the bulk of the PEPFAR funding, followed by the CDC and the Department 
of State (DoS). USAID programme and technical support focuses on prevention, human capacity 
development, NGO capacity building, and strengthening of health systems. USAID also provides 
significant technical assistance to the development and management of ART and patient 
monitoring systems in order to assist Swaziland in adhering to the requirements set out by the 
Global Fund (USAID Swaziland: HIV AND AIDS Health Profile, September 2008).   
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In 2003 the Peace Corps volunteers were reintroduced to Swaziland after a nine-year absence. 
The current Peace Corps/Swaziland programme, namely Community Health Project, focuses 
primarily on the HIV and AIDS threat to the country. It provides assistance in the execution of 
two components of the HIV and AIDS national response policy; risk reduction and mitigation of 
the impact of the disease. Volunteers travel throughout the country spreading their ideas and act 
as securitising agents to encourage the youth to adopt appropriate sexual behavioural changes in 
line with their policies. They also work with children orphaned by the HIV and AIDS pandemic 
and they are active in assisting in capacity building for NGOs and CBOs. The fact that they are 
able to carry out their work and spread their ideas throughout the country provides the volunteers 
with an opportunity to introduce their securitising ideas, often persuading sections of the 
population to adopt their values.  
The USAID Regional HIV and AIDS Program, based in Pretoria, South Africa, provide technical 
and program management assistance to the PEPFAR programmes in Swaziland. The US 
government has laid claim to being responsible for several successful HIV and AIDS initiatives 
carried out by USAID and PEPFAR in Swaziland. The successes include:   
• A computerised system implemented to manage and monitor antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) 
at ART sites, which enabled the Global Fund to lift its moratorium on the use of Global 
Fund resources to purchase ARVs and TB medicines for Swaziland Government 
programmes;  
• A successful family-centred care model for the prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV, which has resulted in a rapidly increasing number of individuals 
who receive HIV counselling and testing; 
• Assistance in collaboration with the CDC on the National TB Programme (NTP).  Policy, 
operational guidelines/standard operating procedures, laboratory services, in-service 
training, and programmatic and surveillance information systems for infection control 
planning and extensively drug- and multidrug-resistant TB have all been upgraded. The 
NTP has evolved from a weak organisation at risk of losing Global Fund allocations to 
one now regarded as a fairly strong part of the overall programmatic response to HIV and 
TB in Swaziland; 
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• Support for the Swaziland National AIDS Programme in the area of HIV testing and 
counselling. The organisations have been at the forefront of scaling up policy, technical 
guidance, service delivery, and training for national HIV testing and counselling scale-up. 
The US government has provided very substantial assistance in the roll-out of 
Swaziland’s provider-initiated counselling and testing plan while maintaining important 
focus on outreach and client-initiated counselling and testing;   
• Support for the Swaziland Action Group Against Abuse’s programme “Reducing 
Gender-Based Violence as a Cause and Consequence of HIV AND AIDS,” which 
reached more than 5,980 people in 67 communities, while also promoting men’s 
involvement in the prevention of HIV infection and gender-based violence;   
• Support for HIV and AIDS prevention, palliative care, and orphans and vulnerable 
children support grants to local and international NGOs and faith - and community-based 
organizations, designed to facilitate the efficient flow of grant funds and to deliver 
capacity-building services to organizations contributing to the fight against HIV and 
AIDS.  
(USAID Swaziland: HIV and AIDS Health Profile, September 2008)   
In an attempt to counter critics challenging them, the US government partners took a policy 
decision that changed the format of their meetings. The new policy implemented was that all 
relevant stakeholders, including the government, were invited for the purpose of outlining and 
coordinating their strategic plan for the year. This forum raised awareness amongst the 
participants of the activities planned for the year. This was important, as it strengthened the 
coordination process and created an opportunity for all actors present at the meeting to identify 
whether there were any overlapping programmes so that this could be addressed accordingly 
(interview, AIDS Specialist William J Clinton Foundation Swaziland (formerly with Ministry of 
Health and NERCHA) 11/4/08). This initiative by the US government partners has been 
influential in supporting the objectives set out in the NSP. This process allows the relevant HIV 
and AIDS stakeholders an opportunity to ensure that more of the objectives are met so as to 
avoid duplication of programmes. This forum also allowed them to share their ideas and to try 
persuading the participants to accept them. The meeting provided a conduit for getting their ideas 
and or polices through to all relevant actors. 
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7.12 Criticisms of PEPFAR activities  
PEPFAR has been criticised for its strict adherence to its policies with very little flexibility for 
change.  This has allowed them to become influential securitising actors who because of their 
funding power, were in a position to successfully promote their policies. A major criticism was 
raised because of the Anti-Prostitution Pledge, which states that anyone receiving money from 
PEPFAR must sign a declaration stating that they do not support prostitution and sex trafficking, 
while at the same time institutions seeking funds must also agree not to work with any of these 
affected groups. This is highly problematic as these women remain at the forefront of the 
epidemic. Formulating policies aimed at offering support to the affected groups creates an 
awareness conduit for introducing them to more efficient prevention methods available. As a 
result, some organisations refused PEPFAR funding on the grounds that they feel strongly that in 
order to effectively fight the HIV and AIDS epidemic, you need to  work with all affected groups 
in the country (interview, Regional Programme Manager PACT, Southern Africa, 10/4/08). 
A key finding from the interview process was that PEPFAR’s funding practices have left some 
programmes without funding at crucial stages of their implementation. PEPFAR tends to provide 
only a one-year grant. However, at times it may provide a two-year grant but with only one-year 
of the grant being guaranteed, while funding for the second year will be released depending on 
the performance of the organisation. This affects organisations that are staffed and operated 
primarily with PLWH since they have a very high fringe benefit cost (medical benefits) as might 
be expected. They are also often more inexperienced organisations based in the rural areas, yet 
they are given the same one-year grant often at the same grant level. The reality is that if their 
staff costs as a result of the high fringe benefits are 20-30 per cent higher than the staff costs of 
another organisations, they will not be able to carry out as many programmes and activities, 
which in turn means their results will naturally reflect a lower achievement, yet they are judged 
on the same criteria (interview, Regional Programme Manager PACT, Southern Africa, 10/4/08). 
Consequently, this impacts directly on the vital work carried out by these important organisations 
working to support the HIV and AIDS national response policy.  Unless the organisations’ 
proposed initiatives are for a one-year grant, it makes it more difficult to obtain a second-year 
grant.  
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In 2006 PEPFAR announced that it would no longer fund an HIV and AIDS programme in 
Swaziland that offered subsidised male circumcision in an attempt to prevent the spread of the 
disease (Kaiser Daily HIV and AIDS Report October 2006). This decision was taken despite the 
outcome of a study conducted in South Africa and published in the PLoS Medicine Journal 
(November 2005), which claimed that “male circumcision provides a degree of protection 
against acquiring the HIV infection, equivalent to what a vaccine of high efficacy would have 
achieved”. USAID claimed it was unaware of the programme, which goes against US policy 
supporting the study of male circumcision but not programmes providing the procedure.  
According to a USAID statement (2006), “There will be no further circumcision performed with 
US government funds until the PEPFAR Scientific Steering Committee reviews data from on-
going clinical trials and considers any recommendations on male circumcision from the 
normative international agencies”. As a result, the circumcision programme stalled due to a lack 
of funding.  
Finally, PEPFAR was also criticised for not incorporating food packages as part of its initiatives. 
According to the WFP, 69 per cent of Swaziland’s population live below the poverty line. One 
interviewee stated, “grassroots issues also need to be dealt with. Social determinants need to be 
addressed before you can help sufficiently. A one-size-fits-all approach does not work!” 
(interview, UNAIDS - Social Mobilisation and Partnership Advisor, Swaziland 14/2/08). 
Therefore, in order to have a more effective national response policy it is important to address 
poverty as a social determinant. An interviewee made the point, “PEPFAR does not do food 
packages. How can you give ARVs on an empty stomach?” (interview, Regional Programme 
Manager PACT, Southern Africa, 10/4/08).  
7.13 Conclusion  
The HIV and AIDS epidemic is fuelled by several factors such as high levels of poverty, gender 
inequalities and cultural practices such as polygamy, which is still practised widely in Swaziland. 
While Swaziland was relatively quick to respond by taking action against the rising HIV 
prevalence rate, cultural norms continue to hinder the implementation of the national policy 
response. Women and children bear the brunt of the epidemic in Swaziland.  
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This chapter found that in the framing of policy the political leadership was influenced by the 
social and cultural norms practised in Swaziland. These mixed messages resulted in a degree of 
inaction, which hampered effective policymaking by key policy decision-makers. Also, the fact 
that Mswati is the absolute authority meant that he controlled the availability of any meaningful 
access points in the political system in the country. Therefore, in overcome this obstacle, 
domestic and international HIV and AIDS stakeholders created a space within the political 
environment by dealing specifically with humanitarian concerns. Mswati’s absolutist rule helped 
to create the internal conditions for the initial rejection of international thinking on the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic. However, this rejection was replaced with a more collaborative relationship 
when domestic and international HIV and AIDS stakeholders were able to define their political 
space with in which to operate. This defines the national HIV and AIDS response policy 
currently. Despite this, neopatrimonialism and Mswati’s lifestyle choices have resulted in donors 
shying away from funding the national response and institutions in Swaziland.  
It was argued that opening up Swaziland’s political and social structures helped external actors to 
gain some access to the domestic policy decision-making process. This resulted in more 
acceptance of international thinking regarding the HIV and AIDS epidemic. The government of 
Swaziland’s approach to include development partners and international organisations in their 
policy implementation processes was beneficial for the policy decision-making processes, as 
skills and expertise were shared and this in turn allowed more efficient policy formulation.  
Finally, the chapter examined the processes and dynamics around the securitisation of HIV and 
AIDS in Swaziland. It was found that the capacity of domestic and international securitising 
actors to exert any influence on key decision-makers was limited since the political space 
provided was regulated and determined by Mswati. Hence the political environment limited their 
persuasive influence to promote the securitisation approach fully.  Because there was a degree of 
political space made available, this resulted in the partial acceptance of the securitisation 
discourse pursued by influential securitising actors which in turn, led to the partially successful 
securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Swaziland. In Swaziland the decision-making 
remained top-down, however, the non-state actors were able to create a political space, which 
positioned them to influence the policymaking processes to a certain degree. 
  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 209 
 
Chapter 8 Conclusion  
8.1 Introduction 
This study explores the dimensions and institutional processes related to HIV and AIDS public 
policy formulation in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland after the securitising move by 
UNAIDS and the Security Council in 2000. Two strands of theoretical literature were reviewed; 
literature on public policymaking processes and dynamics, and literature on the securitisation of 
the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the international domain.  
The study focuses on the political environment and the process of policy making. It also seeks to 
identify the factors that influenced the framing of HIV and AIDS policies in the three Southern 
African countries. Each of the case studies shows how unique factors influenced the policy 
decision-making processes. It also shows how, in line with McInnes and Rushton (2010), it is not 
fruitful to speak of an issue being securitised as a simple binary equation. The empirical findings 
in this study showed that outcomes of the policymaking processes for HIV and AIDS revealed 
differing degrees of securitisation in the different case study countries.  
The thesis demonstrates that the securitisation of HIV and AIDS has gradually become part of 
the collective understandings informing a global community of HIV and AIDS actors. All three 
countries are party to this community through participation in international forums. The US and 
the UN are the two main established securitising actors globally, although whether or not they 
are successful securitising actors has become increasingly contested (McInnes and Rushton, 
2010). Seemingly, the global community agreed that securitising the HIV and AIDS epidemic 
would be beneficial in terms of generating political action. However, this study found that these 
benefits appear more complex and nuanced with a number of potential downsides being 
highlighted (McInnes, 2010:16). 
It was demonstrated that the global HIV and AIDS community supported the securitisation 
norms lead by the US government and the UN. However, despite sharing the view that the 
epidemic had to be securitised, divisions appeared led by the US government and UNAIDS 
respectively, concerning the appropriateness of the measures used to achieve it. This led to the 
global securitising actors being positioned into two separate, and at certain times, opposing sides. 
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It is argued, that this influenced the domestic policymaking structures and also the daily running 
of national governments. These three countries, all at the epicentre of the epidemic, found 
themselves subjected to pressures calling for the securitisation of HIV and AIDS. This study 
examines the different processes and outcomes that took place because of the penetration of 
transitional HIV and AIDS securitisation norms into the domestic political arena of Botswana, 
South Africa and Swaziland. 
The study illustrates that there is an increasing need for a body of scholarship to address the 
significance of HIV and AIDS as security threats. The securitisation perspective of the 
Copenhagen School is examined to explain the rise and diffusion of the discourse around HIV 
and AIDS as a security issue and the related securitisation of public policies. It is argued that 
HIV and AIDS has moved along, Buzan et al.’s (1998), spectrum ranging from nonpoliticised to 
politicised and finally securitised. This movement occurred through the use of public policy 
processes and framing of the HIV and AIDS epidemic as a security threat. The politicised stage 
brought the issue of HIV and AIDS on to the public policy stage that required action from 
government. Without the politicised stage, its continued movement along the spectrum may have 
been limited. Therefore, a link does exist between the framing of public policy analysis and 
securitisation approaches as each can be found on the same spectrum but at different points. The 
argument can be made that depending on the movement of a particular issue along the spectrum, 
public policy processes (the politicised stage) can lead to a particular issue becoming securitised.  
The study sought to find a link between the framing of public policy and the securitisation 
process. It showed that the HIV and AIDS epidemic can be considered a security threat, but this 
is dependent on how the disease is framed. Speech-act theory was examined to demonstrate how 
HIV and AIDS were constructed as a security threat by actors through language, by framing it as 
an existential threat. The framing of the disease was important as its stems from both the public 
policymaking and the securitisation processes. The securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic 
becomes institutionalised, since the epidemic is resilient enough to demand that bureaucratic 
procedures come in to play.  
This study demonstrated that states highly affected by the HIV and AIDS epidemic were 
subjected to the same, or at least similar, external pressures to securitise the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic. As a result, the global HIV and AIDS securitising actors had a variable impact on the 
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domestic decision-making structure and in the daily activities of national governments. Based on 
this assumption, the study investigated different processes and outcomes which resulted from the 
penetration of transnational HIV and AIDS securitisation norms into the domestic political 
setting of the three countries under review.  
This concluding chapter assesses the findings of the three empirical case studies in the light of 
the research questions and theoretical propositions discussed earlier in the study. The guiding 
questions for the study were: 
a) What public policies were designed to combat the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the 
three cases? 
b) What are the similarities and differences in the adoption of international HIV and 
AIDS ideas in the approaches of Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland? 
c) What are the roles of principal policymaking actors as well as domestic and 
international policy-influencing actors? And what are the power dynamics 
between these actors? 
d) What were the discursive processes that featured and shaped policymaking (the 
securitisation dynamics)? 
e) To what degree was the HIV and AIDS epidemic securitised in the respective 
countries? 
8.2 Major findings from each of the case studies - summary 
8.2.1 Botswana – successful securitisation 
Botswana is an example of a developmental state with a top-down system of state-society 
relations. This political environment meant that the formation of an autonomous and outspoken 
civil society sector remained limited. Since Botswana experienced a relatively smooth transition 
from colonial rule, this laid the foundation for a political environment promoting cordial 
relations between Botswana and the former colonising power, as well as the acceptance of 
Western ideas and transnational HIV and AIDS securitising actors.  
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With Botswana’s centralised system of decision-making coupled with a state-sponsored and 
dependent civil society sector, President Festus Mogae became a key actor in the policy 
decision-making process. Mogae’s open support of global securitisation ideals influenced the 
domestic policy response to HIV and AIDS. This led to Mogae being identified by both 
international and domestic HIV and AIDS securitising actors in an attempt to gain access to 
influence the policy decision-making process. His acceptance of the securitisation approach was 
widely accepted by domestic HIV and AIDS actors. For this reason, under the leadership of 
Mogae, Botswana’s attempt to securitise the HIV and AIDS epidemic can be considered 
successful. Botswana can therefore be considered a success story for international attempts to 
securitise HIV and AIDS in states with extremely high HIV and AIDS prevalence rates.  
In chapter 2, it was discussed that three facilitating conditions were necessary for a speech-act to 
be considered successful for the process of securitisation. Mogae complied with all three of the 
facilitating conditions required. He accepted and followed the recognised grammar of security. 
By virtue of his position as President of Botswana, as a securitising actor he was in a position of 
authority to pronounce on the security concerns and was able to raise the level of threat facing 
the population. Therefore, his attempts at speech-acts according to the tool can be considered 
successful.  
The role played by transnational HIV and AIDS actors was important, as they transferred their 
ideas to domestic actors. This took the form of advocacy networking carried out at multinational 
forums, in partnership with the government, where they were able to embed their principles and 
policies relating to HIV and AIDS in domestic processes (Vieira, 2006:267). In the case of 
domestic non-governmental organisations (NGOs), they were more inclined to follow 
government policy since the government sponsored much of their programmes. As a result they 
were not in a position to influence the policy decision-making structures. 
It was found that more influential securitising actors such as the US government, international 
donors and UNAIDS fared better in their attempts to access and influence the policy decision-
making structures than domestic NGOs. For instance, even though being supported by the US 
government, faith-based organisations were also important securitising agents as they operated at 
the grass-roots level and were able to promote the moral agenda of transnational Christian 
organisations. However, because of Botswana’s state-dominated domestic structure, the number 
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of entry points into the policymaking structures was limited. This situation limited their influence 
over top decision-makers, unlike the more influential roles played by the US government, 
international donors and UNAIDS. 
The study also found that Mogae’s administration revealed a preference for the securitisation 
principles and policy ideas supported the US government. Unlike South Africa, as part of 
Botswana’s national response policy it adopted a treatment plan, which included the provision of 
patented HIV and AIDS drugs. Mogae’s approach of resisting generic ARVs was in line with 
that of the US government and international donors. This was discussed in chapter 5, where the 
public-private partnership between the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the US 
pharmaceutical Merck and the government of Botswana through ACHAP, was instrumental in 
the government’s national response policy to adopt a treatment plan based on branded HIV and 
AIDS drugs.    
Significantly, in 2003 Botswana’s national response policy included the controversial opt-out 
routine HIV testing in all its public health facilities. This new policy addition drew criticism 
from HIV and AIDS civil society bodies concerned with the human rights of PLWHA for the 
perceived unilateral form of monitoring HIV. The routine HIV testing stems from a 
recommendation of the US CDC, without the support of UNAIDS and other important 
transnational HIV and AIDS actors. After it became clear that the initial national response 
policy, which focused primarily on prevention61 was not attaining the expected results, the US-
sponsored “abstinence and faithfulness” (AB) plan was introduced into the revamped national 
response policy in an attempt to curb the spread of HIV among the population.  
These examples support the findings of the study which suggest that the persuasion strategies of 
the US government may have been more effective in Botswana as opposed to the approach of 
other transnational HIV and AIDS actors. The long-term collaboration that was formed between 
the US CDC and Botswana’s Ministry of Health was important in building very strong 
institutional and knowledge-based links between the governments of Botswana and the US in the 
area of public health. Also, unlike in South Africa, Botswana’s openness to engage in 
negotiations with a wide range of international actors proved beneficial as it resulted in the 
                                                
61 This early government strategy was in line with the WHO/UNAIDS programme of sexual education in 
combination with the widespread distribution of condoms.   
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establishment of partnerships such as ACHAP. Finally, because of Botswana’s economy and 
political stability, this setting attracted wealthy US donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation which invested large sums of resources in supporting the government’s response to 
the epidemic.  
8.2.2 South Africa – unsuccessful securitisation 
South Africa remains the economic and political power in the region with a relatively efficient 
social infrastructure in place. However, this study has shown that even with strong institutions in 
place, South Africa has struggled to achieve similar success rates in dealing with HIV and AIDS 
compared to countries with much lower socio-economic development. Walker et al. (2004:19), 
stress that “the spread of the disease is also influenced by personal choices, political responses 
and cultural factors”. The South Africa case study demonstrates that the HIV and AIDS epidemic 
is fuelled by several factors; including poverty, gender inequalities and social and racial 
exclusion.  
In South Africa the HIV and AIDS epidemic led to an increase in state-society tensions. These 
tensions became heightened mainly under Mbeki’s presidency since he controversially chose to 
question Western scientific knowledge about the epidemic. Also, the rape charges brought 
against the first chair of the National HIV and AIDS Council, Jacob Zuma in 2006, displayed a 
cultural mismatch between local understandings of the epidemic and the accepted mainstream 
scientific knowledge (Vieira, 2006:273). In addition, Minister Tshabala-Msimang’s continued 
public support for the unconventional methods of HIV and AIDS treatment and prevention 
caused tensions domestically and internationally. These factors made it difficult for the 
securitisation efforts of transnational actors to successfully convince the government’s policy 
decision-makers of the urgent need to address the epidemic.  
Important transnational securitising actors such as the US government and UNAIDS faced 
difficulties in their attempts to penetrate the South African structures of policy decision-making 
on HIV and AIDS. UNAIDS has made more noticeable progress. This is illustrated by the 
UNAIDS Theme Group, which was able to slowly create more multilateral channels with the 
aim of improving communication between the government and international partners, as evident 
in the establishment of the Donor Communication Forum (DCF) in 2000. However, while there 
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may have been noticeable progress, these channels did not lead to engagement with the 
government’s top leadership, but only with lower levels of policymaking structures. This lack of 
effective communication undermined the securitisation attempts or speech-act practises of the 
international securitising actors in South Africa. 
The degree of suspicion about the intentions of Western governments and about the real interests 
of international pharmaceutical companies operating in South Africa impeded the fostering of 
good working relations. This was evident in the suspicion about PEPFAR programmes in South 
Africa. The US government’s continued support of the pharmaceutical industry was viewed by 
the ANC’s ruling elites as part of a strategy that prioritised the economic interests of the 
pharmaceutical companies ahead of the lives of Africans who were in dire need of the life-saving 
drugs. For instance, as discussed in chapter 6, the US government’s backing of the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) in the court case against the South African 
government affected bilateral relations regarding HIV and AIDS policies.  
The South African government also showed resistance towards the US recommendations 
concerning HIV prevention and testing. In the case of South Africa, the “AB” strategy was 
supplanted by a more pragmatic view of UNAIDS and its partners. At the time of the 
formulation of the nation response policy, the gender imbalances in South Africa would create 
significant barriers to abstinence of woman and girls. Regarding HIV testing, the US/CDC’s 
lobby for the introduction in South Africa of routine semi-compulsory testing has also been 
rather unsuccessful because of the government’s and TAC’s strong emphasis on the individual 
human rights of the South African population. 
On the other hand, transnational advocacy networks have been more successful than other 
securitising actors in being promoters of policy change. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), 
an HIV and AIDS NGO, adopted a strategy, which aligned its political agenda to that of its 
transnational counterparts. This alignment was important and produced significant results as it 
forced the government to reconsider certain policy decisions. For example, in 2002 the TAC 
sued the government for refusing to roll-out ARV treatment even though there was the option of 
the cheaper generic drugs. This led to the government being forced by the South African 
Constitutional Court to provide HIV and AIDS drugs through the public health system. The TAC 
was also influential in ensuring that the government was embarrassed and exposed its failed 
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polices to the wider international community. As a result, in 2002 Mbeki distanced himself from 
the views of the so-called dissidents. It can be claimed that this decision was because of pressure 
and sustained criticism by the transnational-domestic mobilisation led by the TAC. By 
continuing to shame and criticise Mbeki’s response to the epidemic, the TAC was able to 
embarrass the government on the international stage. While at the same time gaining ground on 
opposing the South African government’s response policies.  
This chapter also examine the incidences of speech-act which were tested against the three 
facilitating conditions are necessary for a speech-act to be considered successful for the process 
of securitisation. Mbeki failed to comply with all three of the facilitating conditions required. He 
remained hesitant to fully accept and follow the recognised grammar of security regarding the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic. By virtue of his position as President of South Africa, as a securitising 
actor he was in a position of authority to pronounce on the security concerns however, he was 
not willing to fully raise the level of threat facing the population. Therefore, his attempts at 
speech-acts can be considered unsuccessful. 
On the other hand, the TAC complied with two of the three facilitating conditions required for a 
successful speech-act in the process of securitisation. TAC accepted and followed the recognised 
grammar of security. However, by virtue of it being a non-state organisation it was not in a 
position of authority to pronounce on the security. Although importantly, TAC was able to 
successfully raise the level of threat facing the population. Therefore, TAC’s attempts at speech-
acts can be considered more successful. 
8.2.3 Swaziland – partially successful securitisation 
Swaziland remains the last absolute monarchy on the continent, with King Mswati III firmly in 
control of the policy decision-making process. In Swaziland the HIV and AIDS epidemic led to 
an increase in state-society tensions. Swaziland’s HIV and AIDS epidemic is fuelled by several 
factors including poverty, gender inequalities and cultural practices such as polygamy which is 
still practised widely in Swaziland. Swaziland’s initial response policy to the rising HIV 
prevalence rate was relatively quick. However, this initial response policy was hindered as a 
result of existing cultural norms in the country; polygamy, gender inequality and the accepted 
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sexual practices of young men all proved to impede the implementation of the national response 
policy on the HIV and AIDS epidemic.    
Several factors in Swaziland’s political environment impacted on the policy decision-making 
process, namely the prevailing political and social gender bias, Mswati’s promotion of traditional 
customs and culture, and the high levels of neopatrimonialism. These factors influenced and 
hindered the policy decision-making process in Swaziland.  
It is argued that Mswati held contradictory ideals towards the HIV and AIDS epidemic. This was 
best demonstrated at the 2001 UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, when 
he agreed with and accepted the recommendations made by the international securitising actors 
that more focused policies were needed to address the epidemic. However, when the necessary 
policy response appeared to challenge his cultural practices, Mswati was quick to defend his 
kingdom’s cultural practices against any perceived challengers.  
In Swaziland there is limited space for both the domestic and international securitising actors to 
exert any influence on key policy decision-makers. This stems from the fact that Mswati in his 
capacity as absolute ruler ensures that he controls and manages the political space available to 
prevent potential opposition parties’ access to it. However as discussed in chapter 7, while 
traditionally civil society in Swaziland was relatively weak, two important occurrences took 
place to challenge this status quo. Firstly, civil society actors realised that they could access more 
political space if they focused solely on humanitarian and HIV and AIDS issues and not issues 
targeting the government or Mswati directly. By freeing up more political space this meant that 
more civil society actors were able to become part of and exert a degree of influence over the 
policymaking processes in Swaziland on HIV and AIDS issues. Secondly, NERCHA permitted 
civil society organisations to source their own funding for their programmes. This situation 
opened up a conduit through the domestic non-state actors’ access for international non-state 
actors to exert influence and access the policy decision-making structure in Swaziland. This also 
allowed the international securitising actors to persuade and spread their securitisation ideals 
through this process that had previously been closed or rather difficult to access. 
After the realisation was made regarding the opening of political space available to non-state 
actors, this led to gaining key access points the into the HIV and AIDS policy-making structure. 
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This newfound access point to the policy decision-making process led to the government 
establishing a single coordinating HIV and AIDS coordination body, NERCHA. This in turn led 
to the formulation of new more effective collaborative policies to be included in the national 
response policy. NERCHA was instrumental in ensuring that international donors conformed to 
and complied with the objectives set out in the NSP. This was important, as it strengthened 
relations between state and non-state actors as well as ensuring an end to the duplication of HIV 
and AIDS programmes.    
Domestic NGOs were relatively weak coupled with a lack of adequate capacity and skilled staff. 
However, actors such as SWANEPWA were able to persuade the government to increase its 
participation and include non-state actors in the national response policy. This was achieved 
through decentralisation and empowering grassroots-level civil society efforts, which widened 
the scope of PLWHAs who could to be supported. This policy change was important in the 
country’s national response policy as it empowered communities and provided them with more 
access into the policy-making structures.  
The role of international actors such as the US government’s PEPFAR programme proved to be 
problematic at times. This was due to the stringent conditions attached to their programmes, 
which defined only certain sectors of society that the programmes would fund and support. The 
US-sponsored “abstinence and faithfulness” (AB) plan proved problematic since it clashed with 
the cultural norms of polygamy. The government also showed resistance towards the US 
recommendations concerning HIV prevention. In the case of Swaziland, as was the case in South 
Africa, the “AB” strategy was supplanted by a more pragmatic view of UNAIDS and its 
partners. At the time of the formulation of the nation response policy, the gender and cultural 
imbalances in Swaziland created significant barriers to abstinence of women and girls.   
Although the relationship between the government and the international agencies was tense, 
there were important collaborative initiatives such as the establishment of the UN Theme Group. 
This body was influential in providing support to the government in the development of several 
national frameworks and policies for the improved management of the national response policy 
on HIV and AIDS, advocacy activities, training and capacity-building initiatives, research, and 
the increasing availability and accessibility of HIV and AIDS services (UNDP Swaziland 
Country Profile, 2009). This establishment of this structure created an additional access point for 
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the international actors to the country’s policy-making structures and achieved some successful 
policy decision-making change in the country.  
It was also found that, of the three case studies, Swaziland was most in need of donor aid. 
However, it appears that certain donors remain reluctant to fund activities in the country. This 
reluctance may be attributed to neopatrimonialism and Mswati’s personal spending habits. 
According to an interviewee, “Swaziland does not get a lot of support from donors because of a 
non-HIV and AIDS political environment” (telephone interview, UNDP – RSC Johannesburg, 
RSA, 8/5/08). Neopatrimonialism negatively affects policy decision-making, especially 
development projects, and is responsible for the misuse of donor aid and state budgets. Because 
of Swaziland’s neopatrimonial system, this impacts both on existing and potential donors as it is 
fair to assume that the donors will not want to fund or be perceived as funding the extravagant 
lifestyle of Mswati at the expense of the Swazi population. 
In response to the reluctance of donors, CANGO and NERCHA have been instrumental in 
finding means to overcome this obstacle. A key reframed policy decision made was to encourage 
civil society to source funding for their own projects, thereby appealing to donors on their own 
and not in partnership with government. This policy has proved beneficial to domestic actors in 
sourcing funding for their activities. 
When examining the incidences of securitisation speech-acts, Mswati complied with all three of 
the speech-act facilitating conditions required for the process of securitisation. He accepted and 
followed the recognised grammar of security. However, he took exception if that grammar was 
perceived to attack his country’s cultural identity. By virtue of his position as King of Swaziland, 
as a securitising actor he was in a position of authority to pronounce on the security concerns and 
was able to raise the level of threat facing the population. Therefore, his attempts at speech-acts 
were partially successful. 
On the other hand, both NERCHA and SWANEPWA complied with some of these facilitating 
conditions. Both securitising actors accepted and followed the recognised grammar of security. 
But, neither was in a position of authority to pronounce on the security concerns. However, they 
were in a position to help raise the awareness level of the threat facing the population. Therefore, 
their attempts at speech-acts according to the speech-act tool can be considered more successful. 
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8.3 Results and the implications for the theory  
A general empirical finding of this thesis which has strong theoretical implications is that similar 
international pressures for the socialisation of international ideals can lead to very dissimilar 
results in terms of domestic policy outcomes. Therefore, differences found in the domestic 
social, political and cultural structures of all three case studies were proved to be essential 
elements in understanding their responses to the securitisation of HIV and AIDS. For purposes of 
this study and in line with Buzan et al.’s (1998) definition of securitising actor, the term security 
actor was used broadly to encompass anyone or organisation that shows agency because this 
made it easier to compare and contrast their roles in the policy making process. This was done in 
conjunction with the speech-act tool to verify the success of their speech-act attempts. The use of 
this speech-act tool placed the analyst in a better position to assess the degree to which they were 
successful as securitising actors. This study has highlighted several important implications for 
both public policy and securitisation theory. Pluralism has been useful to the study as it 
highlights the fractured nature of political power as was observed in the case study countries. 
From the examples of the case studies it was demonstrated that the decision-making was top-
down in each of the countries. However, in all three cases there were varying degrees of political 
space for HIV and AIDS policy-influencing actors. These policy-influencing actors used this 
space to either conceptualise policy problems related to the epidemic; to seek alternative 
approaches, and to influence the public agenda.  
Fourie (2005:246) asserts that the position of non-state actors should not “be overemphasised in 
terms of their power to implement essentially good AIDS policies”. As shown in chapters 5, 6 
and 7, the state still remained the most important policy agent in each of the countries under 
review, even though transnational actors have been influential. Their influence can be illustrated 
through the lens of elite theory and statism, which show how other key sectors of the AIDS 
community were fairly successful in ensuring that the agenda-setting capacity was widened to 
beyond that of only the governments.  
The case studies revealed that depending on the differences found in the domestic structures of 
states, international approach can be fundamentally accepted in the case of Botswana, rejected in 
the case of South Africa, or partially accepted in the case of Swaziland. While it can be argued 
that the proposed securitisation of HIV and AIDS may not be a good international approach 
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because of the fact that it is an extreme measure found outside the realm of normal politics, 
however, its proponents find it a necessary approach because of the magnitude of the challenges 
posed by the epidemic. 
Drawing from the findings in the case studies, it was revealed that the differences in the domestic 
structures of each state determined the level to which international approaches were accepted or 
not. The study also found that the transnational actors chose to align themselves with domestic 
actors that shared similar priorities regarding the HIV and AIDS epidemic. In the case of South 
Africa, in the face of ever growing civil society and transnational mobilisation, some members of 
the political leadership, found at the provincial level of decision-making, realised a need to 
question the prevailing HIV and AIDS policies formulated and implemented by the national 
government. This realisation was not felt at national government level which led to the continued 
fiercely resist HIV and AIDS social mobilisation.  As a result in South Africa, the TAC adopted 
a dual strategy to organise mass protests in the country, while at the same time the organisation 
also raised international awareness about the situation in the country. The TAC’s next move was 
to resort to the judicial system, using a human rights law suit to achieve their goals. Only then 
did the government move towards the implementation of a nationwide HIV and AIDS treatment 
plan. What the South African case study revealed was that instead of engaging in direct 
argumentative practices with opposing ANC leaders, rather, the domestic HIV and AIDS 
organisations sought alternative forms of social pressure that moved beyond the limits of the 
domestic arena of decision-making.  
In Botswana and Swaziland, on the other hand, there was no strong social movement to exert 
such pressure on the state. In their case, the ruling elites would engage directly with the 
securitisation speech-acts of the US, UNAIDs and other transnational HIV and AIDS actors with 
distinct differences in the outcomes of socialisation.  
In the case of Swaziland, the lack of a strong domestic civil society sector in an absolute 
monarchy meant that the domestic and transnational actors had to develop a strategy to find a 
space for them to operate within the political environment. This was accomplished by ensuring 
that their policies dealt specifically with humanitarian concerns covering HIV and AIDS issues 
and did not appear critical of the King. Once this political space was occupied, it presented 
transnational actors and domestic non-state actors with more access to promote their 
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securitisation approaches to the relevant policy decision-makers in the country. Also, being given 
the opportunity to source their own funding by NERCHA also gave them more autonomy to run 
their programmes. However, this option provided the donors with the ability to influence the 
domestic HIV and AIDS organisations to align themselves with their ideals. 
In Botswana the civil society sector was heavily dependent on the government for financial 
support as well as policy guidance. Botswana has a highly centralised decision-making system. 
This led to a situation in Botswana where domestic HIV and AIDS organisations tended to be 
more reactive than proactive in their approach towards influencing the national response policy. 
Consequently, the government had a fairly autonomous capacity allowing them to negotiate the 
entry of transnational actors and their securitising approaches towards the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic. 
Owing to its economic and political strength, the US government became a strong factor in each 
of the case studies and their acceptance to this government’s ideas. As a result, it was seen that 
the huge economic incentives of PEPFAR indeed did influence policy decision-making in 
Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. However, this was not the decisive factor in any of the 
countries accepting the US government’s HIV and AIDS policies. For instance, Botswana, who 
it appeared needed the PEPFAR money least, was interestingly the country that adhered most 
with the policy influences of the US government. South Africa, also a PEPFAR recipient chose 
to denounce the perceived interference of the US government’s economic interest in Africa and 
actively resisted any interference. Swaziland, which was found to need the funding the most, 
provided political space for the issues related to HIV and AIDS as long as this did not interfere 
with Mswati’s rule. In addition, the high levels of neopatrimonialism and Mswati’s lifestyle 
choices have resulted in some donors shying away from funding the national response policy in 
Swaziland.  
An interesting finding in the case studies is the roles of the domestic non-state policy-influencing 
actors. In South Africa the TAC uses the legislative route in order to influence policy, whereas in 
Botswana and Swaziland, the non-state domestic actors have less of an influence over the policy 
decision-making. In contrast, the UN as an international actor has influenced policy in all three 
countries, from setting the precedent on public policymaking related to HIV and AIDS with the 
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establishment of UNAIDS to elevating the issue onto the security agenda through the UN 
Security Council meeting in 2000. 
The unfolding of the policy processes and dynamics related to the HIV and AIDS epidemic in 
the countries under review has added to the on-going securitisation debate in international 
relations. As was discussed in chapter 2, the Copenhagen School led by Buzan and Weaver have 
attempted to provide a theoretical foundation which sets out the processes necessary for an issue 
to become securitised. A shortcoming in their efforts has been in not actually demonstrating 
when or how a speech-act moves a particular issue from the realm of normal politics to that of an 
existential threat. Vieira (2006:282) claims that this is because the authors “concentrated mostly 
on meta-theoretical assumptions about the inter-subjective security articulations between 
securitising actors and their audiences”. They did not focus on the actual empirical circumstances 
which strengthen the claim for the success of a securitisation attempt. This study has therefore 
helped to expand the capacity of the securitisation theory to empirically understand the way in 
which states and audiences absorb and respond to the securitisation claims of the securitising 
actors. This was done by examining the tool to help study incidences of speech-act in each of the 
case study countries. For a speech-act to be successful three facilitating conditions are required 
in the process of securitisation: 
• It must follow the recognised grammar of security; 
• It must come from an actor in position of authority to pronounce on security (the 
state);  
• That it helps if the object can be generally said to be threatening. 
This tool was useful as it made it possible to for the incidences of speech-acts in each of the case 
study countries to be tested against it. It therefore, helped in the final assessment of whether the 
domestic securitisation approach was successful, unsuccessful or partially successful.  
Chapter 2 used the analogy of a pendulum to best describe how issues are moved from the realm 
of politicisation (normal politics) to that of securitisation (emergency) and back. The inadequate 
understanding of the actual mechanisms whereby securitisation attempts are internalised by 
domestic actors and their response to such attempts remains a constraint on securitisation 
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analysis. The different securitisation approaches examined in each of these case studies have 
therefore widened the scope of the securitisation research agenda by expanding the focus of the 
study to also include the audiences of securitisation.  
Also, the study addressed McInnes’ (2010:14) claim regarding the limitations of available 
empirical research related to the securitisation processes in different countries. McInnes 
(2010:14) argues that “there has been little work which has demonstrated a comparable impact 
on the policies adopted by other countries, nor do the security policy institutions in other 
countries appear to have seized on the issue to the same extent”. This thesis has expanded and 
contributed to address this limitation in the literature by demonstrating the securitisation 
processes, policies adopted and influence of security policy institutions in each of the three states 
in Southern Africa: Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa. 
The findings on Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland showed they can be considered as 
displaying successful securitisation, unsuccessful securitisation and partially successful 
securitisation respectively. This leads to the important finding that instead of an issue being 
securitised or not, an issue may be partly securitised, with different actors and audiences 
positioned at varying points along a spectrum of securitisation. The empirical findings in each of 
the political arenas for the countries under review contributed to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the securitisation process, allowing the role of the audiences of securitisation 
and their social context to be increased. This study has also made a contribution to the existing 
knowledge, because of the author’s ‘real world’ study of securitisation. Since the study of 
securitisation tends to be highly theoretical, this study adds a unique empirical dimension to the 
existing literature. This is done by demonstrating the degree to which the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic was securitised at the national level of all three case study countries.  
The study highlighted that the results of a securitising move are not homogenous. It also revealed 
that some actors have more willingly accepted HIV and AIDS as a security issue than others. 
McInnes (2010:17) argues that this variation may be a reflection of the disease itself, “that its 
effects are not homogenous but diverse depending on context; but it also suggests that different 
actors (often at the level of ministries or even individuals) were more easily persuaded than 
others.” 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 225 
 
The study helped to identify the domestic conditions which proved to either facilitate or impede 
the successful pendulum swing of HIV and AIDS from the area of politicisation to that of 
securitisation. It was possible to identify four main factors that played a role in this movement: 
i) The type of prevailing state-society relations; 
ii) The nature of state institutions and the system of the policy decision-making 
process; 
iii) The long-term values and principles which define the political culture of each 
country; and 
iv) The personal characteristics of key leaders in government. 
Table 8.1 below synthesises the key findings of the study.  
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Table 8.1: Analytical Factors and Case Studies Findings 
 State-Society 
Relations 
State 
Institutions 
and Policy 
Decision-
making 
Process 
Relationship 
between 
Transnational 
HIV and 
AIDS Actors 
and the Pre-
existing 
political and 
Social 
Cultures  
Political 
Leadership 
towards HIV 
and AIDS 
after the 
Securitisation 
Move 
Outcome 
Botswana Collaborative 
with weak 
civil society 
Strong and 
centralised 
Close Assertive Successful 
Securitisation 
South 
Africa 
Contentious 
with strong 
civil society 
Strong and 
centralised  
Distant  Erratic  Unsuccessful 
Securitisation 
Swaziland Collaborative 
on 
Humanitarian 
Issues with 
weak civil 
society  
Strong and 
centralised at 
first leading 
to more 
decentralised 
approach 
Initially 
Confrontational  
Confident Partial 
successful 
Securitisation  
 
8.4 Issues for Further Research 
The study has demonstrated that HIV and AIDS represent an area of contention in the specific 
case studies. This was because of the failure to move policy from the formulation stage to full 
implementation. The reasons behind the policy failures may require further research as it was not 
the aim of this thesis to evaluate the policies themselves. It was found that in the case of 
Swaziland a more decentralised approach to policy implementation has yielded better results. 
Therefore, additional research could be carried out on finding ways for both state and non-state 
actors to cooperate better for more efficient policy implementation. Also when formulating 
policies and programmes, it is important to remember that each country presented displayed 
different cultural and social characteristics, which in turn require HIV and AIDS programmes 
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and policies to be formulated in a more country-specific way since cultural practices are different 
in each of the case studies.  
In the Southern African context HIV and AIDS remains a taboo subject in most cultures because 
of the social patterns and norms associated with sexual and political interaction. This has led to 
policies being formulated that are too socially and culturally generic which then fail to resonate 
with the intended audience. Further research may be carried out on this issue to ensure that any 
future policy decision-making processes speak more to the social and cultural aspect of the 
society concerned.  
Regarding the securitisation approach, future in-depth research on real world securitisations as in 
the case studies presented would be useful. The study has been useful as it may help close the 
gap between scholarly knowledge in this field and that of government’s policymaking processes 
because of the agency aspect brought by the researcher. It is hoped that the study will prove 
helpful in laying the foundation for future research on securitising other global non-traditional 
security threats such as climate change, water insecurity, energy insecurity and food insecurity. 
Thus the study may provide future researchers and policy-makers with some leverage to 
formulate and implement more progressive policies when necessary.  
As the three countries are all in the SADC region and are equally affected by the epidemic, it is 
assumed that a regional securitisation response would be more beneficial.  However, the study 
found that SADC as the regional body was not an important factor in the securitisation process in 
member countries. This was mainly because SADC identified the HIV and AIDS epidemic 
primarily as a health issue. It has not moved the issue from normalcy to securitisation. It was 
found that within the SADC region individual member states have moved towards some stage of 
securitisation, but not collectively. Therefore future research could be carried out on analysing 
the possible impediments facing the regional organisation seeking to securitise not only HIV and 
AIDS but other socio-economic issues too. 
8.5  Conclusion  
Each case study presented unique and similar factors that influenced the policymaking process. 
This process in turn revealed that the policymaking dynamics led to different degrees of 
securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland.  
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Appendix 1 
Interview Schedule – Guiding Questions 
 
a) What do you perceive is the pre-dominant approach to HIV and AIDS in the countries 
(Botswana, Swaziland and South Africa)? Do you think HIV and AIDS also has a 
security aspect and if so what is it? 
 
b) Has the epidemic been fully securitised and to what degree? 
 
c) Does a sufficient political space exist for non-state actors to contribute to curbing the 
epidemic? What is the role of non-state actors in attempts to address the epidemic? (What 
is the role both implicit and explicit?) 
 
d) Are there conflicting approaches between domestic and regional approaches with regards 
to policy concerns? 
 
e) Is SADC as the regional body able to deal with the epidemic? If not, why not? 
 
f) To what extent have HIV and AIDS securitisation attempts been more successful in one 
domestic setting than in another? Do you think there have been successful attempts to 
address HIV and AIDS as a security issue? 
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Appendix 2 
  
Interview Schedule – Interview List 
Name and title Organisation Date and  
Type of interview 
Exploratory interviews 
Dr. Antonica Hembe - 
HIV and AIDS Unit 
Manager 
Social and Human Development 
Directorate -  Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) 
2008/05/07 
Email 
Dr. Alphonse Mulumba - 
HIV and AIDS Senior 
Officer for Research 
Social and Human Development 
Directorate -  Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) 
2008/05/09 
Email and telephone 
Dr. Evaristo Marowa –
Country Coordinator 
Botswana 
UNAIDS 3/3/08 
Email  
Mr. Mark Sterling - 
Regional Director for 
Southern Africa 
UNAIDS 15/04/ 08 
Email 
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Dr. Shivaji Bhattacharya 
-Senior Policy Advisor 
Africa Regional HIV and 
AIDS Team, RSC 
UNDP 7/5/ 08 
Email 
Professor Nana K. Poku  University of Bradford 23/4/06, 8/5/06 and 
12/5/06   
Email 
Dr. Martin R. Rupiya - 
Senior Researcher 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 19/04/07  
Email 
Professor Pieter Fourie University of Johannesburg 25/04/08  
Ms. Angela Ndinga-
Muvumba  
Senior Researcher 
Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) 23/04/08 
Professor Lindy 
Heinecken 
University of Stellenbosch  24/04/08 
Mr. Johan Maritz –  
Senior Manager 
Centre for AIDS Study, University of 
Pretoria 
26/04/08 
Professor Alan Whiteside 
– Executive Director 
The Health Economics and HIV/AIDS 
Research Division (HEARD) AIDS Expert, 
University of Durban 
09/05/08 
Telephone 
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Key Informant Interviews 
Botswana 
Ms. Kirsten Weeks - 
Senior Programme 
Manager 
Academy for Educational Development 
(AED) Centre on AIDS and Community 
Health 
05/03/08 
Ms. Mpho Mmelesi - 
Chief Research Officer 
National AIDS Coordinating Agency 
(NACA) 
07/03/08 
Mr. David Ngele - 
Executive Director 
Botswana Network of People Living with 
AIDS (BONEPWA) 
06/03/08 
Dr. S.M. Kang’ethe - 
Project Development 
Worker 
Botswana Network of People Living with 
AIDS (BONEPWA) 
6/03/08 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Ms. Lebo Lebese - Senior 
Health Officer 
Social and Human Development 
Directorate - Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) 
05/03/08 
Col. Gerson Sangiza - 
Head of Defence Affairs 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation - Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) 
07/03/08 
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Dr Mokete Pherudi - 
Acting Head  
Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) – 
Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) 
07/03/08 
South Africa 
Mrs Nomajoni Ntombela   
Senior Advisor  Maternal 
& Child Health and 
Nutrition 
Academy for Educational Development 
(AED) 
27/02/08 email  
23/04/08  
Dr Lemma Merid Senior 
Policy Advisor  
UNDP 09/05/08 
Telephone 
Mr. Thabo Rakoloti 
Director Department of 
Health 
Department of Health, South Africa 9/10/07 
Email 
Mr. Jacob Ntseke - 
Deputy Director 
International Health 
Liaison Officer 
Department of Health, South Africa   10/10/07 
Email 
Mr. Moses Kau - Head of 
International Health 
Liaison Officer 
 Department of Health, South Africa   
 
10/10/07 
Email 
Mr. Moeketsi Department of Health, South Africa   10/10/07 
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Modisenyane - Director 
Africa Relations 
 Email 
Swaziland 
Ms. Thembisile Dlamini - 
Social Mobilisation and 
Partnership Advisor 
UNAIDS 14/02/08 
Dr. Von Wessels - 
Director 
National Emergency Response Council on 
HIV and AIDS (NERCHA) 
11/04/08 
Ms. Faith Dlamini - 
Health Sector 
Coordinator - HIV 
Prevention 
National Emergency Response Council on 
HIV and AIDS (NERCHA) 
11/04/08 
Mr. Richard Walwema - 
Director  
National Referral Laboratory at the 
Mbabane Government Hospital, Ministry of 
Health 
10/04/08 
Ms. Catarina Andrade 
Policy Advisor 
William J. Clinton Foundation (formerly 
with the Ministry of Health and The 
National Emergency Response Council on 
HIV and AIDS (NERCHA)) 
11/04/08 
Mr. Gavin Khumalo - 
Regional Coordinator 
Shiselweni Region 
Swaziland National Network of People 
Living With HIV and AIDS 
(SWANNEPHA) 
11/04/08 
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Ms. Kate McNally 
Regional Programme 
Manager 
Pact - Southern Africa HIV and AIDS 
Prevention Programme 
10/04/08 
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